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Abstract 
This study gives an overview of the economic and social development of Croatia, covering its 
economy, labour market, education, demographic trends, income distribution and poverty. It 
discusses in detail the country’s social protection system, its governance structure and civil 
society development, as well as specific issues concerning war veterans, war victims and areas 
of special state concern.  
In demographic terms, Croatia is a small country with a declining population. During the 1990s, 
Croatia had a highly centralised government structure, which has slowly been changing 
alongside a deepening of the democratisation process and civil society development. 
Economically, although recent years have shown encouraging trends in GDP growth and 
employment, Croatia still lags behind the new member states of the EU. Still, despite significant 
rises in income inequality and poverty in the post-communist period, the level of income 
inequality is identical to the EU level and the poverty rate is only somewhat higher. Croatia 
spends about a quarter of its GDP on social protection, mainly on pensions and healthcare. In 
addition, following Croatia’s war of independence (1991–95), the country must look after war 
veterans, war victims and internally displaced persons, as well as areas that had been seriously 
affected by the war. 
                                                 
∗ Predrag Bejaković is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of Public Finance, Zagreb (predrag@ijf.hr), 
Zoran Šućur is an Associate Professor of Social Policy at the Department of Social Work, Faculty of Law, 
University of Zagreb (zsucur@yahoo.com) and Siniša Zrinščak is a Professor of Social Policy at the 
Department of Social Work, Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb (sinisa.zrinscak@zg.htnet.hr). Contents 
Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................i 
1. Introduction.............................................................................................................................1 
2.  General economic trends ........................................................................................................3 
2.1 Macroeconomic developments......................................................................................... 3 
2.1.1 Real sector and external trade................................................................................. 3 
2.1.2 Consumer prices and inflation................................................................................ 5 
2.1.3 General fiscal trends............................................................................................... 5 
2.1.4 Regional economic characteristics......................................................................... 6 
2.2 Labour market trends and main issues............................................................................. 6 
2.2.1 Main trends (employment, unemployment and economic activity)....................... 6 
2.2.2 Structure of employment and wages ...................................................................... 8 
2.2.3 Structure of unemployment.................................................................................. 10 
2.2.4 Regional and ethnic variations............................................................................. 11 
2.2.5 Employment institutions and policy..................................................................... 12 
2.3 Structural reforms – Level, current pace and plans........................................................ 14 
2.3.1 Identification of main structural problems/challenges ......................................... 14 
2.3.2 Ownership structure and privatisation.................................................................. 15 
2.3.3 Institutional and legal reforms (regulatory framework, corruption and 
governance).......................................................................................................... 16 
2.3.4 Education.............................................................................................................. 17 
3. Demography .........................................................................................................................18 
3.1 Population trends and structure...................................................................................... 18 
3.2 Migration........................................................................................................................ 21 
4.  Living conditions: Key developments and dynamics...........................................................21 
4.1 Income distribution ........................................................................................................ 21 
4.1.1 Income inequality................................................................................................. 21 
4.1.2 Poverty ................................................................................................................. 23 
4.2 Access to goods and services......................................................................................... 27 
4.3 Work/life balance........................................................................................................... 29 
4.4 Housing and local environment...................................................................................... 29 
5.  Tax/benefit systems and policy approaches..........................................................................31 
5.1 Institutional system of social protection......................................................................... 31 
5.1.1 Pension system..................................................................................................... 31 
5.1.2 Healthcare system................................................................................................. 32 
5.1.3 Unemployment protection.................................................................................... 33 
5.1.4 Protection for families and children..................................................................... 33 
5.1.5 Social welfare....................................................................................................... 34 
5.2 Recent and planned institutional reforms in social protection ....................................... 35 
5.2.1 Pension reform ..................................................................................................... 35 
5.2.2 Reform of the healthcare system.......................................................................... 36 
5.2.3 Reforms in other social protection schemes......................................................... 37 5.3 Public social expenditure ............................................................................................... 39 
5.4 Social protection provisions........................................................................................... 41 
5.5 Taxation.......................................................................................................................... 45 
5.6 Gender equality and anti-discrimination........................................................................ 47 
6. Governance  structures ..........................................................................................................48 
6.1 Governance efficiency in general and in the social protection system in particular...... 48 
6.1.1 Structure of the government................................................................................. 48 
6.1.2 Governance efficiency indicators......................................................................... 49 
6.1.3 Performance of the social protection system and poverty reduction.................... 51 
6.2 The character and capacity of the social partners and social dialogue........................... 53 
6.3 Civil society organisations............................................................................................. 54 
7. Specific  issues.......................................................................................................................55 
7.1 Social protection system for Croatian war veterans and their family members............. 55 
7.2 Displaced persons and areas of special state concern .................................................... 57 
Glossary of Abbreviations...........................................................................................................59 
References...................................................................................................................................60 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.  Country map of Croatia.............................................................................................2 
Figure 2.  Annual GDP growth rate...........................................................................................3 
Figure 3.  Income composition by deciles (2002)....................................................................22 
Figure 4.  Relative poverty risk by subgroup (2004)...............................................................25 
Figure 5.  Fraction of households without access to facilities or durable goods in 2004 (%)..27 
Figure 6.  Social expenditures (as a % of GDP) ......................................................................39 
Figure 7.  Pension beneficiaries...............................................................................................42 
Figure 8.  The average pension benefit (as a % of the average net wage)...............................43 
Figure 9.  Unemployment benefits – Beneficiaries and replacement rates..............................44 
Figure 10.  Revenues of the consolidated central government ..................................................46 
Figure 11.  Governance indicators.............................................................................................49 
Figure 12.  Average pension benefits for war veterans (as a % of the average net wage).........56 
List of Tables 
Table 1.  Estimated share of the shadow economy in GDP (%)...............................................4 
Table 2.  Structure of the labour force based on the level of educational qualifications (%)...9 
Table 3.  Ranking of countries by economic and labour market indicators............................11 
Table 4.  Employer notice periods..........................................................................................13 
Table 5.  Basic demographic information...............................................................................18 | i 
Executive Summary 
Trends in the economy, labour market and education 
1)  Croatia experienced a substantial drop in its GDP at the beginning of the 1990s and only 
regained its pre-transition level in 2003. In 2005, the GDP per capita was €6,972 or 46.7% 
of the EU-25 average when measured in purchasing power standards. Since the 2001 
crisis, the banking system has stabilised and the tax system generally complies with EU 
standards. Unfortunately, in light of EU accession, these positive aspects have been 
outweighed by shortcomings: the low share of the private sector in the economy 
(representing 60% of employment and 75% of GDP) and the high levels of the budget 
deficit and public debt. Furthermore, there is a relatively strong degree of dependence on 
state subsidies, which are much higher than are those in the EU.  
2)  Employment dynamics during the transition exhibited a pronounced decline followed by a 
partial recovery. There is a high share of the long-term unemployed and there are few 
employment possibilities for job seekers with a lower level of education. Most of the 
working-age individuals who are not employed have either little education (primary 
school) or limited skills (vocational school graduates). At the same time, a rapid upgrade 
is also needed in the professional skill levels of those who are employed (especially in 
public administration). Thus, it is important to enhance the knowledge and skills of the 
entire labour force (employed and unemployed) to improve labour force competitiveness 
and employability in general. 
3)  The creation of an adequate entrepreneurial and investment climate is crucial. The 
foundation for such a climate requires improved governance, incentives for economic 
openness towards foreign direct investment and foreign trade, and the establishment of an 
adequate organisational infrastructure that enables investment.  
4)  Croatian society is in general poorly educated, although the educational level of the 
younger generation is much better compared with society as a whole. Approximately 16% 
of the population falls into the group of those aged 25-39 with completed post-secondary 
education. The main challenges for the educational system are not only to increase the 
educational level of the population, but also to bring the educational system closer to the 
needs of the labour market and to stimulate lifelong learning. It is of great importance that 
the government continues with the educational reforms underway, and gives more 
attention to those who have dropped out of the school system with respect to enhancing 
their skills and employment prospects. 
Demographic trends 
5)  Croatia is a relatively small country with 4.4 million inhabitants (2003). Unfavourable 
population ageing trends are high on the public agenda. These trends are clear in the 
negative natural increase of the population, the high old-age dependency ratio and low 
fertility rates. The average family size was 3.1 in 2001 and 58% of couples had children, 
while 15% of families entailed single parents. Adverse trends are particularly evident in 
certain areas of Croatia, which makes any projections about the future development of 
these areas rather unrealistic. Although consecutive governments have embarked on 
various demographic programmes, these trends have remained unchanged.  
6)  The migration balance has been positive in the last 10 years, although its overall level has 
recently declined. So far, the migration pattern has been mainly connected with the 
political processes of former Yugoslavia, as a majority of immigrants have been Croats 
coming from the former Yugoslavian republics. ii | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
7)  Population projections suggest that the decline of the population will continue even if 
expectations about the positive trends in migration are taken into consideration. It is also 
hard to expect any significantly higher fertility rates in the future. Obviously, any future 
demographic programmes should be closely linked with the reform of the labour market, 
as well as with the expansion of public services for children and the elderly. In this 
regard, there is a need to better define the country’s immigration policy. 
Income distribution and poverty 
8)  The Gini coefficient in Croatia is identical to that in the EU-25 (0.29) (remaining 
unchanged since 2002). Wages contributed the most to income inequalities. In relation to 
the population as a whole, the poor earn their income in the labour market to a much 
lesser extent. In the last 15 years, the shares of pensions and other social transfers in their 
total income has steadily increased. Pensions are the most important source of income for 
the poorest 10%. 
9)  Using an international poverty standard of $4.3 per day per person (at purchasing power 
parity), the incidence of absolute poverty is low (less than 5%). According to this 
measurement, Croatia has a much lower poverty rate than many transitional countries. 
Relative poverty rates are higher. Using the EU’s official poverty line, the poverty rate in 
2005 was 17.5% (2.5 percentage points higher than that in the EU-25). Poverty in Croatia 
has been stagnating or slightly decreasing. It is predominantly a rural problem (rural 
poverty rates are three times those of urban areas). The poverty profile is dominated by 
the elderly and persons with low levels of education. Other groups with a relative poverty 
risk above average are the unemployed, single-parent families and families with three or 
more children, persons with disabilities, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the 
Roma. The poor not only have a lower income, they are also more deprived in terms of 
access to goods and services in comparison with the general population. 
10)  Social expenditures are not well targeted. It seems that schemes with the highest shares of 
social protection expenditures have contributed disproportionately little to alleviating 
poverty and reducing inequality. Those transfers that are best targeted on the poor are 
social welfare and unemployment benefits. It is also necessary to expand the coverage of 
the pension system. In the long run, a solution could be the introduction of a state pension 
for all older persons based on a means test. In addition, poverty is unlikely to be alleviated 
without wider prospects in the labour market and investment in the education and human 
capital of the poor. 
Social protection system 
11)  The system of social protection is extensive. A considerable share of the population 
depends on social transfers. Total public social spending is slightly above 23% of GDP 
and when combined with expenditures for war veterans and IDPs it totals around 26% of 
GDP. Since 2001, however, there has been a downward trend in social spending. This 
trend stems from falling pension expenditures and faster economic growth. Central 
government expenditures make up more than 99% of total social protection spending. 
Pension and healthcare schemes absorb more than 80% of the total expenditures. Capital 
accumulation in the partially privatised pension system amounts to about 5% of GDP, but 
pensions from these funds have not yet been paid. Private expenditures in the healthcare 
system were between 1% and 1.3% of GDP in the period 1998–2004.  
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12)  About 4% of total social protection expenditures are devoted to administration and other 
costs (including staff salaries). The Croatian transfer system is as effective as the average 
EU-25 transfer system at reducing the poverty rate. Other social transfers (if old age and 
survivors’ pensions are excluded) are actually more effective than are those in the EU-25.  
13)  Pension and healthcare schemes are having much difficulty with respect to achieving 
financial sustainability. The ratio between pensioners and the insured is 1:1.4. According 
to estimates, about 14% of the population aged 65 and over do not receive any pension 
benefits (pensions from abroad, and military and war veterans’ pensions are not taken into 
account). The replacement rates for all types of pensions are relatively low. In spite of the 
reforms undertaken, the evasion of contributory payments has remained a significant 
problem. It is crucial to channel atypical work into the contribution system. 
14)  Access to healthcare services is another issue that needs to be addressed. Many people, 
even though they are covered by health insurance, do not have access to healthcare 
services in adequate time. There also is much corruption in the system. Meanwhile, there 
are various points of view regarding healthcare reform (the basket of basic healthcare 
services, the method of financing them and so forth). 
15)  In comparison with other EU countries, a small fraction of the registered unemployed is 
covered by unemployment benefits (between 15% and 24% in the last 10 years). About 
6% of Croatian citizens are social welfare beneficiaries, with half of them receiving 
permanent assistance. About 45% of expenditures on non-contributive schemes were 
means-tested in 2004 and 2005. 
Governance structures and civil society development 
16)  During the 1990s, Croatia had a highly centralised government structure. Owing to 
changes in the legislation after 2001, some state responsibilities (including those for 
education, health and social welfare) were transferred to the level of regional and local 
governments.  
17)  An important aspect of the democratisation of society is connected with social dialogue 
and civil society development. Social dialogue has mainly occurred through the activities 
of the tripartite Economic and Social Council and similar councils at the county level, and 
through the procedure of collective bargaining. These councils are only advisory bodies. 
Civil society organisations frequently articulate the needs of marginalised segments of the 
population and can stimulate public debates and raise awareness. Still, the levels of formal 
membership in voluntary organisations and participation in voluntary work are 
considerably low.  
War veterans, war victims and areas of special state concern  
18)  Unlike EU countries, Croatia has recent memories of war (1991–95), from which new 
groups of vulnerable persons emerged – war veterans and IDPs. Since 2000, expenditures 
on war veterans have been about 1.5% of GDP. Many veterans and war victims still suffer 
from trauma. Many IDPs and returnees are living in so-called ‘areas of special state 
concern’, which were directly affected by the war. These areas are disadvantaged and 
deprived in many respects (with destroyed infrastructure, economic underdevelopment 
and high levels of unemployment, limited social services, depopulation, land that has not 
been cleared of mines, etc.). How to reduce regional disparities and foster economic 
growth in war-affected areas that suffer multiple deprivations remains a major challenge. | 1 
1. Introduction 
Croatia is a relatively small country in south-eastern Europe, surrounded by Slovenia, Hungary, 
Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and (across the sea) Italy. It has 56,542 km
2 of 
land area and 31,067 km
2 of coastal sea. The length of the seacoast is just over 5,835 km, of 
which 69.5% belongs to the islands. Geographically, Croatia is a diverse country, which can be 
divided into at least two contrasting parts: a continental one and a coastal one. Croatia had 4.4 
million inhabitants in 2003, with 780,000 living in the capital, Zagreb. Three other major cities, 
situated in three different areas of Croatia are Rijeka (144,000 inhabitants), Split (189,000 
inhabitants) and Osijek (115,000 inhabitants). Croatia has not yet defined its NUTS2 regions, 
but administratively it is divided into 21 counties, 124 towns and 426 municipalities. Counties 
are equivalent to the NUTS3 level (see the country map in Figure 1). 
Recent Croatian history has been almost completely overshadowed by three political upheavals: 
the fall of communism (the first free elections were held in 1990), the declaration of 
independence from former Yugoslavia (1991) and the war of independence (1991–95), which 
ended with Croatia regaining much of its occupied territories by military force. The war, which 
started as a rebellion of Croatian Serbs subsequently backed by the Yugoslavian army and the 
Milošević regime in Serbia, left serious consequences in human and material losses. Thus, the 
problems of transition coupled with those of the war resulted in the country experiencing a 
slower democratisation process than many other post-Communist countries. Croatia became a 
member of the Council of Europe in 1996, and it was not until 2001 that the country established 
its relations with the EU by signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. It was granted 
EU candidate status in 2004 and the negotiation process with the EU began in October 2005, 
after Croatia had met all the preconditions. 
Population ageing is one of the main challenges in Croatia and among the most debated public 
issues. In 2003, the natural population increase was negative and the fertility rate was 1.33. In 
2001, the median age was 39.3 (41.2 for women and 37.3 for men). The old-age dependency 
ratio was 24.5 in the same year. Regional differences in this respect are considerable, as in some 
counties (such as Karlovac, Lika-Senj, Šibenik-Knin or Sisak-Moslavina) negative demographic 
trends are particularly discernible. In ethnic terms, the majority of inhabitants are Croats 
(89.63%). The largest ethnic minority are Serbs (4.54%). During the war, many Serbs left the 
country and many Croats from other former Yugoslavian republics arrived, so the increase of 
Croats and the decrease of Serbs represent the most important changes in Croatia’s ethnic 
composition in the last 15 years.  
Croatia experienced a huge drop in its GDP at the beginning of the 1990s and only regained its 
pre-transition level in 2003. GDP per capita was €6,972 in 2005, or when measured in 
purchasing power standards (PPS) it was 46.7% of the EU-25 average. Political stabilisation and 
economic reforms have contributed to favourable economic trends. The average growth rate was 
4.7% and the average inflation rate was 2.8% in the period 2001–05. The exchange rate of the 
national currency with the euro has been stable. Yet there are some worrying indicators. Gross 
foreign debt has been on the rise in recent years and amounted to 80.2% of GDP in 2005. Public 
debt amounted to 52.1% of GDP. The Croatian economy is service-oriented. Service accounted 
for 74.6% of the total value added in the economy in 2005, while the share of industry was 
18.9% and that of was agriculture 6.5%. 2 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
Figure 1. Country map of Croatia 
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Positive macroeconomic trends in recent years have not been reflected so far in employment, 
which has remained at a low level. The total participation rate was 49.6% and the total 
employment rate was 43.2% in 2005. The youth unemployment rate is exceptionally high and 
the labour force participation of older persons is relatively low. The unemployment rate has 
been on the decline in recent years, but it is still 12.7%. In some counties, the unemployment 
rate is significantly higher. 
Absolute poverty rates have been relatively low in the past five years (less than 5% in relation to 
an international poverty standard of $4.3 per day per person at purchasing power parity (PPP), 
and 10-11% according to the food energy intake method – see section 4.1). Using the EU’s 
official poverty line (60% of median equivalent income), the poverty rate in 2005 was about 
17.5% (just 2.5 percentage points higher than the average for the EU-25). As regards poverty 
dynamics, poverty has stagnated or decreased slightly. Income inequalities (measured by the 
Gini coefficient) are the same as those in the EU-25 (0.29). Yet, there is a general public 
perception that income and wealth inequalities are too high in Croatia. 
There are major regional disparities between those areas that were affected by the war and those 
that were not. Many war-affected areas are depopulated, economically underdeveloped, lacking 
in or suffering from destroyed infrastructure, have lands not cleared of mines, etc. Such areas 
can be found particularly in eastern Slavonia and the Dalmatian hinterland. Moreover, the return 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees has not yet been completed (forecasted for 
the end of 2006). Significant resources are required for this purpose, especially in terms of 
housing, communal infrastructure and (re)construction. 
2.  General economic trends 
2.1 Macroeconomic  developments 
2.1.1  Real sector and external trade 
In the 1990s, GDP and industrial production levels plummeted, primarily owing to the war. The 
GDP in Croatia cumulatively fell by 36% between 1990 and 1993 and only regained its pre-
transition level in 2003.  
In 2005, GDP per capita was just below €6,972 or 46.7% of the average GDP per capita for the 
EU-25 (PPS), a significant improvement from below 40% in 1996 (data from the Central 
Bureau of Statistics, henceforth CBS, and the Croatian National Bank). 
The state of the economy in the years 2000–05 was characterised by the growth of economic 
activity and at the same time the decrease of the current account deficit, the deceleration of 
external debt growth and price stability. The average annual GDP growth rate was 4.7% in the 
period 2001–05 (Figure 2). The kuna versus euro exchange rate was stable and fluctuated within 
narrow margins during the whole period from the late 1990s until 2005.  
The sectors providing the most important contributions to gross value added (GVA) are the 
following: manufacturing (around 20%); trade, repairs of motor vehicles and household goods 
(around 12%); real estate, leases and business services (around 11%); and transport, storage and 
communications (around 10%) (CBS). While the shares of primary economic sectors 
(agriculture, hunting and forestry, and fishing), as well as secondary ones (manufacturing) in 
GVA have been falling over the last six or seven years, the share of services (real estate, leases 
and business services, hotels and restaurants, trade, repairs of motor vehicles and household 
goods) has been rising. 4 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
Figure 2. Annual GDP growth rate 
Source: CBS. 
In the period 1998–2005, exports of goods and services increased their share in GDP from 39.8 
to 49.4%. Simultaneously, the growth of imports slowed, although the share of imports in GDP 
increased from 49.1 to 56.4%. For the Croatian economy as a whole, the tourist industry
1 
(primarily hotel and restaurant activity, including accommodation, food and beverages and other 
services) is very important. The industry has seen a rise in the number of foreign tourist arrivals 
and tourist night-stays over the last 10 years. In comparison with 1995, in 2005 the number of 
foreign tourist arrivals had increased by five times, while the number of foreign tourist night-
stays had grown by almost six times.  
The shadow economy comprises both unreported and under-reported activity. The Institute of 
Public Finance in Zagreb has researched the shadow economy in Croatia for the 1990–2000 
period. Different methods of estimation provide various results. The shadow economy 
accounted for about 25% of GDP in the first half of the 1990s and around 10% of GDP on 
average during the 1996–2000 period. Thus, the shadow economy declined in the 1990s, but 
still had a value of over €1.53 billion. While unreported activity is larger, under-reporting is 
significant and depends rather more on the size of the tax burden (Madžarević-Šujster, 2002; 
Ott, 2002). According to the estimation of Lovrinčević & Mikulić (2005), the share of the 
shadow economy in the GDP in recent years has ranged from 13.9 to 36.5% (Table 1). 
Table 1. Estimated share of the shadow economy in GDP (%) 
Method  year  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Nat. account (N1-N7) 
Lower  estimation  17.0 15.7 16.6 16.1 15.6 
Higher  estimation  36.5 33.7 35.7 34.6 33.6 
Eurostat  15.4 13.5 14.9 14.3 13.9 
Source: Lovrinčević & Mikulić (2005). 
                                                 
1 Given Croatia’s favourable natural endowments – an extensive coastline with a warm Mediterranean 
climate and numerous scenic islands – tourism is one of the most important sectors of the economy, 
providing an estimated 317,000 jobs in 2004, or around 14% of total employment, and contributing 
indirectly to about one-quarter of GDP. 
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The main factors preventing economic agents from registering their activities are the weak legal 
system, weak institutions (e.g. tax and customs administration), administrative control and 
discretionary decision-making in the economy, a high tax burden, government arrears, sectoral 
and institutional restructuring and significant (and frequent) changes in the tax system (see 
section 6.1.2). As a part of the National Action Employment Programme, measures are 
proposed for reducing shadow employment. This scheme is especially oriented towards the 
widespread phenomenon of undeclared cash wages, where the social contribution system loses a 
huge amount of money through tax evasion, with workers being worse off as a result.  
The current account has fluctuated in recent years with the lowest deficit recorded in 2000 
(2.4% of GDP) and the peak in 2002 (8.6% of GDP). More recently, the current account deficit 
has been in the range of 5-7% of GDP. Significant growth in household consumption has tended 
to induce import growth, which has in turn resulted in large current account deficits and a rising 
external debt stock. For the year 2006, according to the projection by the Institute of Economics 
(2006) the current account deficit is to remain relatively high, above 6% of GDP.  
2.1.2   Consumer prices and inflation 
When compared with other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, Croatia was among 
those with the lowest level of inflation. In the period from 2000 to 2005, consumer prices grew 
on average by 3.0% annually. The average consumer price index for goods was 2.4%, while for 
services it was higher (5.3%). If one looks at disaggregated inflation in the period 2001–04, the 
highest price increases were within the sectors of healthcare services and goods (23.1%), 
catering and accommodation services (11.2%) and housing, water, energy, gas and other fuels 
(10.6%). In the past two years, the driving forces behind inflation have been the costs of some 
public services such as water supply and the costs of medical services. Yet there were also 
increases in energy prices, which may generate some pressure on inflationary developments 
throughout the year.  
2.1.3   General fiscal trends 
Faster economic growth has certainly contributed to better budget revenue; however, it has not 
been enough to reach the planned cut in the fiscal deficit to 4.2% of GDP in 2005. The real 
fiscal deficit in 2005 was 6.3%. The planned deficit cut in 2006 to 3.5% of GDP will primarily 
depend on the strict control of public expenditures and the implementation of reforms, above all 
those in the health sector.  
Gross foreign debt in 2005 was €25,541 million or 82.5% of GDP. A 12% increase in 
comparison with the end of 2004 (€22,781 million or 80.2% of GDP) can be attributed to the 
ever-increasing indebtedness of the corporate sector, which represents more than one-third of 
total foreign debt. The government’s share of foreign debt shrank in 2005, as it switched to the 
domestic capital market and bank loans for financing.  
According to data from the Ministry of Finance, the share of general government revenues in 
the GDP declined from a peak of 53% in 1999 to around 42% in the 2002–04 period. The 
expenditures of the consolidated general government as a percentage of GDP rose to 55% in 
1999 and fell afterwards to around 45% on average during 2002–04 and to around 40% in 2005. 
The largest share of total expenses of the consolidated central government (46.3%) was taken by 
social benefits, followed by compensations to employees (27.8%), use of goods and services 
(7.9%) and debt servicing (5.0%).  
Central government debt consists of domestic and external debt. At the end of 2005, the 
domestic debt of the central government amounted to around €7.44 billion, which, together with 
the external debt of the central government of €6.99 billion amounted to 46.6% of GDP.  6 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
2.1.4  Regional economic characteristics 
Regional differences, which were heavily influenced by the locations of large industrial 
complexes, income levels and the development of small firms, have been amplified by the 
damages of the war and the low degree of labour mobility. At present, there are only a few 
regions – such as the counties of Zagreb, Istria and Primorje-Gorski Kotar – that are 
experiencing strong economic growth and labour demand, while in other counties the situation 
is reversed. Difficulties are not confined to the traditionally rural areas; the islands also suffer 
comparative disadvantage, as do war-torn and peripheral localities. Moreover, there are 
substantial differences between individual counties regarding their popularity among tourists. 
The counties of Istria, Primorje-Gorski Kotar and Split-Dalmatia account for more than two-
thirds of total night-stays by foreign tourists. Areas in inland Croatia, especially in Lika, Kordun 
and eastern Slavonia lag behind in this respect. Croatia has not taken a decision regarding its 
regional organisation, thus there are no data about GDP and unemployment at the regional level, 
but only at the county [zupanija] level. According to the available data in 2002, the GDP per 
capita in the richest county – the City of Zagreb, at HRK 71,111 or €9,597 – was more than 
threefold larger than that in the poorest the poorest county – Vukovar-Sirmium at HRK 23,400 
or €3,158.  
2.2  Labour market trends and main issues  
2.2.1  Main trends (employment, unemployment and economic activity) 
The analysis of the main trends in employment, unemployment and economic activity should 
not be limited to the last 10 years. The reason for this is that over the past 15 years Croatia has 
been characterised by U-shaped trends regarding GDP, strong and persistent declines in 
employment rates and stagnant unemployment pools in spite of the rapid structural changes 
taking place.  
There are two sources of indicators of employment and unemployment in Croatia: the registered 
unemployment processed by the Croatian Employment Service (CES) and the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS), which has been carried out each year since 1996 by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS). The LFS methodology has been brought in line with the rules and instructions 
of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and Eurostat. The first LFS in Croatia was 
undertaken in 1996, thus for the previous period one has to use the census data. According the 
census data in the period from 1991 to 2001, the total population fell by 62,000 (1.4%), while 
the active population declined by 87,000 (4.3%). Simultaneously, the share of the active 
workforce in the total population decreased from 45.3% in 1991 to 44.0% in 2001. This 
reduction was mostly the consequence of a fall in the number of employed persons, with many 
of those losing jobs withdrawing from the labour force into inactivity. LFS data show that the 
activity rate for the total population fell from 56.2% in 1996 to 49.6% in 2005. For the 
population aged 15-64, the participation rate of 61.6% in 2001 rose to 63.2% in 2005, while at 
the same time, the employment rate increased from 51.6 to 55.0%. 
The employment dynamics in Croatia during the transition exhibited a pronounced fall followed 
by a partial recovery, which was typical for all of the CEE transition countries. Nevertheless, the 
relative magnitude of the Croatian fall in employment depends on the way it is measured. If the 
decline is measured using the administrative data on employment, it appears to be substantial. 
Based on that source, employment decreased by about a quarter between 1990 and 2001 – the 
year in which employment reached its lowest level. On the other hand, the census data, which 
are more similar to the ILO’s methodology, reveal a modest fall of the employment rate for 
persons of working age (15-64) from 57.7 to 52.3%, corresponding to an employment decline of BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON CROATIA | 7 
 
roughly half the size of that shown by the administrative data. Briefly, according to the LFS, 
while the participation rate for the total population significantly decreased, for persons of 
working age (15-64) it slightly increased. Similar trends are found with the employment rate: it 
fell for the total population until 2001 and rose afterwards, while for persons of working age it 
increased significantly after 2001. The relatively low unemployment rate in 1995 of 10.0% for 
the total population had risen and reached its peak in 2000 (16.1%) but declined afterwards.  
There were several distinctive features of the labour market transition in Croatia. Because of the 
more decentralised nature of decision-making in enterprises and certain market elements of the 
system, there was significant unemployment even before the start of the transition. The 
unemployment rate according to the 1981 census was 4.9%, and by 1991 it had risen to 9.7%. 
Even a modest decrease in employment, measured by the standard of CEE countries, brought 
the Croatian unemployment rate into the upper part of the range observed in these countries as it 
reached 14.9% in the 2001 census. Unemployment in Croatia, according to both administrative 
and survey sources reached its highest level during early 2001 and started to drop thereafter.  
The slow and prolonged employment decline was the consequence of a delayed restructuring 
process and many enterprises operating under soft budget constraints until the late 1990s. A 
lower activity rate than in the rest of the CEE transition countries, even before the transition, is 
the final important distinguishing feature of the Croatian labour market. Among the reasons for 
the lower activity rate could be a relatively low share of persons active in private agriculture, 
and the almost non-existence of part-time jobs in the public and private sectors. In addition, 
there is the relatively low statutory age for full old age pensions, the possibility of old age 
retirement after 40 years of insurance (for men) or 35 years of insurance (for women) regardless 
of age and a loose definition of disability, with incentives for many to retire early. Although the 
employment rate did not decline to the same extent in some of the other CEE transition 
countries, the employment rate in 2001 was considerably lower owing to a lower employment 
rate at the beginning of the transition.  
According to CES figures, in the period 1991–2001 the number of persons unemployed 
increased by more than 126,000 or nearly 50%. A particularly high rise was recorded in 1991 
(almost 60%), when the number of the unemployed reached a level of 254,000. A certain revival 
of economic activity in the second half of the 1990s (the GDP in 1996 rose by 6% and in 1997 
by as much as 6.5%) was not accompanied by increased and more rapid hiring; instead, the 
number of unemployed persons continued to rise considerably. One could guess that in the 
aforementioned period there were still relatively high labour surpluses, thus there was no need 
for new employees. Furthermore, this period also featured a strong unofficial economy, so most 
of the newly employed persons were working off the books. After a decade-long decline in the 
number of employed persons, this trend reversed in 2001 and employment began to grow – 
irrespective of the source of data used. Since the first quarter of 2002, unemployment has 
continually declined, dropping to 308,000 or 17.9% at the end of 2005, according to 
administrative sources. Increased unemployment was mainly the result of large inflows on the 
register. The LFS data indicate a significantly lower unemployment rate of approximately 13%. 
This difference in the LFS probably stems from the share of persons who are registered with the 
CES yet who are not considered unemployed according to the ILO definition – but instead 
unavailable for work. Such persons include women who are in an advanced stage of pregnancy 
or mothers with small children, who are at the same time registered with the CES as a condition 
for acting upon their rights to obtain some social allowances from the welfare system. 
According to the law, able-bodied recipients of these allowances should be registered with the 
CES. In addition, another segment of the unemployed are registered with the CES as a condition 
for enrolling as part-time students in tertiary education, supported either by themselves or by 
their parents. CBS data reveal that around one-fourth of all students enrolled in institutions of 
higher education are part-time students. Finally, there is no doubt that administrative sources are 8 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
unable to capture all employed persons – such as those working in the unofficial economy – but 
they can be included in the LFS.  
An important reason for the relatively high unemployment rates could be high labour costs. Real 
wages in Croatia in 1993 fell to only one-third of their pre-transition level. After the successful 
stabilisation of the economy in that year, a process of rapid recovery began, so real wages 
reached 80% of the initial level by the late 1990s. Despite large fluctuations of the average 
wage, it seems that the wage structure was stable during the transition period, with only a slight 
increase in dispersion in the late 1990s. On the other hand, wage stability seemed to fuel 
substantial employment adjustments of workers with only basic or vocational education. Real 
gross wage growth slowed sharply in late 2004 and early 2005. The average monthly net salary 
per employee paid at the end of 2004 and 2005 was about €600.  
Relatively high wages in Croatia are not justified by proportionately higher labour productivity 
(World Bank, 2003). Using gross national income (GNI) per capita as a proxy for labour 
productivity, it turns out that wage differentials between Croatia and other transitional 
economies are larger than productivity differentials.
2 Croatia does not enjoy a productivity 
advantage that would warrant the existing level of wages. In other words, productivity-adjusted 
wages are high in Croatia compared with other countries (see section 2.2.2). Nevertheless, the 
increase in productivity in the period 2001–05 was significant and average growth was 7.2%. 
2.2.2  Structure of employment and wages 
The general process of structural change in successful transition countries has involved relative 
shifts in employment away from agriculture and industry towards service industries. Croatia had 
an initial advantage in this process since it had the highest share of employees in services of all 
transition countries at the beginning of the transition process. Moreover, most of the change in 
the employment structure in Croatia during the transition was in the ‘right’ direction, if the 
employment structure of the EU countries is considered a target of the restructuring process. At 
the same time, the rebalancing process in Croatia took place almost entirely through job losses 
in agriculture and industry with few expanding activities in the service sector until very 
recently. Although at the beginning of the 1990s, the shares of persons employed in agriculture 
and industry were above 10% and 35% respectively, by 2005 these had reached levels 
comparable with the EU countries (CBS). In 2005, the level of employment in manufacturing 
was 31.4%, close to the EU average, while the share of persons employed in agriculture had 
continually dropped and was 6.1% that year, which is comparable to some EU member states. 
The high share of employment in services (62.5% in 2005) in Croatia is a result of many 
workers employed in the wholesale and retail trade sectors, along with repairs, transport, hotels 
and restaurants.  
Relatively recent advances in privatisation and the increased number of jobs generated by small 
private companies brought a further decline in the share of public sector employment, which 
reduced from more than 42% in 1998 to 39% in 2005. The ratio of employees with elementary 
school and lower education declined significantly, while the share of employees with secondary, 
college and university education grew. This resulted in increased participation in education at all 
levels and in the subsequent decimation of jobs for persons with lower educational 
qualifications (reflecting the growth in demand for an educated labour force), which is why the 
latter have become discouraged and simply left the labour force.  
                                                 
2 Clearly, GNI per capita is a very rough proxy for manufacturing productivity (output per worker), and 
accordingly the results presented are gross approximations. Nonetheless, given cross-country correlations 
between GNI per capita and productivity, the scope for large errors regarding the ranking of countries 
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Important changes in the structure of the labour force based on the level of educational 
qualifications can be seen only during a longer period 1981–2003 (Table 2). While in 1981, 
almost two-fifths of the employed had only elementary school education or less, in 2003 this 
category accounted for merely 17% of all employed persons. 
Table 2. Structure of the labour force based on the level of educational qualifications (%) 
Employed Unemployed 
  1981 1986 1996 2003 2003 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 
Elementary  school  and  less  40 37 30 17 30 
Secondary  school  48 49 53 59 63 
College  5 6 7 8 3 
University and art academy level  7  8  10  16  4 
Note: For 1981 and 1986 only workers in the public sector were cited, while 1996 and 2003 includes persons 
employed by legal entities (public and private).  
Source: CBS. 
The educational structure of the labour force is obviously better than the educational structure of 
the entire population. According to the 2001 census, the population as a whole consisted of 40% 
of persons with elementary school and less, 47% with secondary education, 4% with college 
and 8% with university and art academy level (1% is unknown). There is an obvious cohort 
effect – education at higher levels gradually became more popular after World War II. 
The share of employed persons who had completed secondary school, which was less than 50% 
of all employed persons at the beginning of the 1980s, accounted for almost three-fifths of the 
employed in 2003. The growth in the number of persons with college and university 
qualifications was particularly high, having doubled from 12% in 1981 to 24% in 2003.  
The age of persons employed by legal entities (public and private) in 2001 was as follows: out 
of all employees, 18.4% were younger than 29, while 17.9% were over 50. This situation did 
not change significantly in 2004, with these shares at 19.5% and 19.6%, respectively.  
A breakdown by sector shows that average wages are highest in the financial intermediation 
sector (approximately 60% higher than the national average), while wages are above average in 
the healthcare and social security sectors, as well as in transport, storage and communications 
(at around 20%). Wages in fishing are far lower than average (approximately 30%), along with 
those in agriculture, hunting and forestry (approximately 20%).  
During the second half of the 1990s, the return on investment in education grew by almost half. 
In 1996, the rate of return on investment in additional years of education was approximately 
7.6%, while in 2001 it grew to 10.5%. The rate of return on investment was lower in the public 
sector, although the gap between the rate of return in the private and public sectors had declined 
to less than 1 percentage point in 2001 (Šošić, 2004). 
Wages are high in Croatia – higher than in virtually all the other transition economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe (World Bank, 2003). Rutkowski (2003) underlines that an average 
manufacturing worker received close to €400 per month in Croatia in 2000, which was from 50 
to 100% higher than in Croatia’s closest competitors such as the Czech Republic (€270), 
Hungary (€250) or Slovakia (€200) and almost five times as much as in Bulgaria or Romania 
(€90). As previously noted, however, wage differentials do not reflect productivity differentials.  
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2.2.3  Structure of unemployment 
Unemployment in Croatia mainly stems from an overall deficiency of jobs, but is also structural 
in nature, i.e. it is the consequence of a mismatch between labour supply and demand with 
respect to the occupations, education, training and skills of job seekers and the requirements of 
existing jobs. Once someone has lost a job, the chances of re-employment are slight, especially 
if s/he is older, uneducated or has outdated skills. This situation is exacerbated by the 
inappropriate education and qualification characteristics of the unemployed, that is, their failure 
to have the knowledge and expertise being sought, as well as limited opportunities for relocating 
to areas where there are certain possibilities of employment. In addition, there are other labour 
market restrictions conditioned by a relatively developed underground economy and 
psychological barriers (such as indecisiveness and incapacity for work because of long-term 
unemployment, attitudes towards and the ability to undertake training, and the acceptance and 
application of new knowledge).  
Unemployment is not only rather high in Croatia, it is also often of a long-term nature – very 
similar to what is observed in the new member states (NMS) and Bulgaria and Romania. Half of 
the unemployed wait for a job for more than a year and some 30% remain unemployed for more 
than two years. There is significant evidence that long-term unemployment itself reduces the 
prospects of obtaining work. Most working-age long-term unemployed individuals have either 
very little education (primary school level) or narrowly formed skills (vocational school). The 
relatively high level of long-term unemployment in Croatia is the consequence of more 
restricted labour flows and the lower number of the newly employed, as well as a slightly lower 
number of the employed who quit their jobs in comparison with other southern and Eastern 
European transition countries (Rutkowski, 2003; Rutkowski et al., 2005). 
Labour market data indicate that rising unemployment has mostly hit first-time job seekers, 
particularly those with secondary education. The number of all first-time job seekers in the 
period 1990–2001 increased from 67,000 to 104,000, while the share of those with secondary 
education was stable at around 62%. This suggests that unemployment is predominantly the 
result not only of economic restructuring, but also the country’s inability to create jobs fast 
enough to accommodate new entrants into the labour force. It may also reflect the willingness of 
educated youth to wait for jobs in the formal and public sectors to open up and to register 
themselves as unemployed in the interim, as well as the failure of the educational system to 
provide its students with the kinds of skills needed for private sector jobs.  
Young persons are particularly disadvantaged. Participation in the labour market is haphazard 
for many individuals who do not have regular full-time jobs. They appear to change seamlessly 
between inactivity, different kinds of activity and status depending on opportunity and relative 
reward. The large informal economy provides them with an attachment to the world of work 
and, in many cases, the kind of flexibility and variety of working patterns not available to them 
in the formal economy. Although unemployment rates are very high for young persons (aged 
15-24) (according to the LFS 41.5% in 2001 and 32.6% in 2006), the chances of young persons 
leaving the unemployment register are much greater than for any other group. Their duration of 
unemployment is far less than that of older persons. In 2003 (the only year for which the data 
about the duration of unemployment by age group is available), 90% of all unemployed persons 
aged 15-19 and almost 75% of unemployed persons aged 20-24 found jobs in less than one year. 
On the other hand, only 58% of persons aged 50-59 and 54% of persons older than 60 found 
jobs in less than one year. Older persons are less likely to become unemployed (the 
unemployment rate for persons aged 50-64 was 8.8% in 2005), but are also much less likely to 
leave the unemployment register and are more likely to become long-term unemployed. 
Unemployed persons over age 50 represent a special problem in Croatia. They now comprise an 
important proportion of all unemployed persons (more than 20%), and are seriously exposed to BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON CROATIA | 11 
 
long-term unemployment. Thus, the share of younger persons (aged 15-29) among all the 
registered unemployed in the period 1999–2005 fell from 46 to 33%, while simultaneously the 
share of unemployed persons over the age of 50 increased from 10 to 23%. Based on LFS data, 
the unemployment rate in the period 2001–05 for persons aged 15-24 fell from 41.5 to 32.6%. 
In the same period, the unemployment rate for persons aged 50-64 increased from 8.1 to 9.0% 
in 2003 and then declined to 8.1% in 2005.  
LFS data show that women have much lower participation (in 2005, 42.7%) and employment 
rates (36.8%) than men (57.3% and 50.6%, respectively). Women have a higher unemployment 
rate (13.0%) than men (11.7%) and they fall into long-term unemployment more often. They 
represent almost 60% of unemployed persons and their share is even larger in long-term 
unemployment. Among all the unemployed, the share of the long-term unemployed (longer than 
one year) increased from 51.3% in 1996 to 56.1% in 2001, with further growth to 58.0% in 
2005. In the same year, 60% of women and 55% of men had been looking for a job for more 
than one year.  
In the last several years, looking at the figures for the unemployed by educational background, 
the highest share in total unemployment is taken by those who have three-year secondary school 
and vocational education (around 40%), followed by persons with four-year secondary school 
and grammar school (25.0%) and persons with primary school (23.5%). Those with no 
education and with incomplete primary school (around 6%), with university degrees (4%) and 
with college degrees (3.0%) have lower shares in total unemployment. 
2.2.4  Regional and ethnic variations 
There are significant differences among Croatian counties in terms of economic and 
employment performance (Table 3). The unemployment rates range from the highest rates 
(28.1%) in Šibenik-Knin followed by Vukovar-Sirmium and Osijek-Baranja, to the lowest rates 
in Krapina-Zagorje, Varaždin and Istria. As expected, counties with the lowest unemployment 
rates in general have the highest employment rates. The findings seem to be very consistent. 
The central and western parts of Croatia, together with the City of Zagreb, offer many 
employment opportunities and have a good economic performance. By contrast, parts of eastern 
Croatia together with counties in the Dalmatian hinterland (such as Šibenik-Knin) have the 
worst employment indicators. Differences in employment and unemployment follow economic 
differences. Concerning GDP level, variations among the counties (with Croatia = 100) range 
from 57.5 in both Vukovar-Sirmium and Brod-Posavina to the highest levels of 179.2 in the 
City of Zagreb and 137.5 in Istria. Thus, the difference between the richest and poorest counties 
is more than threefold. It should be noted once again that the counties with the worst 
employment and economic indicators are at the same time those that have been the worst 
affected by the war. 
There are also significant differences in terms of employment structure by economic activity, 
although these differences cannot explain the variations in employment. Coastal counties and 
the City of Zagreb are more service-oriented, while agriculture and industry prevail in the 
central and eastern parts of Croatia. 
Because of the lack of data regarding labour mobility among different parts of Croatia, it is not 
possible to comment on this aspect. In general, Croatia seems to have a somewhat higher degree 
of job stability compared with other transitional countries; labour market flexibility is confined 
to employees in the new private sector, mostly in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
with a stronger chance of fluctuation between employment and unemployment (World Bank, 
2006).  
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Table 3. Ranking of countries by economic and labour market indicators 
Employment structure by economic 
activity (2003) 
  GDP 
current 
prices 
(2003) 
Employment 
rate 
 
(2002–04) 
Unemployment
rate 
 
(2002–04) 
Agriculture Industry  Services 
Counties 
with the 
highest 
rankings 
(descending) 
City of 
Zagreb 
Istria 
Prim.-G. 
Kotar 
Krap.-
Zagorje 
Lika-Senj 
Varaždin 
Šibenik-Knin 
Vuk.-Sirmium 
Osijek-Baranja 
Bjel.-
Bilogora 
Kopr.-Križ 
Vir.-
Podravina 
Varaždin 
Sisak-Mosl. 
Kopr.-Križ. 
Dubr.-Neret. 
City of 
Zagreb 
Zadar 
Counties 
with the 
lowest 
rankings 
(ascending) 
Brod-
Posavina 
Vuk.-
Sirmium 
Šibenik-
Knin 
Vuk.-
Sirmium 
Šibenik-Knin 
Brod-
Posavina 
Krap.-Zagorje 
Varaždin 
Istria 
City of 
Zagreb 
Prim.-G. 
Kotar 
Istria/Split-
Dal. 
Dubr.-Neret 
Lika-Senj 
Zadar 
Kopr.-Križ. 
Bjel.-
Bilogora 
Krap.-
Zagorje 
Notes: Concerning unemployment, the highest ranking indicates the highest unemployment rate; the estimations of 
employment and unemployment data are based on LFS data. 
Sources: World Bank (2006) and LFS. 
There are very few indicators relating to the situation of the various ethnic groups. It can be 
observed, however, that some counties (although not all of them!) with the highest ratio of 
minorities (particularly Serbs) have higher unemployment rates. There is no doubt that the worst 
situation in that respect pertains to the Roma population.  
2.2.5  Employment institutions and policy 
The CES is in charge of the process of mediation in the labour market, providing job placement 
services, counselling, promoting the adaptability of enterprises, facilitating redeployment and 
restructuring. The CES also maintains passive and active labour market policies, facilitates new 
job creation by participating in local development initiatives and provides capacity support for 
international cooperation and reforming the labour market in Croatia. The majority of the active 
labour market policy (ALMP) is financed through the Croatian Fund for Development and 
Employment, while all the money for unemployment benefits is paid through the CES. The 
Ministry of Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship (MELE) is responsible for the policy.  
Employment protection regulation in Croatia was assessed in 2002 as being among the strictest 
in Europe (Biondić et al., 2002). The inflexibility of the Croatian labour market was reflected in 
a high value attributed to it by a composite index on the strictness of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) developed by OECD.
3 When compared with other countries, Croatia had the 
second highest value of the index (3.6), which was significantly higher than the OECD average 
(2.0), that for EU countries (2.4) and that of the transition countries for which the data exists 
(2.2). This situation changed with the revisions to the labour code in 2003, which have caused a 
decrease of the EPL index from 3.59 to 2.76. All three major components of the EPL index 
became more flexible, yet the introduction of the regulation for temporary work agencies has 
had the strongest influence on the overall change of the Croatian EPL index. The current reform 
has detached Croatia from the group of countries with the most protective EPL ratings – yet it is 
still ranked among the most-protected transitional labour markets (Matković & Biondić, 2003).  
There has been no statutory minimum wage in Croatia since 1 January 1996; however, there is a 
‘lowest wage’ (the lowest rate to be paid for full-time work and the threshold for paying social 
                                                 
3 The EPL index is calculated as a weighted average of 22 indicators that quantify different procedures, 
costs, limitations and terms related to the cancellation of the employment contract. BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON CROATIA | 13 
 
contributions). It is determined by a government decision at the beginning of the year and is 
currently around €280 per month, which is around 45% of the average net wage or 33% of the 
average gross wage. According to CBS data for 2004, the share of employees who received 
average, monthly net earnings of less than €300 (€20 higher than the previously mentioned 
threshold) was 15.5%.
4 
An employee, as a party to an indefinite-term employment contract, who is dismissed by an 
employer after two years of continual service, is entitled to special compensation calculated 
based on the length of service with the employer. Employees are not entitled to such 
compensation if they have been dismissed for reasons related to their behaviour. The amount of 
severance pay depends on the previous working period with the current employer. Unless the 
law, collective agreement, employment rules or labour contract stipulate otherwise, the total 
amount of severance pay may not exceed six average monthly salaries earned by the worker in 
the three months prior to the termination of the labour contract.  
Concerning termination procedures, either an employer or an employee may terminate the 
employment relationship. If there is a justified reason to do so, the employer may legally 
terminate the employment relationship basis on the prescribed or stipulated dismissal period 
(e.g. owing to economic, technical or organisational reasons, or if the employee is not regularly 
able to fulfil his/her employment obligations because of certain behaviours or incapacities). 
Dismissals for business and personal reasons are allowed, only if the employer is unable to give 
the employee other work or retrain the employee for the latter (with the exception of employers 
hiring fewer than 20 persons). An employer who has dismissed an employee for economic, 
technical or organisational reasons may not assign the same job to another employee for a 
period of six months. A worker may cancel the employment contract subject to the prescribed or 
stipulated notice period without stating the reason for doing so.  
The notice period for collective dismissals (more than 20 employees) is 90 days. The specific 
notice periods (applicable to the employer) depend on the employee’s length of service (Table 
4). A collective agreement or an employment contract may determine a shorter notice period for 
an employee than for an employer, if the employee terminates the employment contract. If that 
is the case, the notice period may be no longer than a month, unless there is a particularly 
important reason.  
The categories of employees who are protected from dismissal include women who are pregnant 
or on pregnancy leave, or who are taking a 15-day period of leave after the end of a pregnancy; 
parents or adoptive parents utilising the right to shorter hours; and workers suffering from a 
work-related injury or work-related illness.  
The total tax wedge on labour in 1995 amounted to 48% of total labour costs, which was 
exceptionally high, even by the standards of the ‘old’ EU member states and transition 
countries. By 2001, the tax wedge had fallen to 41% and its decreasing tendency has since 
continued. A consistent policy over many years in Croatia of cutting non-wage labour costs 
reduced the labour tax wedge to about 39% in 2005 (Svaljek, 2005). 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 A significant proportion of employers – mostly in the building industry, hotels and catering, and the 
retail trade – report paying wages and contributions for their employees at the lowest level and less than 
those actually paid. The difference between reported and actual wages is paid in cash. In this way, they 
evade paying the full social contribution required. 14 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
Table 4. Employer notice periods 
Length of service (years)  Notice period (months) 
Less than 1  0.5 
1-2 1.0 
2-5 1.5 
5-10 2.0 
10-20 2.5 
More than 20  3.0 
Workers older than age 50  (+) 0.5 
Workers older than age 55  (+) 1.0 
Source: Labour Law, Zakon o radu, Official Gazette 137/04  
The right to unemployment benefits can be realised by individuals who have worked for 9 
months out of the previous 24 at the time of employment termination. The maximum period of 
drawing unemployment benefits is 15 months (with certain exceptions). The minimum benefit 
level is HRK 887 (about €120 per month), and the maximum is HRK 1,000 (about €135). In 
2005, the average unemployment benefit level totalled about a quarter of the average net salary 
and the beneficiaries accounted for 23.6% of all the unemployed (CES, 2006) (see also section 
5.4).  
The expenditure levels on ALMP measures in Croatia do not differ significantly from those in 
advanced transition countries, but their structure does. During recent years, the main emphasis 
in Croatia’s ALMP has been on wage subsidies, measures stimulating self-employment and 
small enterprises as well as job-search assistance, while in the OECD and transition countries 
various training programmes, job-search assistance and public works dominate (Dar & 
Tzannatos, 1999).  
Taking into account the situation in the labour market and the need for enhancing the 
employment of certain target groups of unemployed persons with lower levels of employability, 
in 2002 the Croatian government adopted the Employment Promotion Programme. This 
programme was implemented from March 2002 to August 2005 and it comprised six sub-
programmes/measures. During the period 2002–05, 80,371 persons were employed from the 
unemployment register, out of which women accounted for 47.2% or 37,950. Problems with the 
programme have mostly been linked with its relatively poor targeting (almost 95% of all the 
unemployed were eligible candidates for one of its six sub-programmes). While the imprecise 
definition of target groups can somewhat increase the overall employment outcomes, it often 
leads to the insufficient creation of employment prospects for the most vulnerable groups. In the 
period 2002–05, the total expenditure for the ALMP amounted to HRK 1,321.2 million (€184 
million). During that same period, the share of unemployed persons participating in the 
programme rose from 6% to above 9% of all the unemployed.  
2.3  Structural reforms – Level, current pace and plans  
2.3.1  Identification of main structural problems/challenges  
The main issues in this context remain the advance of negotiations with the EU, fiscal control, 
privatisation and external debt performance. Furthermore, there are important issues related to 
the strengthening of market institutions, judicial reform, enhancing the business climate, 
improving public administration and social sector efficiency, and supporting the infrastructure 
and environment. The process of policy coordination, planning and monitoring in Croatia, while 
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managed at the political level. The preparation for decision-making at the expert level is 
variable and often inadequate. The bureaucratic level involved in policy-making is politicised. 
There are no real forums for addressing cross-sectoral issues or negotiating cross-sectoral 
priorities.  
Although the state has cut back its direct subsidies to individual branches of the economy or 
firms, it still plays a large role in creating the business climate. In public administration, there is 
a serious lack of career prospects for young qualified staff, enforced by an absence of incentives 
for horizontal mobility and weak accountability mechanisms. Owing to relatively low salaries in 
public administration, the civil service has problems in recruiting and retaining qualified staff. 
Graduate recruits to the civil service tend to leave quickly, since the strict seniority principle 
restricts their career opportunities and there are few other incentives (pecuniary, 
responsibilities/job content) for them to remain.  
2.3.2 Ownership  structure and privatisation 
The private sector has grown considerably in size and scope over the period of transition since 
the early 1990s. Yet the increase in the share of private SMEs in employment and GDP owes 
more to the decline of the large enterprises than to a strong pace of new firm formation and 
growth of the SME sector as such (Vehovec & Domadenik, 2002). Moreover, the stagnation of 
Croatia’s exports and the growth of foreign debt have fuelled a growing concern about Croatia’s 
international competitive position, understood as the ability of the economy to produce 
sustained economic growth alongside a broadly balanced external payments position. The low 
rate of new firm entry and SME growth (entrepreneurship) in recent years has had a direct 
adverse impact on Croatia’s ability to combine economic growth, job creation and the external 
balance of payments (competitiveness).  
Over the last decade and a half, the private sector in Croatia has played an important role in 
industrial restructuring and generating new employment. It has been able to absorb and offer 
employment opportunities to many of the workers laid off by the large firms, which have 
undergone a continual trend of downsizing employment levels. In 1991, large firms employed 
75% of the labour force in Croatia, a figure that had dropped to about 35% by 2003. The private 
sector share of the GDP increased from 40% in 1995 to 75% in 2005, while its share in 
employment grew from 48 to 60% (EBRD, 2006). 
In the last few years, some major privatisations have been realised. The privatisation process 
regained some momentum in early 2005 with the sale of several food-processing companies and 
the successful privatisation of some tourist resorts. In the whole period from 1995 to 2005, the 
EBRD index of small-scale privatisation in Croatia was 4.3
5 and did not change. The EBRD 
index of large-scale privatisation changed from 3.0 in the period 1999–02 to 3.3 thereafter. 
After an increase in 1996 (from 2.0 to 2.7), the EBRD index of enterprise reform was stable 
until 2004, at which time it grew to 3.0. Complacency should be cautioned, however, because 
the relatively slow privatisation process of the 1990s, which favoured insiders, along with the 
lack of transparency surrounding some privatisation transactions involving the privileged 
                                                 
5 The EBRD index ranges from 1 (little private ownership) to 4+ (standards and performance typical of 
advanced industrial economies). For large-scale privatisation, 4+ indicates that more than 75% of 
enterprise assets are in private ownership and there is effective corporative governance; for small-scale 
privatisation 4+ means that there is no state ownership of small enterprises and there is effective 
tradability of land. A rating of 4+ is given for a score above 4.5. For comparison, the EBRD index of 
large-scale privatisation for Hungary has been 4.0 over the last seven years, for Latvia it has been 3.7 over 
the last four years, for Lithuania it has been 4.0 over last two years and for Poland it has been 3.3 over the 
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treatment of individuals (tycoons) who are well connected to the political elite and reports of 
corruption have together raised concerns on the part of potential investors.  
2.3.3  Institutional and legal reforms (regulatory framework, corruption and 
governance) 
While there is almost no competition in the energy and utilities sectors because everything is 
provided by public (mostly inefficient and expensive) providers, in the banking and financial 
sector competition is clear and has positive results for the users: better services, lower (but still 
relatively high) interest rates, various credit arrangements, etc. The banking system is almost 
fully privatised and is largely in foreign ownership.  
The judicial system in Croatia has been in a state of permanent crisis for more than a decade, for 
several reasons. The legal system in Croatia has been subjected to the influence of the executive 
branch and politics. The courts have been under political pressure and they remain so 
overloaded with unsettled cases that the right of citizens to settle their problems through the 
courts has been seriously compromised. To enhance the expertise of judges already in office, it 
is necessary to work out a programme for their ongoing training and increase their 
independence.  
Corruption is intimately connected with the ability of civil servants to act according to their 
discretion. Up to 2000, those in whom power was vested in Croatia did not undertake any active 
measures for the suppression of corruption. Since that time, the National Programme for the 
Fight Against Corruption (OG 34/02) has been adopted and the Office for the Suppression of 
Corruption and Organised Crime (known as USKOK) has been founded (OG 88/01). The Law 
on the Prevention of Conflict of Interest in the Performance of Public Office has been passed 
(OG 163/03) as has the Law on the Right of Access to Information (OG 172/03) and 
anticorruption conventions have been ratified. The existence of these necessary laws and the 
involvement of the international community stir optimism about the suppression of corruption 
in Croatia. Nevertheless, very few of the indictments filed on charges of corruption have 
actually ended in guilty verdicts. These outcomes are certainly widely at odds with the public 
perception of the extent of corruption in the country (see section 6.1.2). The Corruption 
Perception Index, which has been continually on the decline since 2001, is also indicative, 
suggesting that businesspersons and analysts perceive no positive movements in the fight 
against corruption in Croatia. 
Regarding democracy, transparency and legal reform, Croatia has made significant advances in 
the last few years, but is still significantly behind the EU. Freedom House (2006) evaluates 
Croatia as a “free” country, although compared with EU countries and the candidate countries it 
lags where political rights are concerned. Still, progress can be seen in comparison with the 
period 1993–2000, in which the country was classified as “partly free”. According to the latest 
rankings for 2005, Croatia was given the rating of 2 (“free”) in political rights and civil liberties, 
on a scale ranging from 1 (best) to 7 (worst). Croatia also demonstrated an upward trend owing 
to the second smooth transition of power since 1999 and the improved cooperation of the new 
government with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 
The lack of transparency, inefficiency and corruption in public procurement has been a huge 
problem. A Law on Croatian Public Procurement was adopted in 2001, which represents a first 
step towards aligning the Croatian legal framework with the European Commission’s 
requirements by providing additional transparency, competition and accountability mechanisms.  
Some improvements were made by introducing a one-stop-shop approach for procedures and 
licences for starting business activity, through the launch of the governmental programme and 
website HITRO.hr, but the situation remains far from satisfactory. HITRO.hr enables citizens BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON CROATIA | 17 
 
and entrepreneurs to have quicker, simpler access to information and services in one location. 
The key service among those of HITRO.hr is the establishment of limited liability companies. 
The process of establishing a firm through HITRO.hr takes three to five days instead of the 
usual more than 40 days. Based on government data, more than 10,000 persons visited the 
website and 8,500 citizens used it to establish their firms or business activities. A further 200 
firms owned by foreign investors were established through the website.  
In subsequent institutional and legal reforms, Croatia will face the following challenges: 
downsizing the presence of the state in the business sector (a large number of public and state-
owned enterprises still need to be privatised or liquidated), improving the business climate, 
strengthening the rule of law and improving the efficiency of public spending. 
2.3.4 Education 
The Croatian educational system has a long tradition based on divisions into pre-school 
education (from one to six or seven years of age), compulsory elementary education (which 
lasts for eight years), secondary education (three or four years, together with some lower level 
educational programmes) and higher education at universities and polytechnics. Despite several 
attempts to introduce change, the educational system remained largely unaltered in the transition 
period, which eventually contributed to its poor performance and ineffectiveness. In addition, 
Croatia has not yet participated in any international research that measures educational 
outcomes and it has very poor educational statistics, which makes any meaningful analyses 
almost impossible.  
The first warnings about poor educational outcomes came from the 2001 census, which showed 
that 18.6% of the population had less than primary school education and that 21.8% had 
completed primary school (ISCED 2) (CBS data). Some 47.1% of the population had secondary 
education (ISCED 3) and only 11.9% had post-secondary education (ISCED 5 and 6). Although 
the educational level of the younger age groups was much better than that of the older groups 
(in the age group 20-24, 83.92% of the population had secondary education compared with 
65.92% in the 25-29 age group), it was obvious that the educational system needed overall 
reform. The educational level of women was significantly lower than that of men: as much as 
24.2% of women had less than primary education compared with 12.5% of men, and 23.7% of 
women had only completed primary school compared with 19.5% of men. The important thing 
is that this difference no longer exists, as in the age group 20-24 both genders have very similar 
levels of education, with women even slightly higher at the ISCED levels of 3, 5, and 6.  
From the available data, 43% of pre-school children were included in pre-school education in 
2004, while all children were included in the year prior to starting school, in either regular 
kindergarten programmes or separate pre-school programmes. There are no data about regional 
differences, although there is a ground for the conclusion that the participation rate is much 
higher in urban and developed areas. The data about enrolment in different levels of education 
have not been systematically analysed and published. In the context of important reform steps, 
the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports (MSES) has recently published data that shows 
that in 2004 the net enrolment ratio in primary school education was 96.5% and in secondary 
school education 79.2% (MSES, 2005a, p. 41). The CBS has calculated data (not yet officially 
published) with different results for enrolment at the beginning of the school year 2004–05 with 
net enrolment in primary education at 92.2% and gross enrolment at 95.8%, while the net and 
gross enrolment in secondary education was 78.9% and 87.8% respectively. Another serious 
problem concerns multiple shifts – classes in the morning one week and in the afternoon 
another, as according to estimations of the ministry 82.5% of primary school pupils and 88.0% 
of secondary school pupils attend multiple shifts.  18 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
In order to address the issues outlined above, in 2005 the government began far-reaching 
educational reforms that, among other things, tend to improve teaching and learning in schools 
through the development of national educational standards (MSES, 2005b). These standards 
were experimentally introduced in 5% of schools in the school year 2005–06. It is planned that 
grammar school pupils will pass the national school graduation examinations in 2009 and four-
year vocational and arts students will do so in 2010. The reform has also aimed at increasing the 
very low level of lifelong learning (the participation rates have been about 2 to 2.3% in recent 
years) and at raising competencies in information and communications technology among both 
teachers and students. The ministry also announced that Croatia would participate in the PISA 
project (Programme for International Student Assessment) in 2006 and 2009. 
3. Demography 
3.1  Population trends and structure 
Croatia is a relatively small country with 4,441,800 inhabitants in 2003 (CBS data), among 
which 51.9% were women and 48.1% were men. From 1991 to 2001, the number of inhabitants 
decreased by 2.4%. The decline is mainly attributable to the lack of natural population growth, 
which showed negative rates of growth in the 1990s, except in 1996 and 1997. More 
specifically, the natural population growth was -0.6% in 1991, -1.5% in 2000 and even -2.1% in 
2004. The age structure in 2003 was as follows: 16.4% under age 15, 13.5% aged 15-24, 27.8% 
aged 25-45, 25.9% aged 45-64 and 16.4% aged 65 and older. This trend in population decline is 
also reflected in the ratio of persons over 65 in comparison with those aged 0-14, which was 
103.1% in 2004, and in the old-age dependency ratio (persons over 65 in comparison with those 
aged 15-64), which was 24%. Therefore, population ageing is a major concern and is very 
visible throughout most of Croatia. Out of 21 Croatian counties, 16 have more than 15% of their 
population represented by the oldest age group. The counties with the oldest population and the 
lowest natural increase rates are Karlovac, Lika-Senj, Šibenik-Knin and Sisak-Moslavina. These 
counties are also those that were most severely affected by the Croatian war; they are 
additionally less developed and more rural than other counties.  
In relation to the natural population increase, the fertility rate merits comment. The total fertility 
rate was 1.5 in 1995 and 1.33 in 2003. Thus, as with many other European countries, Croatia 
has faced a steady drop in the fertility rate, which reached 2.2 in 1960; that being stated, the 
current fertility rate is even lower than the European average (1.5 in 2000). The mean age of 
mothers at the first birth was 25 in 1995 and 26.1 in 2003. 
Table 5. Basic demographic information, 2003 
Population measure   
Total population  4,441,800 
Women (%)  51.9 
Men (%)  48.1 
Ratio of those over age 65 to those aged 0-14 (%)  99.8 
Total fertility rate  1.33 
Average age of mothers at birth  26.1 
Life expectancy at birth, women  78.4 
Life expectancy at birth, men  71.4 
Average family size (2001)  3.1 
Single-parent households (%) (2001)  15.0 
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Demographic trends have been among the main issues featuring high on the public agenda since 
Croatia declared its independence in 1990. Public discussions have mainly had nationalist 
motivations (referring to the ‘strength of the Croatian nation’) although in recent years 
economic and developmental factors have also become prominent (Puljiz & Zrinščak, 2002). 
The first National Programme for Demographic Development was passed in 1996. It anticipated 
many pro-demographic measures, yet only a few have actually been implemented – mainly 
those that encourage mothers to accept a three-year paid maternity leave for the third child or 
more. The government that came to power in 2000 initiated work on a new family policy, with 
the aim of developing a more modern approach to making it easier for parents to combine 
family and work obligations; but basically, the measures have not been implemented. The 
subsequent government (which came to power in November 2003) has begun work on a new 
demographic programme. It is obvious that demographic development largely depends on the 
situation in the labour market (women’s participation rate, work in the unofficial economy, the 
possibilities for realising workers’ rights, etc.) and on the development of family services. 
Meanwhile, the programmes for demographic development have been unable so far either to 
change the unfavourable economic situation or to increase the share of available services 
(mainly in the field of pre-school education).  
Population projections do not offer any optimistic expectations.
6 According to a study by Gelo, 
Akrap & Čipin (2005, pp. 211–52), all possible scenarios (medium fertility with and without 
migration, low fertility, high fertility and constant fertility) result in Croatia having a 
significantly smaller population in 2050 as compared with current figures. The authors of that 
study hold that the most likely scenario is one that includes medium fertility coupled with a 
positive migration balance. In that case, by 2050, Croatia would have around 3.68 million 
inhabitants, the old-age dependency ratio would be 43% and the ratio of the old to children 
would be 459%. The assumed total fertility rate is 1.35 in the period 2045–49. This rate is at the 
same time the most positive scenario. Almost the same projection of inhabitants comes from the 
scenario with high fertility (in which migration is not included). The worst scenario is the one 
with low fertility (and without the migration component), according to which Croatia would 
only have 3 million inhabitants.
7 
In 2003, life expectancy at birth was 78.2 years for women and 71.2 for men. That was 
approximately three years less for women and four years less for men than in the EU-15. 
Another interesting aspect is the difference in life expectancy between women and men, which 
amounts to seven years. Croatian statistics do not calculate life expectancy at 60, while the 
European health for all database of the World Health Organisation shows that life expectancy at 
65 was 16.05 years.
8 Life expectancy has obviously been influenced by the transition process 
and the Croatian war, as the data show there were several decreases in life expectancy during 
the 1990s, however it has risen continually since 1998.  
Family structure shows slow, yet remarkable changes. The total number of families grew from 
1.2 million in 1971 to 1.38 million in 1991 and fell to 1.25 million in 2001 (CBS). In the same 
way, the total number of households fell from 1,544,892 in 1991 to 1,477,377 in 2001. Yet 
among these, the share of single households showed a strong rate of growth, from 274,744 in 
                                                 
6 There are a few different population projections for Croatia, including the UN’s World Population 
Prospects (retrieved from http://esa.un.org/unpp). In this paper, we have relied on a recent study by Gelo, 
Akrap & Čipin (2005), which offers detailed analyses based on different possible scenarios. It should be 
stressed nonetheless that all projections come to very similar conclusions.  
7 It should be noted that the authors start the projections with their calculation of the population in the 
country, which was 4,207,689 inhabitants in 2000. 
8 For further information, see the European health for all database of the World Health Organisation 
Regional Office for Europe (retrieved from http://data.euro.who.int/hfadb/).  20 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
1991 to 307,089 in 2001 or from 17.8 to 20.8% of all households, and that rise can be expected 
to continue. Average family size was 3.2 in 1991 and 3.1 in 2001, which indicates a slow 
decline. Among families, 27% of the couples had no children, 58% had children and 15% were 
single parents. Only 9.7% of families had three or more children. Single-parent families can be 
further subdivided into 12.5% consisting of mothers with children and 2.5% of fathers with 
children. The number of single-parent families in Croatia is still rather low in comparison with 
most EU countries. The share of single-parent families is somewhat higher in urban centres.  
In connection with the changes in family structure, it is interesting to note the changes in 
marriages. Croatia had 5.0 marriages per 1,000 inhabitants in 2003, which is not that different 
from many Central European countries. On the other hand, the gross rate of divorce (per 1,000 
inhabitants) was 1.1, which is approximately the same as it was in 1960 and 1980 (1.2). That 
once again points to the traditional character of Croatian society – a tendency that has 
strengthened as a consequence of the war, economic hardship and the policy of re-
traditionalisation of Croatian society in the 1990s. A slightly different picture is provided by the 
relationship between the numbers of marriages and divorces, as since the share of marriages has 
declined, the ratio of divorces to marriages has slightly risen from 15% in 1970 to 20% in 2000. 
The number of children born out of wedlock amounted to 9% in comparison with 7% in 1991.  
With respect to the ethnic structure of the population, Croatia is a country of many different 
nationalities, although because of the war in the early 1990s the total number of ethnic 
minorities living in the country declined considerably (this applies particularly to Serbs). The 
Croatian constitution lists several national minorities with autochthonous status (Serbs, Czechs, 
Slovaks, Italians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians and Ruthenians), but all other 
nationalities can also realise their rights. Based on the data available from the 2001 census, there 
are 22 listed nationalities, amounting to 7.47% of the population, with many other nationalities 
listed together in the category “other” (0.49% of population). There are 4.54% of Serbs, 0.47% 
of Bosnians, 0.44% of Italians, 0.37% of Hungarians, 0.34% of Albanians, 0.30% of 
Slovenians, 0.24% of Czechs, 0.21% of Roma, etc. Major changes in ethnic composition 
occurred during the 1990s, as in 1991 the number of various nationalities was 18.1%. The 
greatest alteration can be noticed among the Serbs, who constituted 12.6% of the population in 
1991. Owing to the war (after Croatia regained its territories occupied by Serbs), an estimated 
300,000 Serbs left the country. Some of them have returned to Croatia in recent years, so it is 
thought that their number is higher today than it was in 2001, but it is difficult to confirm their 
actual number.
9 The Serbs are mostly (more than 10%) concentrated in the counties of Sisak-
Moslavina, Karlovac, Lika-Senj and Vukovar-Sirmium. The category “other” was also 
significantly higher in 1991, as the category “Bosnians” did not exist at that time; hence, 
Bosnians opted for the category “Muslims” recorded under other. In 1991, a segment of the 
population chose the category “Yugoslavs”, which was also recorded as other. By county, the 
Czechs are mostly concentrated in Bjelovar-Bilogora, the Italians in Primorje-Gorski Kotar and 
Istria, the Hungarians in Osijek-Baranja and Vukovar-Sirmium, and the Bosnians in Istria and 
Dubrovnik-Neretva. The total number of the Roma population is not high in Croatia, although 
there are estimations that their actual number is three or four times higher than that reported 
(about 30–40,000 instead of the registered 9,463) (Pokos, 2005). The only county in which their 
share is higher than 1% of the population is Medjimurje; half of the Roma population lives in 
Medjimurje and the City of Zagreb.  
                                                 
9 According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, at the end of November 2005 
123,000 Serbs who had left the country in 1995 had returned. In September, the OSCE estimated that of 
the total returnees over one-third left soon afterwards owing to a lack of employment opportunities or 
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3.2 Migration 
Throughout its history, Croatia has been very open to migration; however, migration patterns 
after 1990 have mainly been influenced by the political processes linked with the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia and the war of independence (Lajić, 2002). In the last 10 years, Croatia has had a 
positive migration balance – in both 1995 and 2004, immigration was three times higher than 
emigration, although the actual extent of migration was much lower in 2004 than in 1994 (CBS 
data). The balance of migration was 26,613 in 1995 and only 11,571 in 2004, which indicates 
that the factors influencing migration patterns are diminishing. These factors partly stem from 
ethnic composition and the country of origin, as the majority of immigrants are Croats. In 2004, 
91.7% of immigrants were Croatian citizens,
10 and only 8.3% were foreign citizens, among 
whom 60.6% were from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Immigrants belong to all age groups, 
although there were 43% in the age group 20-39. Among those who emigrated, the majority 
went to Serbia and Montenegro (27.6%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (18.3%). Regarding age 
structure, emigrants also belong to all age groups, but we find here a slightly higher proportion 
of the older population: in 2004, there were 13% in the age group of over 60. No data has been 
published on the educational level of migrants. A very recent phenomenon is Chinese 
immigration, and while their number is not so high, their sudden visibility together with 
unfavourable demographic trends has stimulated debates about future migration trends and the 
need to better define immigration policy. 
In the absence of defined NUTS regions, internal migration can only be broken down by county. 
In 2004, 79,800 inhabitants changed their place of residence, which was 1.79% of the 
population. The majority (47.9%) were in the 20-39 age group. The largest internal migration 
within the same county occurred in Split-Dalmatia and in Medjimurje, while the largest 
intercounty migration took place within the City of Zagreb and Zagreb County. The highest 
positive migration balances occurred in Zagreb (1,906 persons) and Zadar (703 persons) and the 
most negative in Vukovar-Sirmium (-814 persons) and Brod-Posavina (-740 persons). These 
levels indicate economic reasons for migration – with the most negative balances in those 
counties that are less developed or most damaged by the war. 
There are no official and reliable data pertaining to a ‘brain drain’. Some estimates speak of 
between 5,000 and 10,000 persons with a high level of education having left the country in the 
period 1991–2000 (Adamović & Mežnarić, 2003). 
4.  Living conditions: Key developments and dynamics 
4.1 Income  distribution 
4.1.1 Income  inequality 
Until the late 1990s, issues of income distribution and economic inequalities were neglected. No 
appropriate statistical data relating to the distribution of total income and the whole population 
were available. Similar to poverty research, only with the introduction of the Household Budget 
Survey (HBS) have the data on income been collected regularly (annually). Rare pre-1998 
studies showed a trend of slightly rising income inequalities during the transition period of the 
1990s (Nestić, 2003). This growth in inequality was an expected consequence of the shift to a 
market economy. Since 2001, the Gini coefficient, the most frequently used indicator of income 
                                                 
10 Croats born outside Croatia can obtain Croatian citizenship simply based on their ethnicity. Therefore, 
almost all Croats who immigrate to the country already have Croatian citizenship. The CBS published 
data about migration based on the citizenship of migrants and the country of previous residence.  22 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
inequalities, has not changed (0.29); neither has the S80/20 quintile share ratio, which was 4.5. 
It can be stated that income inequalities in Croatia are not essentially different from those in 
other transition countries or in EU countries (the average for the EU-25 is also 0.29). These data 
are incongruent with the widespread opinion that inequalities in Croatia are too high. This 
opinion can be linked to perceptions of unfair origins of the inequalities and the experience of 
low inequalities during the socialist period. Many people consider existing inequalities to be the 
result of illegitimate and illegal activities. There is a strong belief among the public that many 
irregularities and misuses occurred in the processes of privatisation.  
An analysis of income distribution by decile at the turn of the 1990s shows that the relative 
share of decile groups in the lower part of the distribution decreased a little, while that of upper 
decile groups increased. The share of the top decile remained unchanged (23% of the total 
income in the population in 2002) (Nestić, 2005). Thus, the share of the poorest decile in the 
total income decreased from 3.5% in 1998 to 3.1% in 2002. Something similar happened to the 
shares of deciles 2 and 3. The shares of deciles 4-6 remained the same, while the relative shares 
of deciles 7-9 rose progressively. Still, the slight decline in the share of the bottom deciles in 
total income did not influence the Gini coefficient (in general, the Gini is more sensitive to 
changes taking place in the middle of the distribution).  
Important changes have occurred in the structure of income since the end of the 1980s (Nestić, 
2005). During the 1990s, the share of wages dropped substantially (from 55.1% in 1988 to 
45.3% in 1998), which can be explained by the war, falling employment rates, population 
ageing and the extension of social rights related to the war. Since 1998, the share of wages in 
total income has been rising, such that now it makes up about 50% of total income (CBS data). 
On the other hand, in the past 15 years the shares of pensions and other social transfers in total 
income have also continually been increasing (in 2002 the share of pensions and other transfers 
was 27.4% of total income, which is twice the share from 1988).  
Wages contribute most to income inequalities. Inequality in the distribution of wages in 2002 
accounted for more than 60% of inequalities in the distribution of total income (Nestić, 2005). 
In the period 2000–02, the contribution of pensions to total inequality doubled (from 8.1 to 
16.5%), which was influenced by a non-linear rise in pensions based on the law on refunding 
debt to pensioners, which came about in the early 1990s because of the non-indexing of 
pensions. This rise in pensions did not cover those of individual farmers, who receive the lowest 
pensions. Moreover, owing to the manner of debt calculation, minimum pensions did not 
increase either. In contrast to pensions, the contribution of self-employed income to inequality 
fell after 1998. The composition of income differed between the upper and lower deciles (Figure 
3).  
In 2002, pensions were the most important source of income for the poorest tenth of the 
population (representing 26.1% of their income), followed by wages (25.3%) and other social 
transfers (20.2%). In-kind income made up almost 10% of the total income of the bottom decile. 
Upper decile groups had, as a rule, an increased share of wages in total income. In the two top 
deciles, wages make up about 57% of income. Income from self-employment was more 
important for the poorest and richest deciles.  
Yet, while individual agriculture was the main source of self-employed income in the bottom 
decile, in the top decile it was income from crafts. Pensions in all deciles (except in the top two 
deciles) comprised over one-fourth of income (in the top decile it was less than 14%). For the 
lower groups in the distribution, other social transfers were more important, particularly for the 
poorest decile, where these amounted to one-fifth of total income. In relation to the whole 
population, the poor earned their income to a much lesser extent from the market (wages, self-
employed income and property income) – in the first decile, market income represented less 
than half of total income. The share of market income in total income has been rising in the BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON CROATIA | 23 
 
upper decile groups (the richest 10% of households obtained just under 80% of their income 
from the market). 
Figure 3. Income composition by deciles (2002) 
Note: Other social transfers include social welfare, unemployment benefits and those for family and children. 
Source: Nestić (2005). 
In the period 1998–2002, the share of the lower deciles in total income and in total social 
transfers reduced. Thus, in 1998 the poorest tenth received 6.2% of total social transfers, while 
in 2002 this level decreased to 5.4%. Also, the share of pensions received by this decile group 
fell from 5% in 1998 to 3.5% in 2002. In the same period, the first decile group obtained a 
greater share of other social transfers (social welfare, unemployment benefits, benefits to family 
and children). So, it should be stressed that the share of the poorest tenth has been decreasing in 
both the distribution of wages and the distribution of pensions. 
The CBS does not publish inequality indicators based on consumption. World Bank studies 
(World Bank, 2000 and 2006) have shown that consumption-based inequalities were lower than 
were those based on income. The Gini coefficient based on consumption was about 2-3 
percentage points lower than was that based on income distribution. 
4.1.2 Poverty 
The first national research on poverty in the post-war period was conducted in 1998 by the 
World Bank and the CBS (World Bank, 2000), prior to which there was no research that could 
be used for comparability. In the 1998 research, an absolute poverty line was used, based on the 
food energy intake (FEI) method.
11 The poverty rate was low by absolute standards. Measured 
by the poverty line of $4.3 per day per person (at PPP), 4.8% of the population was poor in 
1998 (World Bank, 2000). If the FEI method is used the poverty rate was about 10%. A follow-
up study (World Bank, 2006) has shown that absolute poverty rates have not changed 
                                                 
11 This method is based on the food basket and the recommended minimum diet. In other words, the FEI 
method finds the level of total consumption (including non-food items) at which households spend just 
enough on food to meet the minimum recommended energy intake. The method consists of two steps: 
first, one needs to define the food and energy requirements for each family; and second, it is necessary to 
run a regression that relates the food intake to the total equivalent consumption (for details see Ravallion, 
1994).  
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substantially. Using a poverty line of $4.3 per day per person, the poverty rate in 2004 was also 
less than 5%. Using consumption as a welfare indicator and the FEI method (OECD-II 
equivalence scale), poverty rates in 2002 and 2004 were 11.2% and 11.1% respectively. 
In order to compare poverty over a given period, it is necessary to have a representative sample, 
to use the same poverty lines, the same equivalence scales and similar questionnaires. These 
requirements have been met only for the period after 2000. In the period 1999–2000, 
discontinuity occurred because it was not possible to obtain a sample that would be 
representative. During the 1990s, the sample frame was disputable. The size and structure of the 
population changed because of migrations and the war. Therefore, the 1991 census could not be 
used as the sample frame. Consequently, the CBS began to publish poverty indicators in 2001, 
based on income and the Eurostat methodology (the data source has been the HBS harmonised 
with Eurostat requirements). 
The move from consumption to income as a resource base brought about changes in the 
selection of the poverty line as well. Instead of an absolute poverty line, a relative poverty line 
is now used (according to the EU Laeken indicators methodology). Given the official EU 
poverty line (60% of the median national equivalent income, OECD-II equivalence scale), the 
poverty rates in the period 2001–05 ranged between 17% and 18% (if cash and in-kind income 
are taken into consideration) (CBS). In the period 2001–04, the poverty rate decreased slightly, 
but in 2005 it was about 1 percentage point higher than in 2004. Relying on these data, we may 
say that poverty in Croatia has been stagnating; however, poverty dynamics have not been well 
researched. We have no exact information on how long people remain in poverty and what 
happens to them during that period. There is only one qualitative study dealing with survival 
strategies of the poor (Gomart, 2000). Many poor households survive thanks to various credit 
cards, deferred payments and an overdraft facility in their current accounts. Different coping 
mechanisms have been developed relating to food (receiving food from relatives, utilising land 
in town and food storage for winter), housing (regrouping families in three-generation 
households or occupying vacant houses during the war) and public utilities (using electricity 
when it is cheapest or using wood instead of electricity or gas). The poor largely rely on 
networks that ensure day-to-day assistance between relatives and friends. Yet these networks 
have diminished and today tend to be scanty.  
There is a mismatch between objective and subjective poverty. Subjective poverty rates have 
been significantly higher than objective ones, although the results considerably depend on the 
subjective welfare question. During the 1990s, the Centre for Marketing Research of Zagreb 
(now the Centre for Market Research) regularly published data on household income and 
consumption based on the subjective perceptions of homemakers. According to these data, 
subjective poverty rates in the 1990s ranged between 84% and 90% (Vučinić-Palašek, 1998). In 
2003, about 82% of respondents declared their monthly income insufficient to cover “basic 
household needs”.
12 On the other hand, according to the 2004 representative research carried out 
by the Croatian Caritas and the Croatian Centre for the Promotion of Social Teachings of the 
Church (CPSTC) only 15.6% of the respondents considered themselves completely or mainly 
poor, while 31.8% of them believed themselves to be poor from time to time (Šućur, 2006).
13 It 
is evident that the respondents’ subjective perceptions have been influenced by their aspirations, 
which means that citizens are hardly able to rise above their reference group. More precisely, 
                                                 
12 For further information, see the website of the Centre for Market Research (http://www.gfk.hr). 
13 According to the first Quality of Life Survey in Croatia, which was undertaken from March to May 
2006 by the UNDP Croatia, 31.2% of respondents reported that their households were able to make ends 
meet “with difficulty” or “with great difficulty”. In addition, 35% of households were only able to make 
ends meet “with some difficulty”.  BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON CROATIA | 25 
 
subjective perceptions of welfare are more strongly correlated with the patterns of the imitation 
of reference groups than with financial capacity. This could also be explained by the earlier 
experiences of the Croatian population and increased insecurity (job loss and a sense of personal 
insecurity).  
The poverty profile in Croatia has been dominated by households headed by persons with a low 
level of education (elementary school or less), households with an unemployed or inactive head, 
as well as households with a retired head (World Bank, 2000; Šućur, 2005a and 2006). 
Vulnerable groups that should be singled out are as follows: 1) pensioners and the elderly, 2) the 
unemployed, 3) persons with a low level of education, 4) single-parent families and families 
with three or more children, 5) refugees and displaced persons (see section 7), 6) persons with 
disabilities and 7) the Roma. These groups also have a higher relative poverty risk
14 (Figure 4).  
Regarding gender poverty rates, in 2004 the poverty rate of women was higher than that of men, 
but the difference between gender poverty rates has been on the rise over the last three years (in 
2002 it was less than 1 percentage point, while in 2004 it was exactly 3 percentage points). A 
significant difference in gender poverty rates emerges only in old age. The relative poverty risk 
of women over the age of 64 is almost 50% higher than the relative poverty risk of men in the 
same age group. While children up to 15 years of age have a poverty risk below average (10% 
less than the average), persons older than 64 have a poverty rate almost twice as large as the 
poverty rates of other age groups. Older persons are 80% more likely to be poor than the 
average Croatian citizen.  
Figure 4. Relative poverty risk by subgroup (2004) 
Source: CBS. 
 
                                                 
14 Relative poverty risk is defined as the ratio of the poverty rate of a given group and the overall poverty 
rate in society. For example, a group for which the relative poverty risk is 1 has an average poverty risk. 
When members of a group have a poverty risk higher than 1, their risk is above average. In contrast, a 
poverty risk of less than 1 indicates that a group’s risk is below average. 
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Pensioners make up about one-third of the poor in Croatia. Older persons without any pension 
benefits are in the worst situation (their relative poverty risk is four to five times higher than the 
average). With the exception of that portion of older persons who do not receive pensions 
(about 14%), more than half the pensioners in 2004 received pensions that were below the 
absolute poverty line (based on the FEI method). 
The unemployed suffer an extremely high risk of poverty among population groups (almost 
twice as high as the average). Yet, it seems that unemployment has a more adverse impact on 
the material status of men than that of women, with the unemployed among the rare groups in 
which men have a much higher poverty risk than women (in 2004 the relative poverty risk of 
men was 2.4% and that of women was 1.5%). 
In Croatia, one-person households have the highest poverty risk. In 2004, the relative poverty 
risk for this category was more than twice the average. Poverty risk is much higher in those one-
person households where older persons live. Living in single-parent families or families with 
three or more children is also correlated with a higher poverty risk. 
The regional distribution of poverty has not been well researched. Since NUTS2 regions have 
not been defined yet, only the counties can be used as official regions; nevertheless, the HBS 
has not been representative at the county level. That being said, the World Bank studies (2000 
and 2006) have shown that poverty in Croatia is predominantly a rural phenomenon. According 
to the World Bank (2006), poverty rates in rural areas were three times as large as poverty rates 
in urban areas (6.2% in relation to 18.3%). Poverty is concentrated in the rural areas of eastern 
Croatia (Slavonia), which were directly affected by the war, and in the midlands of Croatia, 
where more than 50% of the poor live. The smallest share of the poor is to be found in Istria and 
in Zagreb. The situation in Dalmatia is not uniform. Poverty is a more frequent problem in the 
Dalmatian hinterland than in the coastal areas. The prevalence of poverty in rural areas is 
certainly correlated with the main economic activities of rural residents. Those rural residents 
who base their lives around traditional and inefficient agriculture are much more likely to face 
poverty. A great many of them live in households consisting of one or several older members.  
If social welfare beneficiaries are taken as an indicator of the regional distribution of poverty, 
once again we can see that the number of beneficiaries is above average in the counties directly 
or indirectly affected by the war (Šibenik-Knin, Sisak-Moslavina, Brod-Posavina, Virovitica-
Podravina, Karlovac and Osijek-Baranja). Šibenik-Knin has the largest number of beneficiaries 
(three times larger than the Croatian average). The only county not affected by the war with an 
above-average proportion of beneficiaries is Medjimurje, where the concentration of the Roma 
population accounts for a larger number of beneficiaries. It should also be stressed that while 
richer regions (like Zagreb and the northern Adriatic region) have lower poverty rates, they have 
a relatively high share of the population covered by social welfare. This finding might be 
explained by the better availability of welfare funds from local sources (see more about “local 
welfare states” in section 5.1.5).  
There have been no national (official) data on the distribution of poverty among ethnic or 
religious minorities. As regards the Roma, we can refer to international studies. Based on the 
study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (with the poverty line of $4.3 
per day per person, PPP), the poverty rate among the Roma was about twice as large as the 
poverty rate of the non-Roma majority living in close proximity to them (13% and 5% 
respectively) (UNDP, 2006a). Undoubtedly, the difference between the Roma poverty rate and 
the poverty rate of all non-Roma would be much greater. The material and financial 
circumstances of the Roma population are far worse than are those of Croatian citizens living in 
absolute poverty. The subjective perceptions of the Roma of their material situations do not 
differ significantly from objective poverty measures (Šućur, 2005b). Moreover, additional 
factors influence the increased vulnerability of the Roma population. First, the Roma have low BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON CROATIA | 27 
 
levels of education and lack professional skills – factors that determine their position in the 
labour market. The single-breadwinner model of the Roma family (the role of men as 
breadwinners, while women are reserved a place at home with many children) amplifies Roma 
poverty. In 65% of Roma households one person at the most ensures a means for livelihood, 
while in 64% of households there are no women among the “earners” (Šućur, 2005b). Social 
welfare is a very important source of income for the Roma (for almost three-quarters of 
households, social welfare is the only or additional source of income). During the period 1998–
04, the number of households living on social welfare increased dramatically. Poverty and 
unemployment among the Roma are frequently a permanent state (many of the Roma are never 
formally employed during their active period of life in the labour market). 
4.2  Access to goods and services  
Along with income and poverty indicators, when analysing living conditions one should also 
take into consideration the level of deprivation, which can be measured through access to 
infrastructure or through the possession of certain durables. As can been seen from Figure 5, in 
2004 1% of Croatian citizens (according to the Quality of Life Survey, it was 2%) were not yet 
connected to the electric grid.
15 An analysis at the county level discerns that the number of 
citizens without electricity is above average in Sisak-Moslavina, Bjelovar-Bilogora, Lika-Senj, 
Brod-Posavina, Zadar, Šibenik-Knin and Split-Dalmatia (UNDP, 2006b). The largest numbers 
of citizens without electricity are in Split-Dalmatia (5.4%) and in Bjelovar-Bilogora (4.6%). It is 
expected that all households will be connected to the electric grid over the next few years 
because major investments in the electricity system are projected in some areas. There are more 
households without electricity among the poor than among the whole population. About 20% of 
Roma households do not have electricity; however, there are major differences among Roma 
settlements in this respect. 
As shown in Figure 5, in 2004 approximately 60% of all households were not connected to the 
natural gas system (among the poor it was 70%). About 7% of households in Croatia had no 
access to the water supply system and 23% of households were not connected to the sewage 
system. In the counties of Vukovar-Sirmium, Virovitica-Podravina and Bjelovar-Bilogora, more 
than 40% of households were not connected to the sewage system. The share of households 
without sewage among the Roma was over 70%. About 8% of all households did not have a 
landline telephone, as compared with 14% of poor households and 60% of Roma households 
(similarly, 56% of Roma households did not have a mobile phone).  
Some citizens have difficulties in paying utility bills or rent. About 7% of Croatian citizens have 
admitted that they have been in arrears on rent or mortgage payments for accommodation during 
the last 12 months (UNDP, 2006b).  
By county, the largest number of citizens with rent arrears is in Vukovar-Sirmium (13.4%). 
Those in Primorje-Gorski Kotar, Požega-Slavonia and Brod-Posavina make up about 10%. A 
much higher share of citizens is unable to pay utility bills (electricity, water and gas, etc.) as 
scheduled (20.5%). This percentage is highest in Sisak-Moslavina (38.6%), followed by 
Vukovar-Sirmium and Krapina-Zagorje (32%), and Brod-Posavina and Virovitica-Podravina 
                                                 
15 Comparisons between all citizens, the poor and the Roma are based on the Poverty Monitoring Study 
(carried out in 2004 by Croatian Caritas and the CPSTC) and on the research dealing with living 
conditions of the Roma, conducted in 2004 by the Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar. The former 
research was representative for Croatia and comprised 1,216 respondents. The latter research consisted of 
986 respondents from more than 40 Roma settlements. Comparisons among counties are based on the 
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(30%). It seems that citizens in Vukovar-Sirmium struggle most with utility and rent arrears 
(this county also has the highest unemployment rate).  
Figure 5. Fraction of households without access to facilities or durable goods in 2004 (%) 
Note: Poor individuals are defined according to the EU official poverty line (60% of the median national income). 
Sources: Šućur (2006) and Štambuk (2005). 
Concerning telecommunications and computer technology, in 2004 and 2005 71% of 
households in Croatia did not have Internet access.
16 According to the UNDP (2006b), 64% of 
Croatian citizens have not used the Internet at all in the last 12 months. The largest shares of 
citizens not using the Internet at all were in Požega-Slavonia (over 80%), Lika-Senj (77%), 
Bjelovar-Bilogora (77%), Virovitica-Podravina (77%) and Krapina-Zagorje (76%). A little less 
than 23% of citizens used the Internet everyday.  
In addition, a large number of households do not have a personal computer (in 2004 the figure 
was 66%). According to research from 2006 (UNDP, 2006b), that percentage fell to 52%. 
Counties in which 60 to 70% of households do not have a personal computer are Vukovar-
Sirmium, Požega-Slavonia, Lika-Senj, Bjelovar-Bilogora, Karlovac and Sisak-Moslavina. With 
regard to the Roma, they are quite excluded from using computer technology (about 95% of 
households did not have a personal computer in 2004). 
An important difference between the poor and all citizens concerns the possession of a washing 
machine, which is nowadays considered an element of the minimum standard of living. About 
9% of all households and more than 20% of the poor do not have a washing machine. As many 
as 47% of the Roma are without this durable good. More than 50% of poor households do not 
have a car. In the 1998 study (World Bank, 2000), little more than 10% of the poor in absolute 
terms (using the FEI method) had a car. 
                                                 
16 For further information, see the website of the Centre for Market Research 
(www.gfk.hr/press/trado2.htm). 
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4.3 Work/life  balance 
Although the difficulties in balancing work and life have featured in different public debates, 
particularly from the perspective of women, currently Croatia has no research data concerning 
these issues. According to the Quality of Life Survey (UNDP, 2006b), 33.6% of respondents 
reported spending more than 48 hours per week at their workplace, but more men (39.2%) did 
so than women (27.5%). Some 7.2% of the respondents reported additional work – 8.5% of men 
and 5.3% of women. A very disturbing fact is that the majority (51.3%) of both men and women 
thought that their job was too demanding and stressful. In congruence with this finding, many of 
the respondents (27%) said that several times a week they came from work too tired to do some 
of the household jobs that needed to be done and 17.1% said that it was difficult for them to 
fulfil their family responsibilities owing to the amount of time they spent on the job. This 
situation is very much in accordance with that in other CEE countries in 2003, as in the NMS 
29% of the respondents also reported that they were too tired and 15% had difficulties in 
fulfilling family responsibilities.
17 When we add the number of those who reported being in 
such a situation several times a month to the first category, we come up with 56.7% of the 
population and in the second category with 39.3%. Women share these feelings a little more, 
among whom 30.3% reported that they came home from work too tired several times a week 
and 19.5% of whom faced difficulties in fulfilling their family responsibilities.  
Although the feeling of difficulties in combining work and household responsibilities is almost 
equally spread between the genders, it is obvious that women actually perform household 
activities to a much greater extent. For example, 35% of women are involved in caring for and 
educating children on a daily basis in comparison with 22.6% of men. As many as 80.7% of 
women undertake household chores every day in comparison with only 32.8% of men. The 
proportion of women who tackle household chores every day in Croatia is high, but that is 
similar to other European countries. Caring for elderly or disabled relatives is not widespread 
and only 6.7% men and 9.8% women report doing so on a daily basis. If they are included in 
domestic responsibilities, more men than women take care of children up to five hours per day 
(71.6% and 59.5% respectively) and 78.2% of men and 71.8% of women report up to five hours 
per day for household chores. Women nevertheless more often spend more than five hours per 
day on domestic responsibilities. That is also confirmed by responses to the question of whether 
their share of household work is more than a fair share – this response was given by 5.1% of 
men and 18.9% of women.  
These results concerning work/life balance are also reinforced by the findings of the European 
Values Survey conducted in Croatia in 1999. This survey suggests a sharp distinction between 
those who support the traditional role of women (as homemakers) and those who think that 
women also need to be economically independent (Črpić, Bišćan & Aračić, 2005). It is 
interesting to note that the traditional role of women is more supported by men and older 
women, in contrast to younger women who tend to opt for a modern view of women.  
4.4  Housing and local environment 
Although Croatia has witnessed considerable improvements in housing conditions since the end 
of World War II, they still cannot be deemed particularly good (Bežovan, 2004a). According to 
the 2001 census, the average square metre (m
2) of housing per inhabitant was 27.2, and the 
average number of rooms per house was 2.74 (CBS data). Based on available rooms, the 
housing structure is not appropriate, as a large share of homes consists of two-room flats, which 
together with one-room flats amount to 45.64% of the entire housing stock. It is also worth 
                                                 
17 See the report of the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(2004) (retrieved from http://www.eurofound.eu.int/pubdocs/2004/105/en/1/ef04105en.pdf).  30 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
noting that 10.6% of flats have no toilet, 11.6% have no bathroom, 6.4% of flats have no water-
supply system and 7.3% have no indoor plumbing. There are also considerable differences 
among the various counties. In six counties, the proportion of flats with no toilet exceeds 20%: 
Krapina-Zagorje, Koprivnica-Križevci, Bjelovar-Bilogora, Virovitica-Podravina, Požega-
Slavonia and Brod-Posavina. The 2001 census has also shown that through extensive 
privatisation of the housing stock private ownership prevails (82.93%).  
The Quality of Life Survey (UNDP, 2006b) reveals a similar picture, as 78.2% of the citizens 
said that they owned their accommodation (either with or without mortgage). It is interesting to 
note that similar to Croatia, the NMS have in general a higher share of homeowners than is the 
case in the EU-15.
18 In addition, 11.5% reported that their accommodation was provided rent-
free. The survey also reveals that a majority of flats have up to three rooms (69%), while a 
further 17.4% of flats have four rooms. Those who reported a shortage of space made up 19.6% 
of the respondents. It can be concluded that the Croats have more problems with the quality of 
housing and the possibility for regular improvements: 31.2% reported problems with rot in the 
windows, doors or floors; 19.3% reported issues with damp or leaks; 21.3% attested to a lack of 
sewerage; and 4.4% revealed the lack of an indoor flushing toilet. These problems are generally 
higher in the NMS than in the EU-15. Concerning rot in the windows, doors or floors, Croatia is 
more similar to Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey (30%), than to the NMS (25%), but concerning 
damp or leaks, it is more similar to the NMS (19%), than the three candidate countries (30%). 
By contrast, concerning the lack of indoor flushing toilets Croatia is more similar to the EU-15 
(1%), than to the NMS (10%) or to Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey (21%). 
The housing conditions of the Roma population are particularly bad. A survey in 2004 showed 
that only 4% of the households had all the necessary equipment and facilities, such as 
connections for running water, electricity, indoor plumbing and a bathroom and toilet in the 
house (Miletić, 2005). According to the UNDP study (2005), only 43% of the Roma population 
had indoor showers or bathrooms in comparison with 96% of the majority living in close 
proximity to them. Some 60% of the Roma did not have improved sanitation and there was only 
14 m
2 per Roma household member in comparison with 33 m
2 for the majority.  
For the majority (60.5%) of respondents included in the Quality of Life Survey (UNDP, 2006b), 
the physical distance from home to work did not exceed 30 minutes (by typical modes of 
transportation), while 27.1% needed up to 60 minutes and 11.2% more than 60 minutes. These 
findings are inconsistent with overall level of satisfaction with the immediate neighbourhood of 
home. In principle, more than 60% did not find reasons for complaining about noise or air 
pollution, the lack of access to recreational or green areas, or water quality. Those stating that it 
was very safe to walk around in their area at night made up 55.5% of respondents and an 
additional 30.8% thought that it was rather safe.  
Regional differences can be noticed here as well. Problems with rot in the windows, doors or 
floors were more widespread in the following counties: Karlovac, Bjelovar-Bilogora, Lika-Senj, 
Brod-Posavina and Šibenik-Knin. Damp or leaks was the biggest problem in Karlovac and 
Brod-Posavina, the lack of sewerage in Sisak-Moslavina, Koprivnica-Križevci, Bjelovar-
Bilogora, Virovitica-Podravina and Vukovar-Sirmium, and the lack of indoor flushing toilets in 
Bjelovar-Bilogora, Virovitica-Podravina and Brod-Posavina. It is obvious that some counties 
are in a particularly bad position in this respect. On the other hand, noise and air pollution were 
the biggest problems for the City of Zagreb, as was the lack of access to recreational or green 
areas for (more urban) Primorje-Gorski Kotar, Split-Dalmatia and the City of Zagreb. As can be 
expected, the feeling of insecurity was most widespread in the City of Zagreb, followed by 
Bjelovar-Bilogora, Primorje-Gorski Kotar and Vukovar-Sirmium. 
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5.  Tax/benefit systems and policy approaches 
5.1 Institutional  system of social protection 
The social protection system in Croatia consists of contributive (social insurance) and non-
contributive schemes. There are three social insurance schemes: pension insurance, health 
insurance and unemployment insurance. In addition to insurance schemes, the main non-
contributive schemes are social welfare and the system of benefits for families and children. The 
above-mentioned schemes cover different functions. Pension insurance assists individuals with 
income deficiencies arising from old age, disability or the death of a main provider and fosters 
professional rehabilitation. Health insurance provides services/benefits in cases of illness, injury 
at work or giving birth. The unemployment protection system provides benefits to unemployed 
persons and the system for the protection of families and children covers services and transfers 
to children, mothers and families. Social welfare provides income support in case of poverty 
and other contingencies. The system of social protection is predominantly public and highly 
centralised. The role of subnational authorities in funding social protection rights is not very 
important with the exception of a few of the largest cities (see section 5.1.5).  
In addition to the regular social protection schemes, Croatia was forced to develop specific 
schemes for war victims and similar groups. Here, two subsystems of social protection are 
important: the first one assists war veterans and their family members and the second one aids 
refugees and IDPs (see section 7). They provide beneficiaries with different benefits and 
services. The social protection system for war veterans and their family members is expected to 
demand significant resources in the future, because the number of beneficiaries has increased in 
recent years (in particular the number of disability pensioners). On the other hand, expenditures 
on refugees and IDPs are on the decline, because most refugees and IDPs have returned to the 
places they had previously lived. Nevertheless, significant resources are needed for the 
reconstruction of destroyed or damaged homes or for the return of the remaining refugees and 
IDPs. 
5.1.1 Pension  system 
The pension system is the main scheme of social security, which consists of public and private 
components. Since 1999 (when the new Law on Pension Insurance came into force), public 
pension insurance has been run by the Croatian Pension Insurance Institute (CPII). The Institute 
is a result of a merger of three different bodies administering pension and disability insurance in 
Croatia: the Pension Insurance Institute for Workers (employees), the Pension Insurance 
Institute for the Self-Employed (artisans) and the Pension Insurance Institute for Farmers. The 
largest was the Pension Insurance Institute for Workers, covering 87% of all insured persons 
and 91% of all pensioners (Bejaković, 2004). The Pension Insurance Institute for the Self-
Employed covered about 6% of the insured and 2% of pensioners, while the Pension Insurance 
Institute for Farmers had about 8% of the insured and 7% of the pensioners. There were 
significant disproportions among these three pension subsystems in terms of beneficiaries, the 
insured and funds, and different laws regulated their affairs. Until 1999, the pension system was 
a mono-pillar, completely public, mandatory, pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme with defined 
benefits. The coverage of the system was even extended in the socialist period, when all 
employees and self-employed persons (including farmers) were covered by pension insurance 
(almost the entire active population). In the pre-2002 period, however, professional and private 
pension schemes did not exist (except for a few quasi-professional schemes). 
Partial privatisation of the pension system began in 2002. New institutions in the pension 
system were established, such as the Central Register of Insured Persons (REGOS), the Croatian 
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insurance companies. The function of REGOS is to maintain the system of individual 
capitalised savings and to collect data on all types of contributions. HANFA is responsible for 
the surveillance and regulation of pension funds (it protects the interests of pension fund 
members and of participants in voluntary pension insurance schemes).  
Mandatory pension insurance comprises all employees, the self-employed and farmers who cite 
agriculture as their sole or main occupation. In 2004, 1.2 million persons (about 85% of the 
insured) were covered by mandatory private pension insurance, while in 2002 this decreased to 
65% (Vuković, 2005). At the end of 2005, there were 4 private mandatory pension funds and 14 
voluntary pension funds (of which 8 were closed funds). Voluntary pension insurance is still 
underdeveloped because very few employees are members of voluntary pension funds (in 2005, 
there were about 56,000 members, which was 4% of all employees). 
The pension system has long been faced with the problem of collecting funds for pension 
benefits. As the share of contributions in pension revenues has diminished, revenues from the 
budget have become increasingly important. About 42% of the total monthly revenues needed 
for the payment of pensions come from the budget, while the remaining amount comes from 
contributions. 
Difficulties in funding pensions are partly the consequence of pension privileges. Pensions or a 
portion of the pension benefits of persons with privileged pension rights have been financed 
from the state budget. At the end of 2005, about 174,000 persons (around 16% of all pensioners) 
received privileged pensions (CPII). War veterans from World War II and the Croatian war are 
the largest group with pension privileges, making up approximately 72% of all persons with 
privileged pension rights. Other groups with pension privileges are members of the police and 
Croatian army (16%), members of the former Yugoslavian army (7.8%), former political 
prisoners (3.3%), parliamentary representatives, etc. These groups receive pensions that are 
higher than the average pension in Croatia. At the end of 2005, expenditures on privileged 
pensions amounted to 25% of the total expenditures on pension benefits.  
5.1.2 Healthcare  system 
According to the structure and type of financing, the Croatian healthcare system is based on 
universal access to primary and secondary healthcare, and can be regarded as a Bismarckian 
model because about 80% of costs are covered by contributions (data from the Ministry of 
Heath and Social Welfare or MHSW). The balance is covered by tax revenues (on the national 
and county levels), donations, voluntary health insurance and the direct contributions of users. 
Contributions were collected and distributed through the separate Croatian Institute for Health 
Insurance (CIHI), but from 2002 onwards, it became a part of the state budget in financial 
terms. Therefore, contributions are collected by the state authorities and distributed to the CIHI, 
which further distributes money to institutions (including private doctors) with which the fund is 
connected.  
About 97% of Croatian citizens are covered by the public health system. The lack of full 
coverage is in many cases related to the failure of meeting the registration deadlines. Private 
general practitioners and dentists who have contracts with the CIHI mainly perform primary 
care. By the end of 2004, 6,764 private practice units (doctors’ offices, laboratories and 
pharmacies) were registered. Out of these, 44% were private physicians’ practices, and out of 
this figure, 69% were ‘private rentals’, i.e. practices that work in previously state-owned units 
and have a contract with the CIHI. There were 2,463 private dentists’ offices, out of which 47% 
were private rentals (CNIPH, 2005). Secondary and tertiary care is performed by the state health 
institutions. Teaching hospitals, clinical hospital centres and state institutes of public health are 
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emergency medical aid, home care institutions and county institutes of public health are county-
owned. 
One of the most significant problems of the Croatian health system has to do with the fact that 
the role of primary care has shrunk and 49% of all consulting specialist services are performed 
by clinical hospitals, which among other things contributes to long waiting lists. For this reason, 
the population living far from the largest cities have more problems in exercising their rights to 
adequate healthcare. The Quality of Life Survey (UNDP, 2006b) revealed that access to 
adequate healthcare was a problem for the elderly, the poorly educated and those with a lower 
income as well as those who live in rural areas. Nearly 12% of Croatian citizens reported that 
the distance from ambulances or hospitals made their access to healthcare very difficult. In this 
respect, four counties should be singled out – Bjelovar-Bilogora, Lika-Senj, Zadar and Sisak-
Moslavina – as 20-29% of their citizens indicated that the distance from ambulances and 
hospitals was a serious problem. Bjelovar-Bilogora has the highest share of the agricultural 
population in Croatia (about four times larger than the Croatian average). One of the main 
features of Lika-Senj is the low population density. In southern Dalmatia, 140,000 citizens are 
more than 40 km from the nearest hospital. Over half of them are two hours or more away from 
the first general or clinical hospital (and access to a hospital is a problem in particular for 
citizens of certain islands).  
Concerning the burden of out-of-pocket healthcare costs, the research from 1994 showed that 
low income groups reported more co-payments than did high income groups. Respondents in 
that research also reported informal payments to healthcare providers such as gifts (14%) and 
“gratitude money” (8%) (Mastilica & Božikov, 1999). The most recent adult health survey from 
2003 also confirmed significant inequalities: individuals reporting poor health and low incomes 
used significantly fewer specialist services than those reporting poor health but higher incomes 
(Mastilica & Kušec, 2005).  
5.1.3  Unemployment protection  
Unemployment protection falls within the competence of the CES. Alongside the CES, the 
Ministry of the Family, Veterans’ Affairs and Intergenerational Solidarity (MFVAIS) conducts 
employment incentive projects aimed at war veterans and their family members. Legal 
amendments from 2002 allow private organisations and agencies to act in the employment 
sector. Private agencies are less interested in those with low employability, however, as they are 
searching for highly skilled persons who are in great demand in the labour market. The benefits 
and measures administered by the CES are financed by contributions, which are transferred 
from the budget to the CES. The ALMP is predominantly funded from the budget.  
5.1.4  Protection for families and children  
Protection of the family and children and the pro-birth policy are the responsibilities of the 
Department for Family in the MFVAIS. In addition, other institutions play an important role in 
providing benefits and services to families and children: the CIHI (maternity benefits and one-
off payments for newborns) and the CPII (child allowances). Mandatory maternity leaves lasts 
up to six months, and maternity benefits during this period are determined in relation to the 
average wage during the last six months of pregnancy. Additional maternity leave may last from 
six months to one year, or extend up to three years for mothers who give birth to twins or to a 
third child and every subsequent child after that, which is financed from the budget. 
Unemployed mothers are also entitled to maternity benefits financed from the budget 
(previously only unemployed mothers who gave birth to twins were entitled to receive maternity 
benefits). One-off payments for newborns are available to all mothers and do not depend on 
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The right to a child allowance is inherited from the socialist period, during which only the 
children of employed parents were entitled to this right as the allowance was financed from the 
contributions of employees. Moreover, the right to a child allowance was subject to a means 
test. The Law on the Child Allowance from 1999 expanded the right to a child allowance to all 
children, regardless of the employment status of their parents. Along with the children of 
employed parents, the new law covers the children of farmers, the unemployed and artisans. 
Also, the financing of the child allowance changed from a contribution- to a budget-based 
system. This new law has maintained the means test – that is, eligibility for receiving this 
benefit is subject to family income.  
Childcare services are decentralised. Institutions for daily childcare are funded from the budgets 
of local authorities, meaning that there are large regional differences in terms of the supply of 
childcare (in particular between rural and urban settlements). Local authorities subsidise 
childcare services in pre-school institutions, however, and parents may contribute depending on 
the decisions of local authorities. In addition to this, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
private and religious organisations also play an important role in providing childcare services 
(kindergartens, nurseries, etc.). In spite of the increasing number of institutions and services 
provided by private organisations and NGOs, the increased demand for childcare services have 
not been sufficiently met.  
5.1.5  Social welfare  
The system of social welfare has been regulated by the Law on Social Welfare since 1997. 
Institutions responsible for this segment of social protection are the MHSW, centres and homes 
of social welfare. The standard rates for all social welfare benefits are completely funded from 
the central budget, with the exception of housing and fuel allowances, which are funded from 
county and city budgets. County and local authorities may finance a portion of the benefits 
above standard amounts or introduce new rights. Even though social welfare and services come 
under the competence of local authorities according to the constitution and the Law on Local 
Self-Government, the system of social welfare is highly centralised because, among other 
things, the fiscal preconditions for decentralisation and the delegation of competences to 
regional and local authorities have yet to be established. It is true that decentralisation in some 
way started with the Law on Social Welfare and amendments thereto in 2001. Thus, since 2002 
founding rights and the financing of homes for elderly and infirm persons have been delegated 
to the counties. Counties or lower local units may establish other institutions of social welfare, 
such as aid and care centres. In addition, local self-governments finance a portion of the running 
costs of centres for social welfare and participate in the decision-making process.  
There are significant differences between local authorities in terms of funding additional 
entitlements to social welfare (Bežovan & Zrinščak, 2001). In particular, larger cities (Zagreb, 
Rijeka and Split), which have broader financial capacities, have developed their own social 
welfare schemes, which can be labelled (because of their scope) ‘local welfare states’. These 
cities evaluate social needs before undertaking social policy interventions. The City of Zagreb 
has the highest share of social expenditures in its budget. If we include in social expenditures 
healthcare costs, social welfare expenditures (income support for the elderly, pensioners, 
families/children or the poor in general) and expenditures on war veterans and their family 
members, then in 2005 these expenditures made up 9% of the budget in the City of Zagreb, 7% 
in Split and 5% in Rijeka. Yet, if we add to these expenditures pre-school education costs, 
expenditures on pupils and students (dormitories, school meals, textbooks and transport to 
school) and subsidies for public city transport, then total expenditures in the City of Zagreb 
amounted to 24% of the budget (in 2006 the budget size is expected to be about HRK 6.5 billion 
or €0.9 billion). By contrast, a study on social programmes in 74 towns showed that in some BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON CROATIA | 35 
 
welfare spending was only 0.36% of their budgets (Bežovan & Zrinščak, 2001). Local (city) 
authorities spend most on children (school meals and transport to school) and housing. It should 
be mentioned that the City of Zagreb also has developed a kind of additional child allowance, to 
which all children are entitled (in contrast to the governmental child allowance, which is means-
tested). Additionally, all elementary school children have the right to schoolbooks free of 
charge. 
Services that have been provided through the system of social welfare are intended for the 
different categories of beneficiaries: children without parental care, children and youth with 
behavioural disorders, elderly and infirm persons, persons with disabilities, drug addicts, ex-
prisoners, victims of violence, migrants, refugees, etc. The role of the third sector in social 
welfare is becoming more and more important, in particular in the provision of services. The 
Law on Social Welfare allows for profit and non-profit organisations to found institutions of 
social welfare. The trend of opening new homes for social welfare by different non-
governmental founders (private persons, religious and humanitarian organisations, and 
associations) is evident. Social services are highly institutionalised and the number of persons 
placed in institutions has been increasing. The market for social services is poorly developed in 
relative terms, and the demand for institutional services exceeds the supply. Even though efforts 
towards deinstitutionalisation can be observed, this process is developing very slowly.  
5.2  Recent and planned institutional reforms in social protection 
5.2.1 Pension  reform 
During the 1990s, the reform of the pension system began. At that time, the number of insured 
persons decreased while the number of pensioners increased. The replacement rate for pensions 
declined as well. These trends in the 1990s were linked to rising unemployment rates (a fall in 
the number of those insured), early retirement policies, demographic processes (population 
ageing, diminishing fertility rates and prolonged life expectancy) and war-related circumstances. 
Intense debates on the reform of the pension system have been held since the mid-1990s. The 
World Bank and its model of pension reform have had a significant influence on these debates 
with respect to the changes needed to meet the difficult challenges facing the pension system. 
The Law on Pension Insurance, which contained two reform packages, was passed in 1998. 
These two packages are known as small-scale and large-scale pension reforms. The goal of the 
former was to reorganise and rationalise the existing pension system (reducing pension costs 
and forging a clear link between pensions and contributions). Thus, the law gradually increased 
the retirement age (for women from 55 to 60 and for men from 60 to 65). The model on which 
pensions were calculated was also changed. In 2008, after the transition period expires, pension 
calculations will be carried out based on the entire working life, not on the 10 most favourable 
years. The model of pension indexation was modified, too. It was accepted that pensions were 
to be indexed partly according to the growth of wages and partly according to the growth of 
prices. The definition of disability was revised and disability pension terms were made stricter, 
as was the criteria for early retirement. Certain institutions that were part of the former pension 
system (representing the interests of specific groups) were abolished and transferred to the 
social welfare system, where their benefits are allocated based on means testing. 
The second reform, which began in 2002, has had aims that more radical, related to the 
privatisation of pension schemes and the introduction of a multi-tier system. In addition to the 
first tier of intergenerational solidarity (PAYG), an additional two tiers were established: a first 
tier of mandatory, individual capitalised savings and a second tier of voluntary, individual 
capitalised savings. The second tier included all those insured who were younger than 40 at the 
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could and still can choose a private pension fund that invests their savings. The pension 
contribution rate is divided into two parts: the first (now 15% of gross wages) goes to the tier of 
intergenerational solidarity, while the second (5% of gross wages) goes to the tier of mandatory 
individual capitalised savings. This formula means that every insured person is obliged to pay 
some contributions to the fund and some to social security. The transition costs for the pension 
reform have been financed through international loans. In annual reports, all of the mandatory 
pension funds, transactions and investments have been estimated as positive. Yet so far, these 
funds have only collected contributions and have not begun paying out as pensions (the first 
pensions from the second tier are expected to be paid out in 2013). The long-term goals of the 
reform are to consolidate the system, increase the level of pensions, influence economic growth 
through increased national savings and reduce budget expenditures. Some advantages of the 
reform can be noticed already. It has strengthened individual responsibility and made the system 
of paying contributions more transparent. For example, since 1999 the revenues from 
contributions have continually risen. The nominal growth index of contribution revenues in 
2002 was 9.3% and in 2003 it was 12.7% (Vuković, 2005). The pension insurance based on 
voluntary funds has been open to all persons with residency status in Croatia. Voluntary pension 
insurance has been further stimulated by state subsidies and tax allowances. 
Of course, there were some disadvantages to the pension reform in the transitional period. 
Pensions realised after the new Law on Pension Insurance came into force (1 January 1999) 
have been lower by almost one-fourth compared with pensions realised before that date 
(Vuković, 2005). The main reasons for this can be found in the increased retirement age and 
changes in the composition of pensioners (see section 5.4). Also, the reform abolished some 
pension supplements that were previously included in the pension base. After 1999, many 
pensioners (almost half of them) have realised the minimum pension as the most favourable 
one.  
5.2.2  Reform of the healthcare system 
The reform of the Croatian healthcare system has just begun. Based on proposals from the 
MHSW, in July 2006 parliament passed the National Strategy for Health Development and four 
bills, on healthcare, basic health insurance, voluntary health insurance and the protection of 
health at the workplace. The significance of this strategy comes from the fact that it is the first 
document of its kind since 1990. The strategy and bills began with statements that the 
healthcare system is uneconomical, poorly managed and that despite its high costs citizens are 
largely dissatisfied with its performance. To improve the healthcare system the strategy 
proposed many measures for enhancing territorial and temporal access to healthcare, making the 
system more integrated (more effectively linking primary, secondary and specialist care), 
building incentives for primary healthcare to resolve at least 80% of medical cases and making 
the system more economical by categorising hospitals and standardising medical procedures. 
Nevertheless, the main motivation of the reform is to stabilise the system financially and hence 
the ministry proposed cuts in public spending and increased private spending. The main 
instrument for this is the division between the basic healthcare services (covered by basic health 
insurance) and additional services (financed by additional, private insurance). The reforms 
define who is entitled to healthcare without any additional fees (such as children up to age 18, 
pregnant women and poor persons) as well as the kinds of medical cases that also qualify for 
free treatment (such as HIV or other infectious diseases). Outside this scope are persons/cases 
whose treatment would involve fees or payments from additional private insurance. The reforms 
also propose two drug lists, the basic one (which would mainly contain generic drugs) and an 
additional one covering drugs that require payment by the recipients (mostly brand-name 
drugs). Public reaction to these proposals has been negative, with the response basically having 
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are no guarantees that the poor (or those who cannot pay for additional insurance) would receive 
the same quality of the healthcare. 
5.2.3  Reforms in other social protection schemes 
As regards non-contributive schemes, the MHSW (in collaboration with the World Bank) is 
preparing the social benefit reform strategy for 2006–08. The main goal of the strategy is to 
investigate the possibilities for reducing the share of expenditures on social benefits as a 
proportion of GDP and for raising the share of expenditures based on means testing among total 
social spending. More concretely, the objectives of the strategy are to 
•  reduce the number of benefits;  
•  better target social benefits (through wider uses of means testing);  
•  provide faster and less complicated access to social entitlements (through the introduction 
of a uniform register of social benefits);  
•  simplify the administration of social benefits; and  
•  avoid the accumulation and overlap of social entitlements. 
In the system of protection for family and children, reforms have been aligned with a pro-birth 
policy and the improvement of the situation of families with children. During the 1990s, some 
measures were linked to a trend towards the retraditionalisation of the family. In 1996, the 
National Programme of Demographic Development was adopted. This programme contained a 
range of policy measures, which were primarily intended to change unfavourable demographic 
trends in Croatia. These measures included generous child and family allowances, ‘pro-birth 
housing loans’, additional benefits for families with three and more children, paid maternity 
leave for a duration of three years, an additional year of service at retirement for every born 
child and the paid status of so-called ‘mother-educators’. The institution of the mother-educator 
was especially perceived as an attempt to focus policy on traditional family models. Namely, it 
was proposed that mothers with four or more children receive a salary and other entitlements as 
a result of their full-time ‘work’ of staying home and raising children. The proponents believed 
that in such a manner more families would decide to have more children. Conservative attitudes 
on family policy also became prominent in public debates on abortion, when those opposed to it 
were especially vociferous. Nonetheless, most citizens did not share these attitudes and abortion 
was not prohibited. Some promoters of the new traditionalisation of the family tried to impose 
an idyllic picture of a traditional, patriarchal family with many children and a mother who stays 
at home. The National Programme of Demographic Development was never carried out, 
although some of the policies proposed have been adopted (paid maternity leave up to three 
years for the mothers of twins or for mothers who give birth to the third child and every child 
thereafter). Large funds were needed for its implementation but some of its basic, traditional 
standpoints were not in accordance with the dominant social values and trends in Croatian 
society, particularly among its younger segments. At present, the two main-provider model is 
supported. 
In the near future, an increase in funds for child allowances is not planned (perhaps only some 
redistribution through the introduction of more income brackets). In order to improve the 
position of families with children, it has been proposed that child allowances and alimony 
payments not be regarded as income when applying for social welfare. In accordance with EU 
legislation, maternity leave is expected to be separated from parental leave (additional maternity 
leave will be legally renamed to parental leave), in order to eliminate discrimination against 
fathers in this branch of social protection. In the future, it will be important to extend the 
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parenthood. It may be supposed that more intense state interventionism will continue in family 
policy, because it deals with the crucial issue of population growth.  
The Law on Social Welfare from 1997 changed the structure of benefits and introduced new 
ones. The principle of subsidiarity has been highlighted to affirm more strongly the 
responsibility of the individual and the family for their own social security. Additionally, the 
law has opened wider possibilities for private and non-profit organisations to act in the social 
sector. That notwithstanding, the present social welfare system has many shortcomings, among 
which the following can be singled out:
19  
•  The system is insufficiently transparent (with a lack of information about beneficiaries, 
schemes or efficiency).  
•  Citizens are poorly informed about their social rights.  
•  There is an absence of objective criteria for the implementation and evaluation of 
schemes. 
•  The system is highly centralised and there is little adaptation to local needs. 
•  A high degree of institutionalisation persists. 
•  There is insufficient collaboration with NGOs. 
•  It is inefficient in terms of integrating the poor into society and the labour market. 
•  Professional staffing is inadequate, as are the levels of training.  
The decentralisation of the social welfare system has been taking place very slowly. An 
important reason for that is the territorial structure of Croatia. Small local units (municipalities) 
have been formed but without fiscal or human resources to take responsibility for social welfare. 
Therefore, cooperation among municipalities will be necessary for combating similar social 
problems, as well as financial support from the central government to these otherwise 
resourceless municipalities. 
At present, the MHSW is preparing or conducting a few reform projects in social welfare. In 
order to harmonise social welfare with EU standards and criteria, the Social Welfare 
Development Project is underway (in collaboration with the World Bank). Its aim is to establish 
a more efficient system targeted at socially vulnerable groups. The project envisages  
•  the further decentralisation and delegation of authority to regional and local self-
government (to enhance the accessibility of services to citizens);  
•  systematic financial support for NGOs and humanitarian associations;  
•  the better targeting of cash benefits;  
•  the provision of higher quality services within and outside of institutions (by taking into 
account the specifics of certain areas or styles of living, and the needs and interests of 
beneficiaries);  
•  improved access to information about social entitlements; and  
•  computerisation of the system.  
Moreover, work on preparing a new law on social welfare is going to commence soon, which 
will take into consideration the reform requirements outlined in these projects. 
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5.3  Public social expenditure 
According to the Ministry of Finance, total public social spending in 2000 amounted to HRK 
40.5 billion (€5.3 billion at the official exchange rate) and in 2004 it increased to almost HRK 
50 billion (€6.7 billion). The share of social protection expenditures in GDP in 2003 and 2004 
was less above 23% (Figure 6). In contrast to EU countries, Croatia has been forced to allocate 
considerable funds for war veterans and war victims.  
Figure 6. Social expenditures (as a % of GDP) 
Note: Based on the government’s Finance Statistics, 1986 classification. 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
The share of expenditures for war veterans, refugees and IDPs in 2003 and 2004 was 
approximately 3% of GDP (out of which half was expenditures for war veterans). From a 
comparative point of view, Croatia’s social expenditures are higher than are those of any other 
new EU member state (except Slovenia). 
It is clear that the total social expenditures (measured as a share of GDP) have been decreasing 
in particular since 2001 (the share in 2004 was 3 percentage points lower than in 2001). The 
greatest reductions took place in 2002 and 2003. This downward trend was influenced most by 
the cut in pension expenses. Pension system expenditures in 2004 were 12.2% of GDP and have 
been slowly reducing since 2001 (in 2004 the share was 1.5 percentage points less than in 
2001). The decrease in pension spending is the result of delayed pension indexation with wage 
increases and living costs, as well as lower pensions realised after 1999, when the reform of the 
pension system began. An even more pertinent reason for the reduction is the strong economic 
growth after 2001, which caused a faster GDP growth rate in comparison with pension 
expenditures.  
Expenditures by the consolidated central government
20 represent more than 99% of total social 
protection spending (Ministry of Finance data). Although the share of expenses of the local and 
county governments has increased since 2000 (in 2003 and 2004 it almost doubled in 
comparison with the previous years), these expenses are irrelevant (about 0.5% of GDP or 2.3% 
of total social expenditures) in comparison with the expenses of the central government. These 
data reveal a highly centralised system of social protection. Expenditures from social security 
funds in 2002 were 1.7% of GDP and 0.8% in 2004. Such a low share of social security funds in 
                                                 
20 For further details about the consolidated central government and its revenues and expenses, see section 
5.5. 
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total social protection expenditures reflects the fact that the contribution revenues and 
expenditures of social security funds have been largely incorporated into the central government 
budget (the CPII from 1 July 2001 and the CIHI and the CES from 1 January 2002). Prior to 
that (in 1999 and 2000), the share of expenses of social security funds in total social 
expenditures was over 23%. That means that the social protection expenditures of the central 
government are almost completely central budget expenditures. That notwithstanding, social 
security funds are independent of the government (only the tax office collects social security 
revenues) and are administered by a board consisting of representatives of different groups or 
institutions. 
Based on the methodology of the International Monetary Fund (government Finance Statistics, 
1986 classification), healthcare (aside from cash benefits the system provides for sickness and 
maternity leave) in 2004 represented slightly more than 28% of the total social protection 
expenditures. Measured as a percentage of GDP, the share of healthcare expenses has somewhat 
decreased since 2000, thus it was under 7% of GDP in the last three years (Figure 6).
21 The 
structure of healthcare costs has not changed very much. The most significant costs are those 
related to hospitals and their services, followed by those for ambulance and primary healthcare, 
then drugs, medical prostheses and equipment. Also, expenses for social security affairs and 
services fell from 17% of GDP in 2001 to 13.6% in 2004. Only social welfare expenses rose 
from 2% in 2001 to 2.6% in 2004.  
According to the data obtained by ministries and institutions that are in charge of particular 
schemes (ILO, 2005), the structure of social protection expenditures for 2003 suggests that 
pension and healthcare expenditures absorbed more than 80% of the total public spending on 
social welfare policies, while expenditures of the pension system represented more than a half 
of the total (51.2%). Social welfare spending was 5.4% and spending on child allowances 
comprised 3.3% of the total expenditures. Spending on unemployment benefits was 1.7% of the 
total. The expenditures on benefits for war veterans and the reconstruction costs in the areas of 
special state concern (where the majority of IDPs, refugees and returnees live) are estimated at 
8.9% of the total social protection outflows.
22  
                                                 
21 If one takes into account total public healthcare expenses (including maternity and sick leave), then 
these expenses in 2004 were about 7.5% of GDP, which is a significant decline in comparison with 2000, 
when they represented about 10% of GDP (CBS, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Croatia). Total 
public and private healthcare costs were 11.1% of GDP in 2000 and 8.6% in 2004 (Matković & Zrinščak, 
2006).  
22 At present, governmental institutions in Croatia do not collect data on social expenditures according to 
the EU’s ESSPROSS methodology. Owing to the fact that there are no official data, we can only use 
ESSPROSS classifications prepared by the authors of this report. Using the data of the Ministry of 
Finance and the ILO (2005), the structure of expenditures on social benefits in 2003 was somewhat 
different from that in the EU. For example, the expenditure under the disability category was 14.3% in 
Croatia and 8% in the EU-25. On the other hand, the expenditure for the old-age category was 11% 
higher in the EU-25 than that in Croatia. These differences can be explained by the fact that Croatia has a 
larger number of different disability benefits (because of the war and flexible disability pension terms) 
and also by the fact that recipients of disability pensions who are above the retirement age have not been 
classified as old age pensioners. Nevertheless, the expenditures under the survivors’ category are 2.6 
times the survivor’s expenditures in the EU-25. The shares of expenditures under the health/sickness 
category are similar in Croatia and in the EU-25. The unemployment category accounted for 1.7% of 
expenditures on benefits in Croatia and for 6.6% in the EU-25. Still, unemployment expenditures in 
Croatia did not comprise the costs of the ALMP. Expenses on benefits to family/children in the EU-25 
were almost twice those in Croatia, but in Croatia childcare expenditures were not included. Expenditures 
for housing benefits are very low in Croatia if housing expenses for IDPs and war-affected areas are 
excluded. BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON CROATIA | 41 
 
Private expenditures are more important in the pension and health systems.
23 Owing to the fact 
that the privatisation of the pension system began in 2002, pensions from the second tier 
(mandatory funded pension savings) will not be paid out until 2013. That means that private 
pension funds for now only collect contributions and invest them for the realisation of profit. 
Mandatory pension funds at the end of 2005 had net assets in the value of HRK 11.7 billion 
(about €1.5 billion), which represented 5.1% of GDP. The contributions represented 87% of net 
assets. Furthermore, voluntary pension funds at the end of 2005 had net assets in the value of 
HRK 230 million (about €31 million). If the entry fees transferred to pension funds and pension 
societies (which in the period 2002–05 amounted to 6% of net assets) are subtracted from total 
mandatory and voluntary pension fund assets, it turns out that by the end of 2005 mandatory 
pension funds and voluntary pension funds had net assets totalling 4.9% of GDP (HANFA 
data).  
In spite of the high share of healthcare expenditures in the GDP, the health system is facing 
significant financial problems. The data about private healthcare expenditures are ambiguous. In 
the World Bank study (2004), private healthcare expenditures in the period 1999–2002 were 
estimated at 2% of GDP. Yet, the methodology for the estimate used in that study is not clear 
(or available). On the other hand, according to CBS data (based on the annual HBS), private 
healthcare spending in the period 1998–2004 was 1-1.3% of GDP. In the period 2002–04, the 
level of private expenditures of the total healthcare expenditures ranged between 15% and 
17.6%. If absolute amounts of public and private healthcare expenditures are analysed, then 
their continual growth has been evident since 2002, but the relative share has not changed 
owing to stronger GDP growth. Average public healthcare spending per citizen in Croatia in 
2004 was about €400. Average private healthcare spending in 2004 was about €73 (Matković & 
Zrinščak, 2006). 
According to the data collected from the responsible ministries (the social benefit reform 
strategy 2006–08), about 45% of expenditures on non-contributive schemes in 2004 and 2005 
were means-tested.
24 The only two ministries that use the means test are the MHSW and the 
MFVAIS. Means testing has mostly been used by the MHSW, where almost all benefits are 
means-tested. The ILO (2005) found that almost 60% of non-contributory programmes were 
subjected to a means test (but that study excluded from its analysis schemes for war veterans, 
non-contributory in-kind programmes, insurance-based additional maternity benefits and the 
like). 
5.4  Social protection provisions 
Among social protection benefits, pensions are of particular importance (here, we refer to 
pensions that the CPII have been paying, without the pensions of military persons or war 
veterans). Almost one-fourth of the Croatian population receives some form of the three types 
of pensions (the number of pensioners at the end of 2005 was just below 1.1 million) (CPII). 
The most numerous are old age pensioners, who make up about 55% of all pensioners, then 
disability pensioners (about 23%) and survivors (about 22% of all pensioners). Since 2000, the 
                                                 
23 Furthermore, there are private organisations in the social welfare sector. They provide care services and 
other benefits (in cash or in-kind). Yet, with the exception of Croatian Caritas (a charity of the Catholic 
Church), these organisations are predominantly financed by public sources. It is hard to assess the share 
of their expenditures in total social welfare spending.  
24 In the strategy, all schemes financed from the budget were considered non-contributive ones: war 
veterans’ schemes (except pensions), schemes for civil and military invalids from World War II, schemes 
for refugees and IDPs, non-contributory in-kind schemes, all additional maternity benefits and social 
welfare. In addition, unemployment benefits as a contributory scheme were included in the strategy.  42 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
share of the population of active age (15-64) receiving disability pensions has been about 13%. 
It should be mentioned that disability pensioners who are above the retirement age have been 
recorded as disability pensioners, not old age pensioners. In the same period, the old age 
pension coverage (old age pensioners/population aged 65+) was 76%, or 71% without early 
retirement pensions. In general, in 2005 about 86% of the population over age 64 in Croatia 
received some sort of pension benefits. In other words, about 14% of the population over 64 
was without domestic pensions (pensions from abroad along with military and war veterans’ 
pensions are not taken into consideration). Still, in 1988 the ratio between pensioners and the 
insured was 1:3.5. In 1990, this ratio was 1:3, but in 1995 it had halved (1:1.8), while since 
2001 it has been 1:1.4 (CPII).  
Since 2000, the number of old age and survivors’ pensioners has slightly risen (Figure 7). The 
growth index of old age pensioners in the period 2000–03 was between 1% and 1.5%, and in 
2004 it decreased to 0.5%. The growth index of survivors’ pensioners in the period 2000–04 
was 1-1.4%. The number of disability pensioners in 2000 and 2001 remained unchanged, and 
then decreased in 2002 by 1%. Since 2002, the number of disability pensioners has recorded a 
growth rate of less than 1%. The share of women among old age pensioners in 2002 and 2003 
was 48%, among disability pensioners 38% and among survivors 82-83%. 
In the period 1999–2004, the number of new old age pensioners declined continually (in 1999 it 
amounted to 31,700, in 2002 it was 24,800 and in 2004 the number was 19,000). The trend 
among new disability pensioners was a little different. 
By far the largest number of new disability pensioners was recorded in 1999 (37,100), 
subsequently dropping to 2,700 the next year. In 2003 and 2004, the number ranged around 
7,000. The main reason for the inflow of a large number of new disability pensioners in 1999 
was the new Law on Pension Insurance, which transferred over 35,000 persons who had 
temporary papers on disability pensions into the pension system (persons who by that time had 
received temporary benefits from employers). The inflow of new survivors’ pensioners does not 
indicate significant oscillations. Between 13,000 and 14,500 new survivors’ pensioners enter the 
system annually. According to the data from 2003, the shares of women and men among old age 
pensioners were the same. On the other hand, men prevailed among new disability pensioners 
(in 2003 they comprised over 70%). 
Figure 7. Pension beneficiaries 
Source: CPII. 
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After the new Law on Pension Insurance came into force (1999), average pensions have been 
rising in absolute terms expressed in local currency or euros (in 2005 the average old age 
pension amounted to €273, the average disability pension to €219 and the average survivors’ to 
€212).  
By contrast, if the pension levels are compared with the average wage (the replacement rate), 
then, as can be seen from Figure 8, the replacement rates of all three types of pensions increased 
in 2001, but thereafter they have been on a continual decline. In 2005, the replacement rate for 
old age pensions was 46% of the average wage, for disability pensions it was 37% and for 
survivors it was 36%. The rise in 2001 was a result of the law on the increase of pensions in 
order to eliminate the differences in the amount of pensions realised prior to 1999.  
Figure 8. The average pension benefit (as a % of the average net wage) 
Source: CPII. 
After 2001, the share of average pensions in the average wage has shown a downward trend, 
because the Law on Pension Insurance revised the formula for pension calculations. Since then 
the calculations have been carried out on the basis of an increasingly extended accounting 
period (in 2004 it was 25 years, in 2005 it was 28 years and in 2006 it is 31 years). That is why 
pensions realised after 1 January 1999 are almost a quarter less than those realised before that 
date.  
The decrease in the average pensions of new pensioners is confirmed by the fact that the 
replacement rate for new old age pensions in 2004 was 13.6% less than that for old age pensions 
as a whole. Nevertheless, the previously mentioned decrease in replacement rates has been 
influenced by the changes in the composition of pensioners since 1999. For example, there are 
many more farmers, who began to receive pensions for the first time at the end of the 1990s (as 
pension insurance for them was introduced in 1980). Their pensions are considerably lower, but 
they also pay half the contribution rate. In addition, the number of disability pensioners with 
low pension benefits has increased as well. After 1999, a uniform pension calculation formula 
for men and women was accepted, whereas in the past the method of pension calculation for 
women was more favourable than it was for men (e.g. women received five years of service 
when retired).  
Moreover, the relevance of the minimum pension in the new law, which plays a very important 
redistributive role, should be pointed out. In the period 1999–2005, more than 46% of 
pensioners realised the minimum pension as the most favourable one (in 1999 the share was 
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over 66%). This kind of pension is of particular importance for farmers (because over 99% of 
them receive the minimum pension) and for women. 
The portion of recipients of unemployment benefits among the registered unemployed in the 
period 1995–2005 ranged from between 15% and 24%. From 1995 until 2001, this portion was 
less than 20%, and after 2001, it ranged between 21% and 24% (Figure 9). These data show that 
unemployment benefit coverage is quite modest in relation to many countries in the EU. The 
relatively poor coverage of unemployment benefits is a result of a large number of long-term 
unemployed and of young persons entering the labour market for the first time, as they are not 
entitled to such benefits.  
Figure 9. Unemployment benefits – Beneficiaries and replacement rates 
Source: CES. 
The insufficient number of jobs and weak dynamics in the labour market make it difficult for 
the unemployed to change their status. The number of women among those who receive 
unemployment benefits has risen steadily since 1995, when women made up about 28% of 
beneficiaries. Yet in 2000, the share of women among beneficiaries was over 55%, and in 2004, 
it exceeded 60%. In 2005, about 58% of the beneficiaries were women. The reason for this 
increased share of women among unemployment benefit recipients is most likely linked to the 
fact that in the early 1990s, sectors employing mostly men (the building industry, the production 
of machines, steel, etc.) were hit harder by the closing of firms and restructuring.  
This trend was accompanied by the demobilisation of soldiers in the Croatian army and the staff 
reductions at the Ministry of Defence. In the second half of the 1990s, restructuring was 
predominately oriented towards sectors employing mostly women (the textile and garment 
industry, services, the public sector and the like). Also, women wait longer for jobs.  
The level of unemployment benefits in 2005 amounted to a little more than €130 per month. If 
we compute the replacement rate for unemployment benefits, then we notice a continual decline 
in the replacement rate (from 34% in 1997 to 23% in 2005). Frequently, the levels of benefits go 
down when the number of beneficiaries goes up. Furthermore, there is a very narrow span 
between the highest and the lowest levels of benefit (less than €15). 
Regarding benefits to family and children, the largest number of beneficiaries is represented by 
the group receiving child allowances (in 2005 about 440,000 children). A considerable rise in 
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child allowance beneficiaries occurred in 2001 (the number of beneficiaries was 45% larger 
than in the previous year), which was caused by an extension of the right to a child allowance to 
all children and by new income thresholds in the system for the allowances. But the government 
lowered the income threshold the following year in order to reduce the number of beneficiaries 
and the level of expenditures (at present the right to a child allowance is available to those 
households with an income per household member below 30% of the average net wage). The 
average amount of the child allowance has been a little less since 2001 (now it is €37 per 
month). Each newborn is entitled to a one-off payment of HRK 1,360 (€188), which has not 
changed over past 10 years. The average mandatory maternity benefit is about €450 (the benefit 
cannot exceed €587) and monthly amounts of additional maternity benefits range between €221 
and €345. Unemployed mothers are entitled to maternity benefits, which are set at the same 
amount throughout their entire maternity leave (€221).  
Childcare services (nurseries and kindergartens) are under the remit of local government. About 
43% of children aged 3-7 are covered by institutional childcare services. It should be stressed 
that in addition to child allowances and one-off payments financed from the central budget, 
local authorities may introduce their own benefits intended for families and children, and some 
local authorities have done so (Zagreb and others). The levels of local funds vary to a large 
degree.  
The number of social welfare beneficiaries in the period 2000–04 ranged between 4% and 6% 
of the Croatian population. A slow upward trend in the number of beneficiaries has been 
evident, such that in 2004 almost 6% of the Croatian population received some kind of material 
support or care services. The number of permanent social welfare recipients (support allowance) 
at the end of 2004 was a little less than 3% of Croatian citizens. There was a noticeable upward 
trend in the number of recipients from the introduction of this scheme in the beginning of 1998 
until 2002, when the number of beneficiaries stabilised at about 121,000 (52,500 households). 
There is no difference in the gender composition of beneficiaries. The support allowance is the 
most important benefit in the social welfare system. In 2004, expenditures on this benefit made 
up approximately one-fourth of total social welfare expenditures and more than 45% of total 
spending on social welfare benefits. The standard rate of permanent social welfare for an able-
bodied person is HRK 400 (about €54) or 9% of the average net wage.  
5.5 Taxation 
The consolidated central government consists of the budgetary central government, three social 
security funds (the CPII, the CIHI and the CES), two extra-budgetary funds (Croatian Waters, 
and the Environment Protection Fund) and four agencies (Croatian Motorways, Croatian Roads, 
the State Agency for Deposit Insurance and Bank Rehabilitation and the Croatian Privatisation 
Fund), whose revenues and expenses are consolidated. According to Ministry of Finance data, 
consolidated general government revenues totalled HRK 103.1 bn (€13.9 bn) in 2005. The 
greatest contributions to the rise of consolidated general government revenues in 2005 came 
from VAT revenues, social security contributions and profit taxes, which make up nearly 70% 
of all revenues at this level of government. Tax revenues, which make up nearly 60% of total 
consolidated general government revenues, grew by 7.3% in 2005 year-on-year. The growth of 
revenues from VAT, profit taxes, excise taxes and income taxes added most to this rise. 
Personal income and company taxes exist but they are less important as sources of public 
revenues and comprise approximately 20% of all tax revenues (or less than 10% of GDP). 
Social security contributions, which make up nearly one-third of the revenue structure of the 
consolidated general government, went up by 6.2% year-on-year in 2005. This rise was 
primarily owing to the growth in the average monthly gross wage. Employees’ contributions 
versus employers’ contributions in percentages fell slightly during the 2003–05 period from 46 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
86.1 to 83.0%, although the opposite is expected in 2006. Meanwhile, the share of employers’ 
contributions increased in 2004 and 2005 (9.9% and 6.1% respectively). The governmental 
share increased in 2004 by 16.7% and slightly decreased in 2005 by 1.9%. The share of 
contribution revenues in the total expenses of social security funds fell from 75.7% in 2003 to 
74.2% in 2004 and returned to the previous level in 2005. For the year 2006, it is expected that 
the share of contribution revenues in the total expenses of social security funds will be 77.8% 
(see also section 6.1.3).  
Figure 10 again illustrates that taxes are the most significant source of revenues. Taxes on the 
consumption of goods and services (among which VAT and excise taxes are the leading items) 
are the largest components of the tax revenues. Taxes on international trade and transactions 
showed a nominal decrease in revenues in comparison with the previous years, which is a 
consequence of developments in international cooperation and international trade liberalisation. 
On the other hand, taxes on property have experienced significant growth (especially compared 
with the pre-2004 period), which has primarily stemmed from a rise in prices and trade in the 
real-estate market. In 2005, local (regional) government revenues made up about 10% of 
consolidated general government revenues and they grew nearly twice as fast (12.3%) year-on-
year as consolidated central government revenues (6.5%). In July 2001, Croatia embarked on a 
partial decentralisation of its public finance. Thus, the total revenues of local governments in the 
period 2002–05 rose by 25%. Local government revenues from taxes increased during this same 
period and in 2005 they were around 58% of total local government revenues. The share of non-
tax revenues was around 30% of the total, in which revenues from assets were around 8% and 
administrative fees and other revenues were around 20%. 
Figure 10. Revenues of the consolidated central government 
Source: Ministry of Finance. 
As social security contributions are an important source of public revenues (and a heavy burden 
for taxpayers), it is necessary to analyse the tax burden and causes of tax evasion for the whole 
system of taxes and social contributions. The evasion of paying taxes and contributions is a 
widespread phenomenon in Croatia (but it is extremely difficult to estimate precisely the scope 
of the evasion). Sanja Madzarevic-Sujster (1997) found that such evasion in Croatia most often 
involves declaring lower tax bases and the payment of wages in cash, through unions or in kind, 
hence evading the payment of taxes and surtax. The amount of unpaid tax and contributions is 
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very much conditioned by the source of the income, that is, by the industrial sector in which the 
person is employed. Using simulations, Madzarevic-Sujster (2002) estimated that in the period 
1994–2000 the extent of income tax and surtax evasion grew by 1-1.5% of GDP. Thus, a large 
portion of income goes unreported and untaxed. An obvious impact tax evasion is the erosion of 
the tax base. Tax evasion also affects the government’s ability to distribute the tax burden fairly: 
individuals who underreport their income may be unfairly receiving benefits that the 
government has aimed at providing only to those who earn less than a certain amount. 
5.6  Gender equality and anti-discrimination 
Given their unfavourable position in the labour market, the difficulties of reconciling work and 
household activities and the general influence of the traditional image of women in society, it is 
not surprising to note the low level of participation of women in public life. As European gender 
statistics have not covered Croatia so far, the most relevant source of gender statistics are those 
compiled by the UN’s Economic Commission for Europe.
25 This source reveals that the share of 
women in Croatia’s national parliament in 1995 was only 7.9% and among government 
ministers, it was 10%. The situation improved after 2000, with the share of women in 
parliament in 2005 having risen to 21.7% and to 26% among government ministers.  
Several recent reports have shown that further efforts are needed to raise the political 
participation of women and to ensure that women’s representation reaches the 30% deemed 
necessary by the government’s national policy on gender equality for 2001–05 (see Ženska 
mreža Hrvatske [Women’s Network Croatia], 2006, and the analysis made by Croatia’s Gender 
Equality Ombudsman).
26 Some studies also point out the low numbers of women in higher 
positions: women represent 6% of managers, 30% of entrepreneurs, 39% of school headmasters 
and 28% of managers of healthcare institutions (Milidrag Šmid, 2005).  
Against this background, government policies concerning gender equality have improved over 
the last 10 years. In 1997, along with setting out the national policy for gender equality, the 
government also established a Committee for Gender Equality and openly highlighted the low 
level of women’s participation in higher political bodies. After the general elections in 2000, 
amendments were made to the constitution stating that gender equality is a basic value. Very 
important steps were taken in 2003, when parliament passed the Law on Gender Equality, and 
when the Gender Equality Ombudsman and the government’s Office for Gender Equality were 
established. The concept of gender mainstreaming also came onto the public agenda. Activities 
towards gender equality have been closely linked to the laws and policies on domestic violence 
and particularly violence against women. The public has become more sensitive to these issues, 
although a high incidence of domestic violence is still present. In its latest conclusions on 
Croatia, the UN’s Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women stated that 
while noting Croatia had enacted a package of anti-discrimination laws, the Committee was 
concerned that insufficient measures had been put in place to ensure their speedy, consistent and 
effective implementation.
27 Croatia is currently drafting a new national policy on gender 
equality for 2006–10, which is based on improvements made during the recent period, but also 
the acknowledgment that gender equality is far from realised. 
                                                 
25 See the website of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (retrieved from 
http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/Saveshow.asp).  
26 Data derived from the website of the Gender Equality Ombudsman (retrieved from http://www.prs.hr).  
27 Data derived from CEDAW (2005) (retrieved from http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ 
cedaw32/conclude-comments/Croatia/CEDAW-CC-CRO-0523910E.pdf). 48 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
The protection of national minorities and particularly of the Serb minority is one of the main 
issues in Croatia’s post-war development. In this regard, Croatia created the government Office 
for Human Rights in 2001, signed various important international agreements (such as the 
European Convention on Nationality) and passed several laws. The Law on the Rights of 
National Minorities that was passed in 2002 guarantees the human, cultural, economic and 
educational rights of minorities and their adequate representation in political bodies. It also 
established the Council of National Minorities and respective councils in municipalities, towns 
and counties. This framework has proven important in cases where the violation of the rights of 
minorities has persisted (although it occurs to a lesser extent than during the war or immediately 
following it). 
The need for the effective implementation of respective laws and programmes is of special 
interest for the Roma, whose living conditions have been repeatedly discussed in this country 
report. Some encouraging signs come from the fact that the National Programme for the Roma 
was passed in 2003 and in 2005 the Action Plan for the Decade of Roma Inclusion for 2005–15 
was adopted. It should be stressed that the Roma are the only minority group who cannot fulfil 
their constitutional right to have education in their own language (because of a lack of teachers 
who are proficient in the Romani language, the non-standardised character of the language and a 
lack of textbooks). 
Improving life for persons with disabilities, as well as their active social involvement is 
promoted by the national strategy for an integral policy for disabled persons for 2003–06. The 
government also adopted some measures for increasing their employment possibilities. They 
have the right (based on their abilities) to be included in the educational system, which has a 
duty to facilitate their inclusion. Nonetheless, the Quality of Life Survey (UNDP, 2006b) 
identifies them as among those persons who face different kinds of discriminatory attitudes in 
daily life.  
Anti-discrimination provisions are included in various other laws (such as penal or labour laws), 
banning any kind of discrimination based on race, colour, gender, sexual orientation, 
nationality, social or health status, family obligations, etc. Much attention has been devoted to 
child protection, with the Office of the Ombudsman for Children being established in 2003. 
Since 2004, the Croatian Penal Code has also contained regulations related to human 
trafficking. There are several other programmes to promote anti-discrimination in the fields of 
youth, protection against violence, sex workers and the treatment of persons with HIV/AIDS, 
etc. Still, and although it is committed to doing so, the government has not yet passed the 
proposed national strategy for the elimination of discrimination, which should further develop 
anti-discrimination practices in Croatia. 
6. Governance  structures 
6.1  Governance efficiency in general and in the social protection system 
in particular 
6.1.1  Structure of the government 
The Croatian constitution from 1990 together with respective laws from 1992 created a legal 
framework for the development of local self-government in Croatia. Contrary to this, the entire 
administrative system was highly centralised and local governments did not even have the 
power to perform their constitutional tasks. In this respect, the Croatian situation was in 
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Various legal changes made in 2001 enabled the greater and more appropriate role of regional 
(21 counties) and local governments (124 towns and 426 municipalities). Counties undertake 
tasks that are of regional importance in the fields of education, healthcare, spatial and urban 
planning, economic development, traffic management, and the planning and development of 
educational, welfare and cultural institutions. County competencies can be transferred to towns 
that have more than 30,000 inhabitants and meet certain requirements. Local governments 
perform tasks of local importance, particularly those connected with housing, spatial and urban 
planning, protection and development of the environment, childcare, primary education, 
welfare, primary healthcare, culture, sports and consumer protection. 
Thus, based on these changes, funding and management rights were transferred to the counties 
for primary and secondary schools, dormitories, elderly care homes and some of the costs for 
health and social care. The financing system was also considerably altered. For example, until 
the year 2000, the share of the different levels of government in the disbursement of revenues 
from income tax was as follows: municipalities and towns 25%, counties 5% and the central 
government 70% (the only exception was the City of Zagreb with a share of 45%). From July 
2001, the share of the central government in the income tax declined to 25.6%. Still, the 
financial capacity of the less developed counties is far from appropriate for their needs. Based 
on minimal financial standards, the government decides each year on the disbursement of 
financial help to local governments that cannot meet those standards. The key differences are 
noticeable among local governments that have problems in satisfying minimal needs and the 
richest counties (such as the City of Zagreb), which can set significantly higher standards and 
social benefits. Another problem concerns the relatively large number of municipalities that do 
not meet the essential preconditions for the establishment of separate municipalities, but which 
have been founded primarily because of different political interests. 
6.1.2  Governance efficiency indicators 
According to different governance indicators (Figure 11), Croatia ranked at around 60% in 
2004, which indicates the need and room for considerable improvement.
28  
Figure 11. Governance indicators 
Source: World Bank (retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/sc_chart.asp). 
                                                 
28 Data derived from the World Bank (retrieved from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/ 
mc_chart.asp).  
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The indicator of government effectiveness, which reflects the quality of public provision, the 
quality of bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service 
from political pressure and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies, ranked 
at 54.2% in 1996 and at 64.9% in 2004.
29 The crucial challenge here is how to reduce political 
control over the civil service and how to make the civil service attractive for younger and 
educated persons, who could apply their expertise.  
The indicator of regulatory quality, which reflects the incidence of market-unfriendly policies 
and burdens imposed by the excessive regulation of foreign trade and business development, 
was rated at 44.8% in 1996 and 58.1% in 2004.  
The rule of law, as a third indicator, is one of the main issues stressed in numerous policy 
papers, particularly those connected with the integration of Croatia in the EU. The reform of the 
judiciary is still a major priority, which has been repeatedly emphasised by the European 
Commission.
30 This indicator measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society and it includes perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness 
and predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. The value was 32.5% in 
1996 and 55.6% in 2004. Croatia has obviously made considerable improvements since 1996, 
but it should be noted that this is the lowest value among others mentioned here, and that the 
value of around 50% is not a particularly high one. The indicator for control of corruption is 
also very important for overall economic and social development. It measures perceptions of 
corruption, which is defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. This indicator had 
a value of 34.7% in 1996 and 60.1% in 2004.  
Additional detailed insight into corruption, as well as the connection between the perception of 
corruption and other government effectiveness indicators, most notably the rule of law, can be 
drawn from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and the data provided by 
Transparency International, Hrvatska (2005).
31 With the value of 3.4 (on a scale from 1-10 with 
10 being the best), in 2005 Croatia ranked 70
th in the world. About 89% of respondents thought 
that corruption was present or widespread in Croatia. As in the case of other indicators, Croatia 
made significant steps forward in 2000, and after that, a slow but worrying decline has been 
observed. The value of the Corruption Perception Index was as high as 3.9 in 2001. In this 
respect, Croatia was similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a negative trend was observed 
from 2003 to 2005, and these two countries were the only ones with a negative trend among the 
neighbouring countries of Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, and Macedonia. Among all CEE countries, the respondents from Croatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed the greatest concern about the impact of corruption on the 
business environment and in Croatia the justice system was seen as that most endangered by 
corruption.  
A very interesting feature to note is the change recorded over time for all the government 
indicators. The usual pattern is to start from a very low level in 1996 with declines commencing 
from 2000 or from 2002 to 2004. Decreases in recent years may relate to the change of 
government in 2000 and the very high expectations of it in various social fields. Namely, that 
was the first change of the party in power since 1990 and the public in general had very high 
                                                 
29 The description of indicators and methodology is drawn from Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi (2005).  
30 In the Croatia 2005 Progress Report (European Commission, 2005), the European Commission stated 
that the backlog of cases before the courts and the excessive duration of legal proceedings affect access to 
justice and the right to an effective remedy within a reasonable time. 
31 For further details, see the website of Transparency International (http://ww1.transparency.org/cpi/2005 
/cpi2005.sources.en.html and http://www.transparency.hr/dokumenti/istrazivanja/omnibus_04_2005_ 
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expectations that quickly (partly) proved somewhat unrealistic. On the other hand, it seems that 
the willingness of the government (both the previous and the current one) to make considerable 
changes in some fields usually linked with corruption or the rule of law is not as strong as it 
should be. One of the most widely discussed issues in recent years is the law on the financing of 
political parties, which should build a mechanism for the prevention of non-transparent 
financing and reduce financing from public companies. In this respect, the government has 
recently passed some important measures (like the introduction of the one-stop-shop HITRO.hr 
for starting a business or the visible attempts to make improvements in the cadastre system), 
which will hopefully be reflected in the indicators for 2006. 
Another thing meriting comment is the fact that the values of all the indicators (except for the 
control of corruption) were higher in 1998 in comparison with 2004. This is something that 
cannot be understood from the political and social processes at the end of the 1990s. It is hard to 
believe that, for example, the independence of the civil service from political pressure or the 
effectiveness of the judiciary were at that time better than today. In the late 1990s, Croatia had 
serious problems in democratic and overall social development and had no relations with the 
EU, as in the EU’s estimation Croatia was neither a fully democratic state nor a functioning 
market economy. From that point of view, the results from 1998 should be taken with caution.  
The need to make improvements in government efficiency and transparency are also apparent 
from the comparison between Croatia and other CEE countries. Usually, Croatia is behind 
countries such as Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia or the Czech Republic and is roughly at the same 
level or is doing slightly better than countries like Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. On the other 
hand, while Croatia is situated at around 60%, the majority of the OECD countries have scores 
of between 80% and 90%.  
6.1.3  Performance of the social protection system and poverty reduction 
It is quite clear that contributive (social insurance) schemes depend on the level and method of 
collecting contributions. In Croatia, since the middle of 1991 all social insurance contributions 
have flowed into the Treasury, from where they are transferred to the institutions, such as the 
CPII, CIHI and CES. Before that, contributions for health, pension and unemployment 
insurance were directed towards separate funds. The shift to the Treasury model was motivated 
by the desire for better collection and control of contributions. Pension and health systems face 
great financial difficulties. The share of contributions in total pension revenues decreased 
dramatically. Collecting contributions is still an important issue. The evasion of paying 
contributions has been taking place in various ways. During the 1990s, a considerable number 
of employers did not pay wages to their employees (wages were in arrears for months or even 
years). According to the estimates of trade unions, at present about 40,000 employees do not 
receive wages or receive them with long arrears. On the other hand, many employers register 
their employees at the minimum wage and thus pay contributions on the minimum contribution 
base. This practice will influence the pensions that will be paid from the second tier of 
individual savings, which will depend only on contribution amounts and the regularity of their 
payments. As employers pay contributions on behalf of their employees, before the changes in 
the pension system it was extremely difficult to determine whether they had done so. Based on 
the data from mid-2003, about 11.4% of those insured by mandatory pension insurance paid 
contributions that were below the minimum contribution base for employees (Bejaković, 2004). 
It is also very difficult to estimate arrears in paying contributions. Such data are not available, in 
particular since the CPII ceased to inspect this problem. Now, the tax authorities are obliged to 
control and enforce contributions (including contributions to the second tier). 
It should be pointed out that some forms of atypical work (part-time work, externally contracted 
work, etc.) have been regulated by amendments to the law, for which contributions has been 52 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
paid. Efforts have been made to cover some vulnerable groups of employees by pension 
insurance and to increase the contribution revenues.  
The fraction of the active population not included in the pension system is relatively small. If 
one compares the number of insured persons with the number of employed persons (according 
to the LFS), then the percentage of those excluded has decreased (e.g. in 2000 it was 11%, and 
in 2005 it was 5%) (CPII and CBS). The data show that contribution compliance has improved 
since 2000. The ratio between the effective contribution rate and the statutory rate for all insured 
persons reached 78.4% of the maximum attainable amount in 2000 and in 2002 it was 81.2%. If 
one compares the covered wage bill with the actual wage bill, it turns out that contribution 
compliance improved at the turn of the 1990s. In 2001, this ratio was 91.4% (Bejaković, 2004). 
The data from 2004 show that it had not changed essentially (90.9%) (CPII and CBS). 
If we analyse the expenditures by the social protection system as a whole (including schemes 
for war veterans and their family members), then expenditures on benefits in 2003 came to 96% 
of total expenditures (the same percentage as in the EU) (Eurostat). The remaining expenses 
refer to salaries and allowances, running expenses of the administrative offices and other costs. 
If we are confined to the pension system, administrative and other costs (including staff salaries) 
were 2.6% of total pension expenditures in 2004, with personnel costs making up 1.3%. 
A simple way to determine how social security transfers (separately or combined) influence the 
reduction of the poverty rate is to compare pre-transfer and post-transfer income. Pre-transfer 
income is defined as actual disposable income less the actual social security transfers received, 
while post-transfer income is equal to disposable income (including all transfers). Social 
security transfers are divided into two categories: pensions and ‘other social transfers’. Pensions 
here include only old age and survivors’ pensions for the sake of comparability with EU 
countries. Pensions are separated from other social transfers because pension costs represent the 
largest part of social expenditures. Other social transfers include benefits related to 
unemployment, maternity, newborns, children, sick leave, welfare assistance, physical 
impairments, the rehabilitation or employment of persons with disabilities, scholarships and 
housing. If pensions and other transfers were excluded from income, then the poverty rate 
would be 41.4% in 2004 instead of 16.7% (CBS). If pensions were considered part of income 
before transfers, the poverty rate would be 33.7%. The overall effectiveness of social protection 
transfers is measured by the poverty rate reduction (the reduction of the poverty rate owing to 
transfers is expressed as a percentage of the poverty rate before transfers). In 2004, the poverty 
rate was reduced by 60% owing to pensions and other social transfers. The poverty-rate 
reducing potential of other social transfers (with old age and survivors’ pensions included in 
pre-transfer income) was more than 50%. Comparing poverty rates before and after social 
transfers shows that the Croatian transfer system is as efficient as the average transfer system of 
the EU-25 (Šućur, 2005a). If old age and survivors’ pensions are included in pre-transfer 
income, other social transfers in Croatia are more efficient (in terms of poverty reduction) than 
those in the EU-25. A relatively high efficacy of the transfer system as a whole is combined 
with a relatively ineffective system of old age and survivors’ pensions (in terms of poverty rate 
reduction), which accounts for more than 40% of social protection expenditures. Poverty rate 
reduction owing to old age and survivors’ pensions is on average half the poverty rate reduction 
in most EU countries. In 2003, the poverty rate reduction stemming from old age and survivors’ 
pensions was 20.5% in Croatia and 37.5% in the EU-25 (Eurostat). The reasons for such a 
difference are the low levels of pensions and inappropriate coverage by the pension system. In 
2004, the average old age pension amounted to only 106% of the general poverty line 
(calculated by the FEI method).  
The transfers that are best targeted on the poor are social welfare and unemployment benefits. 
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population received (in the form of transfers or services) 14% of total social expenditures, 
including education expenditures. For example, shares of the poorest 20% in pension and health 
expenditures were 16% and 6% respectively. When the targeting of benefits is analysed (how 
much the poor received), in 2004 about 70% of social welfare expenditures and about 40% of 
unemployment benefit expenditures were received by persons who were by their incomes 
among the poorest 20% (World Bank, 2006). In the 1998 study (where the sample was not quite 
representative), this share was 50% for both benefits. Then, the poorest 20% received less than 
30% of the expenditures on benefits for children and families. In general, coverage by social 
benefits (the percentage of the population receiving benefits) is very low, even in the case of 
social welfare. In 2004, about 4% of the population and 12% of persons from the two bottom 
deciles received social welfare (World Bank, 2006). In addition, 5% of the population and 9% 
of the citizens from the two bottom deciles took up unemployment benefits, while about 20% of 
the population and 20% of the poorest two deciles received child allowances. Croatia spends 
relatively modest funds on social welfare benefits (0.7% GDP) in relation to other schemes, but 
even these funds are a considerable income source for the poor, because they cover more than a 
quarter of poor households’ expenditures (World Bank, 2000). The targeting of child 
allowances is not satisfactory; nevertheless, the government also wants child allowances to 
become a tool of a pro-birth policy.  
6.2  The character and capacity of the social partners and social dialogue 
The history of social dialogue in Croatia can be traced back to 1993, when the government 
made an agreement with the Economic Chamber (later replaced by the Croatian Employers’ 
Association) and three trade unions.
32 In 1994, the tripartite Economic and Social Council (ESC, 
or in Croatian GSV) was established and the new Labour Law in 1995 provided an important 
legal framework for social partnership and social dialogue at the national and regional levels 
and the level of particular industrial branches. The ESC consists of 18 members (6 presidents of 
trade union confederations, 6 representatives of employer associations, 4 government ministers 
and 2 deputy prime ministers) and it mainly has an advisory role. Separate laws have stipulated 
that social partners are involved in the governing boards of the CES, Croatian Pension Institute, 
the Croatian Health Institute and the Fund for Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of 
the Disabled. 
Contrary to the established legal framework, social dialogue did not actually exist, particularly 
at the level of industry. A new impetus came in 2001, however, when the government signed the 
so-called Partnership for Development with four trade unions. Yet, the agreement with the trade 
unions soon failed, as the trade unions officially declared their dissatisfaction with the level of 
social dialogue with the government. The Office for Social Partnership was also established in 
2001 in order to facilitate the work of the ESC. Based on the financial assistance granted by the 
US Agency for International Development, it helped to set up ESCs at the county level (18 of 
them were created, each with 18 members), promote social dialogue and foster learning from 
foreign experience, say from Ireland or the Netherlands. The National Competitiveness Council 
was also formed, consisting of five government ministers, nine business leaders, four leaders of 
trade union confederations and four university professors.  
Although important achievements have been accomplished, dissatisfaction with the work of the 
ESC and the regional ESCs is widespread. The ESC is mainly seen as an ineffective body, with 
little or no impact on policy formulation. In some counties, ESCs have collapsed because of a 
                                                 
32 Data drawn from the websites of the Croatian Employers’ Union (retrieved from www.hup.hr), the 
Office for Social Partnerships (retrieved from www.socijalno-partnerstvo.hr), Lowther & Sever (2006) 
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lack of interest from the local government but some are very active. It also seems that the 
current government does not pay much attention to social dialogue, as the Office for Social 
Partnership exists, but without any important projects or an official role.  
One of the most crucial issues in the development of social dialogue is connected with 
collective bargaining. At present, there are several collective agreements concluded at the level 
of economic sectors, which have been supported by trade union federations, the Chamber of 
Commerce and employers’ federations, as well as the county ESCs. Still, the system of 
collective bargaining in Croatia remains to a large degree decentralised and confined to 
negotiations with a single employer. There are no reliable data about the coverage of workers by 
collective agreements. Some estimates speak of the coverage of 60% of workers, which is 
related to the practice of extending concluded agreements to all workers (irrespective of their 
membership in trade unions) or to all workers within the same branches of industry. At the same 
time, there are many employers who create obstacles for trade unions or workers’ 
representatives, and who usually do not see any merit in promoting social dialogue. The 
competition among different trade unions is also a problem, and there are no official data about 
trade union membership.  
6.3  Civil society organisations 
Civil society is a new phenomenon in Croatia, which became prominent after the fall of 
communism. Although we cannot talk about civil society in the Communist period, it has to be 
noted that associational activities were partly autonomous with respect to sports, cultural and 
professional organisations. In the 1980s, a few new organisations emerged, such as women’s 
and green organisations, and they contributed to the democratisation of society. During the 
1990s, civil society development was mainly connected with the humanitarian crisis and many 
international and new domestic organisations began to operate in Croatia. At the same time, the 
1990s did not greatly favour civil society development, given the many political, legal and tax 
barriers (Bežovan, 2004b). The Law on Associations passed in 1997 proved to be very 
restrictive, and even the Constitutional Court found it unconstitutional in 2001. Although this 
unfavourable legacy cannot be overcome in a short period, important improvements have taken 
place since 2000: the restrictive provisions of the Law on Associations have been changed, 
several tax laws have been revised by the government (improving the position of the non-profit 
sector) and in general the government has shown a willingness to cooperate with civil society. 
There were about 20,000 registered associations in 1998 (according to the procedure prescribed 
by the law from 1997), whose number rose to almost 30,000 in 2006. That being said, almost 
half of these are sports (35%) and cultural (13%) organisations.  
One aspect of the societal legacy can be found in more developed, informal contacts with 
relatives or friends in comparison with activities through formal organisations. That has been 
proven by the Quality of Life Survey in 2006 (UNDP, 2006b), which shows that regular face-to-
face contacts are spread outside the household, but mainly occur with family members and 
friends. Assistance in various instances (such as illness, the need for advice about a serious 
personal or family matter, etc.) is also predominately expected from family members and to a 
lesser extent from friends. Formal organisations and voluntary activities through such 
organisations is of much less importance. Only 5.7% of respondents reported that they had 
attended a meeting of a charitable or voluntary organisation over the past month and only 4.8% 
had served on a committee or performed voluntary work for voluntary organisations. 
Attendance of meetings of trade unions or political parties, action groups or any other kind of 
political activity was reported by 8%. Croats are not in the habit of contacting politicians or 
public officials. Meanwhile, the image of Croatia as a highly religious country is not 
overestimated, although church attendance was lower than the number of religious persons. BALKANDIDE: COUNTRY REPORT ON CROATIA | 55 
 
Regular attendance (once a week or more) was reported by 24.7% of respondents and less 
regular but still high levels of attendance (once or twice a month) were reported by 17.1%. 
These rates are slightly lower than those reported in 1999 (the European Values Survey), when 
attendance at least once a week was reported by 31.4% and at least once a month by 21.1% 
(Črpić & Zrinščak, 2005a). 
The results of the European Values Survey from 1999 also showed that Croats usually spent 
time with friends every week, and only a minority (12%) did so with persons in clubs or 
voluntary organisations (Črpić & Zrinščak, 2005b). The same study revealed that while 
membership in voluntary organisations was not high, membership was more widespread in 
religious or church organisations, sports and recreational associations, trade unions, educational 
and cultural organisations. Some 60% of respondents were not members of any organisation and 
almost 80% did not perform any voluntary unpaid work.  
Important insights into the state of civil society came from the research conducted in 2004 and 
2005 by the Centre for Development of the Non-Profit Sector (Ceraneo), on the basis of the 
comparative methodology developed by CIVICUS (World Alliance for Civil Citizenship), 
which was undertaken in 60 countries around the world (Bežovan, Zrinščak & Vugec, 2005). 
The research showed that the willingness of citizens to donate for humanitarian reasons is on the 
rise, but not voluntary work. There is a great deal of mistrust among civil society organisations, 
which tend to balk at networking. The overall low level of trust in society is also a factor 
inhibiting their contribution to civil society. These organisations are concentrated in larger cities 
and in the developed parts of the country with a higher share of educated persons. The main 
obstacles to their development can be found in inadequate financial resources and non-
transparent state funding to different organisations. In general, their influence in the process of 
policy formulation and implementation is very limited. On the other hand, they satisfy the needs 
of marginalised segments of the population and can provoke and have an impact on important 
public debates. In addition to the shortcomings mentioned above, it should be noted that this 
research also confirmed improvements in civil society development in comparison with similar 
research conducted in 2001. These improvements are mainly visible through the ability of civil 
society organisations to raise some crucial social issues and to make an impact, such as it is, in 
the fields of domestic violence, human rights or environmental protection. There are also signs 
that relations between the local governments, the business sector and civil society organisations 
are improving.  
7. Specific  issues 
7.1  Social protection system for Croatian war veterans and their family 
members  
The system of social protection for Croatian war veterans and their family members falls under 
the competence of the MFVAIS. In addition to this ministry, the activities related to the rights 
of veterans and their family members are performed by the state administration offices in the 
counties. Veterans’ entitlements are based on body damage incurred in the Croatian war, the 
loss of family members, the material and other necessities of war veterans and their family 
members, and are regulated by a set of laws.  
The expenses of the protection system for war veterans and their family members in the period 
since 2000 have represented around 1.5% of GDP. The relative share of these expenses in the 
GDP has tended to stagnate or rise slowly. In the future, it is possible to expect a slight increase, 
not owing to the growth in benefit amounts but to the inflow of new beneficiaries in the system 
(the status of some war veterans has yet to be resolved). Also, it can be expected that some war 56 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
veterans who are currently employed by the Ministry of Defence will be transferred to this 
system, given the fact that the pensions of war veterans are significantly higher than the 
pensions of military staff.  
There are three basic groups of beneficiaries: 1) war veterans; 2) disabled war veterans; and 3) 
family members of killed, missing and deceased veterans. Each of these groups of beneficiaries 
is entitled to obtain various benefits. The system of social protection for war veterans is very 
complex and consists of many benefits (more than 30 entitlements). 
Among the numerous rights of war veterans and their family members, the rights to disability 
and survivors’ pensions should be highlighted. The expenses of these two benefits in last few 
years have come to represent more than 70% of the total benefit expenses for war veterans and 
their family members. On the other hand, personal and survivors’ disability allowances 
(compensation for the body damage incurred) represent about 15% of total benefit expenses. 
Excluding housing and tax and customs allowances, the expenses for other entitlements 
represent less than 1% of the total expenses for war veterans.  
As can be seen from Figures 8 (see section 5.4) and 12, the replacement rates (the share of the 
average pension in the average wage) for the pensions of war veterans and their family members 
are substantially higher in comparison with those of all pensioners. In 2004, the ratio of the 
replacement rate of war veterans’ disability pensions and the replacement rate of all disability 
pensions was 3.1:1, while this ratio for survivors’ pensions was 3.9:1. 
Figure 12. Average pension benefits for war veterans (as a % of the average net wage) 
Source: CPII. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the replacement rates for war veterans’ pensions have been 
falling since 2001 (with the exception of survivors’ pensions in 2005). The reason for the fall is 
that veterans’ pensions have not increased in nominal (absolute) amounts; they are not adjusted 
(indexed) according to rises in wages or the costs of living. Veterans’ pensions are adjusted 
according to the base amount determined by the government, which has remained unchanged 
since 2001.  
The healthcare expenses of the veterans’ population are also significant, but these costs are 
financed by the MHSW. A considerable share of the veterans’ population suffers from various 
war traumas, which affect their social functioning, particularly post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Furthermore, the veterans’ population is without doubt the group with the highest suicide rate. 
That is the why in 1999 the government implemented the national programme for psychosocial 
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aid. It aims at enhancing the quality of life and improving the social integration of persons who 
were victims of the war. The system of psychosocial assistance is organised at the national, 
regional and county levels.  
Various activities have been undertaken with the aim of including war veterans (who are mostly 
young persons) and their family members in mainstream economic and social life, to shift the 
focus away from these groups being passive recipients of welfare benefits. Because of the war, 
many veterans lost their jobs or discontinued their education. For diverse reasons, a segment of 
the veterans’ population is less easily employed (especially those with disabilities). The CES 
has designed a number of programmes with the goal of employing war veterans. In addition, the 
MFVAIS has established a set of policies for professional training and employment, as well as 
for introducing veterans to the system for facilitating SME entrepreneurship. The necessary 
financial resources for these programmes are allocated in the budget.  
7.2  Displaced persons and areas of special state concern  
As a consequence of the outbreak of the war in mid-1991, new socially vulnerable groups 
appeared – IDPs and refugees. These persons were forced to leave their homes, and many of 
them subsequently lost their homes or family member(s) or both. At the end of 1991, there were 
more than 550,000 IDPs in the Republic of Croatia (Office for Refugees, Returnees and 
Internally Displaced Persons). During the war, Croatian citizens expressed deep solidarity with 
IDPs and refugees (e.g. 80% of IDPs and refugees were accommodated in private 
houses/apartments and 20% of them were housed in state facilities and institutions). The social 
welfare system at that time was unable to look after such a huge number of persons; hence, a 
parallel system of protection for IDPs and refugees was established at the end of 1991, which 
still exists today (but in much narrower scope). When the war erupted in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in mid-1992, a large number of refugees found shelter in Croatia. Thus, at the end 
of that year, Croatia was obliged to take care of 700,000 displaced persons (400,000 IDPs and 
300,000 refugees). Refugees and IDPs represented 15% of the total population. This 
phenomenon was something akin to Germany looking after 10 million refugees. 
A set of laws was adopted that regulates the rights of IDPs and refugees with regard to housing, 
nutrition, psychosocial help, financial aid, the education of children, healthcare, etc. After the 
start of the return process of IDPs and refugees, a new category of so-called ‘returnees’ 
emerged. IDPs and refugees who return to their area can obtain the status of returnees, which 
can last for six months. Once this status expires, they can switch from the special benefit 
programme to the regular welfare system. Today the provision for the remaining IDPs and 
refugees falls under the Administration for IDPs, Refugees and Returnees, which is 
incorporated into the Ministry of Sea, Tourism, Transport and Development. The aid to refugees 
has mostly been financed from the state budget and partly from international humanitarian aid 
and loans. In addition, NGOs have had a very important role in helping displaced persons and 
refugees (in terms of material and psychosocial assistance). 
The socio-economic situation of the majority of IDPs and refugees is adverse. Poverty surveys 
indicate that the poverty rate of IDPs and refugees is much higher when compared with that of 
the local population. If a relative poverty line is used (60% of the median per capita national 
income), the poverty of these population groups is about three times higher than the Croatian 
average (UNDP, 2005). The loss of property, inadequate housing, unemployment and irregular 
income are the main sources of their poverty. The unemployment rates of IDPs and refugees are 
also two to three times higher than the national average. Also, many IDPs and refugees face 
other problems connected with access to healthcare and social services, pension entitlements, 
acquiring necessary documents, tenants’ rights, war-related trauma, isolation, illness, etc.  58 | BEJAKOVIĆ, ŠUĆUR & ZRINŠČAK 
The process of return began in the mid-1990s. In the period from 1995 to 2005, 340,000 
returnees registered (65% of them were Croatian citizens and 35% were ethnic and national 
Serbs who were also Croatian citizens). The number of returnees who are willing to return to 
Croatia is not available. The number of potential returnees who live in Serbia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is estimated at 20-25,000 persons. In Croatia, there are still slightly over 7,000 
persons willing to return to the cities and villages in which they lived before the war.  
From 1995 to 2004, HRK 25.2 billion (which equated to 11% of GDP in 2005) was spent on the 
return of IDPs and refugees, of which 92% were resources from the central budget. Annual 
expenditures for IDPs, refugees and returnees in the period 1996–2002 represented about 1.5% 
of GDP (since 2002, this share has been decreasing because the number of IDPs and refugees 
has been falling).  
There are many problems associated with the process of return: inadequate or destroyed 
infrastructure, weak economic activity and the deficit of private initiative (unemployment and 
economic underdevelopment), unavailable or limited social services, depopulation, land areas 
that still have not been cleared of mines, etc. Social integration is a problem at the local level 
and in neighbourhoods, particularly in ethnically mixed communities. Among the ethnic group 
of Serb returnees older persons dominate (few persons are aged 18-40 or younger than 18), 
although this trend partially changed after 2002. The majority of returnees are faced with the 
difficulties of ruined assets, a lack of income and unemployment.  
The areas of special state concern were defined by government law with the goals of eliminating 
the repercussions of the war, rebuilding production and the infrastructure, enhancing the return 
of the population, averting negative demographic trends, re-establishing mutual trust and 
providing incentives for growth and equal development. These areas were affected directly or 
indirectly by the war (mostly in eastern Croatia and the Dalmatian hinterland). During the war, 
26% of the territory was occupied and 54% was affected by war operations. The law on areas of 
special state concern primarily sets out policies for accommodation and the reconstruction of the 
housing stock, owing the fact that dwelling capacity was largely devastated by the war. 
Furthermore, various tax exemptions are stipulated for citizens living in these areas, as well as 
for the investors and local government administrations associated with them. The project for 
rebuilding the communal infrastructure in the areas of special state concern, with a value of 
around €100 million, began in 2004 with an expected completion date by 2007. It involves the 
revamp of communal services, local roads, council housing and other communal works. 
Unfortunately, government programmes and measures directed towards areas of special state 
concern have not yet been evaluated thoroughly. Some of the measures have not been 
implemented and thus many of the adverse trends in these areas have not been arrested (very 
high levels of unemployment, a lack of investment, depopulation, welfare dependency, etc.). 
The intention of the government is to end the parallel welfare system for displaced persons and 
to complete the process of their return as quickly as possible. Based on an arrangement from 
January 2005, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro are obliged to 
complete the process of return by the end of 2006. In that context, the budget financing of the 
separate system for IDPs, refugees and returnees is to be phased out in the next year. Because of 
this change, groups of displaced persons and refugees will lose some of their entitlements and 
benefits, and hence their inflow into the welfare system can be expected. Thus, it is necessary to 
forecast a higher welfare budget and more local government resources to accommodate this 
shift. | 59 
Glossary of Abbreviations 
ALMP  Active labour market policy  
CBS  Central Bureau of Statistics 
CEE  Central and Eastern European (countries) 
CES  Croatian Employment Service 
CIHI  Croatian Institute for Health Insurance 
CNIPH  Croatian National Institute for Public Health 
CPII Croatian  Pension Insurance Institute 
CPSTC  Centre for the Promotion of Social Teachings of the Church 
ESC  Economic and Social Council 
EPL  Employment protection legislation 
FEI method  Food energy intake method 
GNI  Gross national income 
GVA Gross  value  added 
HANFA  Croatian Agency for the Supervision of Financial Services 
HBS Household  budget  survey 
HRK  Hrvatska kuna [Croatian kuna] 
IDPs  Internally displaced persons 
ILO International  Labour  Organisation 
ISCED International  Standard  Classification of Education  
LFS Labour  Force  Survey 
MELE  Ministry of Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship 
MFVAIS  Ministry of the Family, Veterans’ Affairs and Intergenerational Solidarity 
MHSW  Ministry of Heath and Social Welfare 
MSES  Ministry of Science, Education and Sports 
NGOs Non-governmental  organisations 
NMS New  member  states 
NUTS  Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (Eurostat) 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
PAYG  Pay-as-you-go pension system 
PPP  Purchasing power parity 
PPS  Purchasing power standards 
REGOS  Central Register of Insured Persons 
SMEs  Small and medium-sized enterprises 
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme 
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Annex 3.1: Economy, labour market
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Inflation rate
Till the end of 1997 the price index 
series were presented according to 
UCEA (the Uniform Classification of 
Economic Activities), and in later year
according to NCEA (National 
Classification of Economic Activities)
aggregate CPI Statistical Yearbook 2005.
Till 1998 inflation rate was measured 
with costs of living indices. for 1999-
2004 with consumer price indices. For 
2006. estimation by The Institute of 
economics. Zagreb  - in Croatian 
Economic Outlook Quarterly 4.3 4.1 6.4 4 4.6 3.8 1.7 1.8 2.1 3.3-3.5
goods CPI Statistical Yearbook 2005. 3.6 3.9 5.2 2.9 4.5 3.4 0.3 1.5 1.7
services CPI Statistical Yearbook 2005. 9.2 5.6 12.9 8.1 5.1 5.3 7.3 2.6 3.3
Foreign Direct Investment
euro Croatian National Bank
for 2005 Q1.Q2.Q3 - WIIW estimation
for 2005. 1328  million EUR  
million 
euros 84 394 477 843 1,369 1,142 1,503 1,195 1,788 981 1,245
Productivity
Labour productivity per person employed (GDP in 
Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) per person 
employed relative to EU-25 (EU-25 = 100)) Eurostat
average nominal monthly wage. EUR
for 2006, first two months 
CBS Average Monthly Gross 
Earnings of Persons in Paid 
Employment
Used official exchange rate by 
Croatian National Bank, gross wage 483 544 599 638 678 724 744 797 815 879
nominal average wage growth. local currency
 Statistical Yearbook 2005. 7-
1. Average Monthly Paid Off 
Net And Gross Earning Per 
Person In Paid Employment In
Legal Entities, For 2004-2006,
CBS Average Monthly Paid 
net Earnings of Persons in 
Paid Employment gross wage 113.1 112.3 113.1 112.6 110.2 107 103.9 106 104.8 104.2 104.4 106.1Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Macroeconomic policies & other indicators
general government revenues; % of GDP Ministry of Finance
Data are shown for Consolidated 
General Government Revenues 
according to economic classification 
and as a share of the gross domestic 
product.  Expenditure includes all 
unredeemable and capital payments 
with or without counter-obligation, as 
well as paid off grants and transfers to 
others. Lending minus repayments is in
connection with claims from third 
parties coming out from public policy 48.2 50.7 49.0 52.9 53.0 48.9 47.5 41.8 41.8 42.0
general government expenditures; % of GDP
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development: Transtion 
Report 2003 - Integration and 
regional cooperation (2003) 
and Transtion Report 2004 - 
Infrastructure and Transition 
Report update. Transtion 
Report 2005 Business in 
transition 44.9 45.3 44.4 46.7 56.6 52.7 50.7 51.4 52.7 52.0
average interest rate - official. for major monetary 
policy instrument
Croatian National Bank - 
www.hnb.hr CNB Discount rate  8.5 6.5 5.9 5.9 7.9 5.9 5.9 5.6 4.5 4.5 4.5
3 month interbank offered interest rate
Croatian National Bank - 
www.hnb.hr
average of monthly rates, Average 
lending interest rates - Short-term 
corporate loans without a currency 
clause year 20.5 20.9 9.8 10.7 12.8 12.3 10.2 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.3
average annual exchange rate - local currency per 1 
euro
Croatian National Bank - 
www.hnb.hr 6.76 6.8 6.96 7.14 7.58 7.64 7.47 7.41 7.56 7.5 7.4
Balance of payments
current account
Croatian National Bank - 
www.hnb.hr, Ministry of 
Finance - www.mfin.hr
million 
euros (-1 305) (-1 312.9) (-489.8) (-817.7) (-2 097.2) (-1 866.2) (-1 445.2) (-1 963.6)
worker remittances The World Resources Institute Current US dollars
million 
USD 506 603 524 520 453 537 568 666 787
capital and financial accoun
Croatian National Bank - 
www.hnb.hr
million 
euros 2,250.9 1,244.7 1,051.1 2,732.0 2,996.5 2,267.1 2,896.1
direct investment in reporting country
Croatian National Bank - 
www.hnb.hr
million 
euros -4.1 -18.8 -174.5 -89.9 -54.4 -1.5 -175.6 -597.8 -93.0 -280.2 -142.7Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Labour market indicators
participation rate
total
Labour Force Survey, CBS, 
http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/priopce
nja/PrFrameH.htm , for early 
period Statistical yearbook 
1997-2000
for 1996 and 1997 rates are for the 
whole year, for 1998, 1999, 2002, 
2003, 2004 and 2005, rates are half-
sum of data for the first and second 
half of the year 56.2 54.7 53.1 51.9 50.6 49.7 50.9 50.3 50.5 49.6
age 15-64 ::::: 61.6 62.6 62.3 63.5 63.2
age 15-24 44.9 42.7 42.7 42.3 40.3 40.6 38.8 38.1 39.0 37.7
age 24-55
age 55-64
employment rate
total Labour Force Survey, CBS 50.6 49.3 47.0 44.8 42.6 41.8 43.3 43.1 43.5 43.2
age 15-64 ::::: 51.6 53.1 53.2 54.5 55.0
age 15-24 32.9 30.5 39.4 26.9 24.8 23.8 25.0 24.5 26.0 26.0
age 24-55
age 55-64
unemployment rate
total Labour Force Survey, CBS 10.0 9.9 11.4 13.6 16.1 15.8 14.8 14.3 13.8 12.7
age 15-64 ::::: 16.3 15.2 14.7 14.2 13.1
age 15-24 26.7 28.5 31.2 36.5 38.4 41.5 35.5 35.9 33.4 32.6
age 24-55
age 55-64
participation rate
male Labour Force Survey, CBS 64.9 62.7 61.1 59.3 58.4 57.9 58.6 58.3 58.3 57.3
age 15-64 ::::: 68.9 69.2 69.2 70.0 69.6
age 15-24 46.7 44.3 44.7 42.7 41.6 42.9 42.0 42.1 42.5 41.9
age 24-55
age 55-64
employment rate
male Labour Force Survey, CBS 58.7 56.9 54.5 51.7 49.7 49.7 50.8 50.7 51.2 50.6
age 15-64 ::::: 58.9 59.8 59.9 61.3 61.2
age 15-24 34.3 31.1 30.3 27.9 26.7 25.8 27.4 27.7 30.4 29.2
age 24-55
age 55-64
unemployment rate
male Labour Force Survey, CBS 9.5 9.5 10.9 12.8 15.0 14.2 13.4 13.1 12.2 11.7
age 15-64 ::::: 14.6 13.7 13.5 12.5 12.1
age 15-24 26.5 29.9 32.2 34.8 36.0 40.1 34.7 34.1 29.7 30.4
age 24-55
age 55-64
participation rate
female Labour Force Survey, CBS 48.6 47.6 47.1 45.4 44.0 42.4 44.0 43.1 43.6 42.7
age 15-64 ::::: 54.7 56.3 55.7 57.1 56.8
age 15-24 42.9 41.0 42.8 41.9 39.2 38.6 35.4 34.0 35.1 33.1
age 24-55
age 55-64Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
employment rate
female Labour Force Survey, CBS 43.5 42.7 40.6 38.9 36.4 34.9 36.7 36.3 36.7 36.8
age 15-64 ::::: 44.7 46.7 46.9 47.9 48.6
age 15-24 31.1 30.1 28.5 27.8 22.8 21.9 22.5 21.0 21.7 21.4
age 24-55
age 55-64
unemployment rate
female Labour Force Survey, CBS 10.5 10.4 13.0 14.5 17.3 18.1 16.6 15.8 15.7 13.0
age 15-64 ::::: 18.4 17.0 16.3 16.3 14.5
age 15-24 27.0 26.9 30.1 38.3 41.1 40.7 36.7 38.2 38.3 35.6
age 24-55
age 55-64
number of unemployed
in Labour Force Survey
Labour Force Survey, CBS, 
Publication:  Persons in  
Employment by Activity and 
by Seks, 2005/9-2-7 
http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/priopce
nja/PrFrameH.htm 
for the 1996 and 1997 whole year, for 
other years second part of the year, 
First labour Force Survey was 
performed in 1996.  170,000 175,000 204,000 251,000 322,000 290,000 259  000 259  000 246  000
registered by Croatia Employment Service
Croatia Employment Service - 
Monthly Statistics Bulletin 240,601 261,022 277,691 287,762 321,866 357,872 380,195 389,741 329,799 309,875 308,738
number of unemployed obtaining unemployment 
benefit
Croatia Employment Service - 
Monthly Statistics Bulletin 36,183 52,912 55,171 44,779 54,257 63,396 70,369 80,795 67,977 70,467 72,801
Active Labour Market Policies
number of unemployed taking part in ALMP Croatia Employment Service
Number for 1998 is valued for the 
period June 1998 till February 2000, 
number for 2001 covers only period of 
the last quater of the year, for 2002-
2005 number of people that were 
employed through ALMP 16,180 5,493 - 18,226 see notes  see notes  8,227 16,998 25,031 23,857
expenditures on ALMPs Croatia Employment Service
million 
HRK 125.6 44.1 1.3 80 6.87 338.11 329.19 255.86
Self-employment
rate of self-employed persons in employment all 
sectors 
CBS: Source: Statistical 
Yearbook 2005. Table 6-17 
Persons in employment by 
sectors of ownership, status in 
employment   second part of the year  % 12.8 17.6 16.7 19.2 20.7 21.1Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Legislative and regulatory framework
EBRD rating of legal extensiveness
http://www.ebrd.com/country/
sector/law/cla/croatia.pdf  and 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/
sector/law/about/assess/localla
w.pdf
for 1997-1997 LIS Overall 
Commercial Law Indicators 4 3 3+ 4 4-
EBRD rating of legal effectiveness
http://www.ebrd.com/country/
sector/law/cla/croatia.pdf and 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/
sector/law/about/assess/localla
w.pdf 3.3 4-
Transparency International corruption index
http://www.transparency.org/p
ublications/gcr/download_gcr in bracket position of Croatia 3.8 (51st  out of 102)   out of 133)  h out of 146)  h out of 158) 
Privatisation and private sector development
EBRD index of small-scale privatisation EBRD - Transition report  4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3
EBRD index of large-scale privatisation EBRD - Transition report  33333333 3 . 3 3 . 3 3 . 3
EBRD index of enterprise reform EBRD - Transition report  2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3 3
EBRD index of competition policy EBRD - Transition report  2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
Doing Business'. Dealing with licenses - time
http://www.doingbusiness.org/
ExploreTopics/StartingBusine
ss/ days 278
Doing Business'. Starting a business - duration
http://www.doingbusiness.org/
ExploreTopics/StartingBusine
ss/ percentile rank 49 49 49
Doing Business'. Starting a business - no. Of 
procedures
http://info.worldbank.org/gove
rnance/kkz2004/mc_indicator.
asp 12 12 12
WB Regulatory Quality from Governance Indicator
http://info.worldbank.org/gove
rnance/kkz2004/mc_indicator.
asp
standard 
deviation 
in bracket  44.8 (0.26) 60.9 (0.24)  59.9 (0.29) 62.2 (0.17)  58.1 ( 0.18)
WB Government Effectiveness from Governance 
Indicators
standard 
deviation 
in bracket  54.2 (0.19)  69.9 (0.22) 60.2 (0.20)  66.2 (0.14)  64.9 (0.14)
Structure of the economy
Value added by sector (% of total value added in the 
economy) Statistical Yearbook 
   Industry 22.8 21.6 21.9 21.1 20.7 20.7 20.7 19.8 19.4 19.2 18.9
   Services 68.6 70.0 70.3 71.9 71.2 71.9 72.2 73.3 73.8 74.2 74.6
   Agriculture 8.6 8.4 7.8 7.9 8.1 7.4 7.1 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.5Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Value added by sector - annual growth rates
CBS 2005. Quarterly Gross 
Value Added And Gross 
Domestic Product, at current 
prices, 
http://www.dzs.hr/hrv/priopce
nja/PrFrameH.htm since 2000, yearly current prices
   Industry 6.4 18.5 16.1 15.2 7 11.3
   Services 3.2 0 6.9 11 8.1 7.5
   Agriculture (-2.3) 11.1 4.4 1.7 5.9 3
Private sector share in: gross value added. 
employment. investments. imports and exports by 
sectors
share in employment EBRD: Transition report % 48 53 54 54 58 60 60 60 60 60.0. 60
share in GDP EBRD: Transition report % 4 05 05 55 56 06 06 06 06 57 57 5
Financial sector
EBRD index of banking reform  EBRD: Transition report 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.7 4 4
EBRD index of reform of non-banking financial 
institutions EBRD: Transition report 2 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
Interest rate spread (GCR)
Croatian National Bank www-
hnb.hr 16.93 11.13 10.63 8.3 6.32 11.2 10.05 9.87 9.58
Domestic credit and loans as share of GDP (including 
consumer loans and mortgages) EBRD: Transition report 22.9 21.4 25.3 26.6 22.1 27.8 33.7 44 48.5 52.1 :
Education
enrolment rates at various stages of formal education Central Bureau of Statistics
Although different data are publised 
about enrolment rates beacuse of the 
unrealiable source the Central Bureau 
of Statistics does not calculate them 
and provided only data for the school 
year 2004/2005. 
   in primary education %
       total - net enrolment 92.2
       total - gross enrolment 95.8
   in secondary education
       total - net enrolment 78.9
       total - gross enrolment 87.8Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Regional labour market
Unemployment rate  by county
Analytical Bulletin No. 4 from 
2004 from the Croatian 
Employment Services, 
Croatian Bureau of Statistics 
Unemployment rate is calculated as 
unemployed /employed and 
unemployed. The total number of 
employed includes persons employed 
in legal entities and by natural persons, 
craftsmen and free lance professions, 
as well as farmers. 
Zagreb 16.9
Krapina-Zagorje  14.6
Sisak-Moslavina   30.9
Karlovac 26.4
Varaždin 14.6
Koprivnica-Križevci 16.7
Bjelovar-Bilogora 24.2
Primorje-Gorski kotar 12.7
Lika-Senj 21.7
Virovitica-Podravina 28.9
Požega-Slavonia 20.0
Brod-Posavina 29.1
Zadar 20.7
Osijek-Baranja 26.7
Šibenik-Knin 26.8
Vukovar-Srijem 32.9
Split-Dalmatia 22.5
Istria 6.1
Dubrovnik-Neretva 15.9
Međimurje 16.1
City of Zagreb 7.8
Croatia  18.0Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
Annex 3.2: Demography
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Population structure by age and gender
Croatian Bureau of 
Statistics
total 4,501,000 4,554,000 4,381,000 4,439,600 4,443,200 4,441,800
female 2,338,000 2,365,000 2,276,000 2,302,600 2,304,700 2,304,100
male 2,163,000 2,189,000 2,105,000 2,137,000 2,138,500 2,137,700
<15 895,000 901,000 867,000 754,600 743,100 729,300
15-24 612,000 620,000 595,000 606,500 604,100 599,600
25-45 1,347,000 1,362,000 1,308,000 1,245,500 1,239,900 1,236,200
45-64 1,092,000 1,108,000 1,063,000 1,132,900 1,140,600 1,148,500
over 65 555,000 563,000 548,000 700,100 715,500 728,200
Fertility Council Of Europe
average age of mothers at first birth 25 25 25.2 25.4 25.4 25.5 25.7 25.9 26.1
Migration
Croatian Bureau of 
Statistics
total immigration 42,026 29,385 24,415 20,365 18,455 18,383
total emigration 15,413 5,953 7,488 11,767 6,534 6,812
Family structure and changes
Statistical Yearbook of the 
Republic of Croatia 2004 + 
Census Data 2001 % 1991
average family size 3.2 3.1
single households 17.8 20.8
single-parent households 12.4 15.0
couples with no children 27.1 27.0Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
source notes
Ethnic minorities 1991
ethnic structure of the population; % of total 
population
Croatian Bureau of 
Statistics, Census data 
Croats 78.10 89.63
Albanians 0.25 0.34
Austrians 0.00 0.01
Bosnians
In 1991 the ethnic category 
"Bosnians" did not exist (in 
the 1991 Census they declared 
as Muslims and are under 
category "other") . 0.47
Bulgarians 0.01 0.01
Montenegrins 0.20 0.11
Czechs 0.27 0.24
Hungarians 0.47 0.37
Macedonians 0.13 0.10
Germans 0.06 0.07
Polish 0.01 0.01
Roma 0.14 0.21
Romanians 0.02 0.01
Russians 0.01 0.02
Ruthenians 0.07 0.05
Slovaks 0.12 0.11
Slovenians 0.47 0.30
Serbs 12.16 4.54
Italians 0.45 0.44
Turks 0.01 0.01
Ukrainians 0.05 0.04
Vlachs 0.00 0.00
Jews 0.01 0.01
Other 3.19 0.49
Ethnically uncommitted 2.48 2.01
Unknown 1.32 0.41
Total 100 100Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
source notes
Projections - 4 scenarios
Gelo, J., Akrap, A., Čipin, 
I. (2005) Basic 
Characteristics of 
Demographic Development 
of Croatia (In Croatian 
language). Zagreb: 
Minsitry of Family, 
Defenders and Inter-
Generational Solidarity. 
2000 2010 2025 2050
Total population-medium fertility (with 
migrations) 4,207,689 4,101,146 3,918,436 3,677,585
Total population-medium fertility (without 
migrations) 4,207,689 4  101 146 3,822,549 3,135,441
Total population-low fertility  4,207,689 4,095,824 3,789,195 3,012,362
Total population-high fertility  4,207,689 4,109,128 3,939,785 3,683,541
Total population - constant fertility 4,207,689 4,098,078 3,842,405 3,239,197
2000-2004 2010-2014 2025-2029 2050-2054
Medium fertility 1.44 1.48 1.33 1.4
Low fertility 1.44 1.4 1.25 1.1
High fertility 1.44 1.6 1.85 2.1
Constant fertility 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.47Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
Annex 3.3: Living conditions
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Income distribution
Laeken indicators
Gini coefficient
Croatian Bureau of 
Statistics 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29
Early school leavers not in education or training Eurostat 8.3 8.4 6.2
Persons with low educational attainment Eurostat 30.4 30.2 28.6
Access to goods and services
"Poverty Monitoring 
Study" carried out by 
Croatian Caritas nad 
Centre for the promotion 
Catholic Social Teaching 
(2004)
percentage of households having electricity 98.8
percentage of households connected to the gas pipe 40.1
percentage of households with improved water source 92.8
percentage of households with improved sanitation 76.5
percentage of households having a home telephone 91.9
percentage of households with internet access
www.gfk.hr/press/trado2.
htm 29 29Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
Annex 3.4: Tax-benefit general
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Exchange rate (average annual exchange rate of national currency
to euro) Croatian National Bank 6.76 6.81 6.96 7.14 7.58 7.64 7.47 7.41 7.56 7.5 7.4
Social protection provisions
old-age Croatian Pension Institute 
Old-age and anticipatory 
pensions are included
number of beneficiaries, total 442,985 457,554 477,544 495,677 518,039 531,483 539,650 546,606 553,985 556,748
number of beneficiaries, female 262,593 268,472
number of beneficiaries, male 284,013 285,513
coverage
Croatian Pension Institute and
Croatian Bureau of Statistics
For the 1999-2001 period 
the number of persons over 
64 is from the Census 2001, 
while for 2004 it is from the 
estimate for 2003 (see 
Demography) 74.0 75.9 77.1 76.4 76.1 76.5
average benefit in local currency 1,475 1,554 1,793 1,841 1,889 1,947 2,023
average benefit in euro 195 203 240 248 250 260 273
average benefit as percentage of average net wag 48.3 46.7 50.6 49.5 47.9 46.7 46.2
number of new beneficiaries, tota 28,980 20,359 21,271 30,614 31,671 28,624 25,091 24,764 23,742 18,996
number of new beneficiaries, female 11,800
number of new beneficiaries, male 11,942
average benefit of new beneficiaries in local currenc 1,327 1,460 1,578 1,634 1,463 1,383
average benefit of new beneficiaries in euro 175 191 211 221 194 184
average benefit of new beneficiaries as percentage of average ne
wage 43.4 43.9 44.6 43.9 37.1 33.1
disability Croatian Pension Institute 
Only disability pensions are 
included (without pension 
benefits of Croatian 
defenders)
number of beneficiaries, total 190,231 191,425 198,021 201,152 235,400 237,497 237,614 235,538 236,132 238,165
number of beneficiaries, female 90,361 90,154
number of beneficiaries, male 145,177 145,978
average benefit in local currency 1,173 1,235 1,395 1,430 1,502 1,559 1,619
average benefit in euro 155 162 187 193 199 208 219
average benefit as percentage of average net wag 38.4 37.1 39.4 38.4 38.1 37.4 37
number of new beneficiaries, tota 16,154 9,667 7,041 14,234 37,112 2,675 3,406 4,196 7,188 6,948
number of new beneficiaries, female 2,063
number of new beneficiaries, male 5,125
survivors Croatian Pension Institute 
Without survivor's benefits 
of Croatian defenders. 
number of beneficiaries, total 190,981 191,608 198,809 206,477 210,293 213,003 216,696 219,282 224,264 227,369
number of beneficiaries, female 180,247 186,012
number of beneficiaries, male 39,035 38,252
average benefit in local currency 1,120 1,183 1,366 1,411 1,452 1,503 1,572
average benefit in euro 148 155 183 190 192 200 212
average benefit as percentage of average net wag 36.7 35.6 38.6 37.9 36.9 36.0 35.9
number of new beneficiaries, tota 13,821 12,785 13,265 13,590 14,734 14,569Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
unemployment
number of beneficiaries, totalCroatian Employment Service 36,183 52,912 55,171 44,779 54,257 63,396 70,369 80,795 67,977 70,467 72,801
number of beneficiaries, femaleCroatian Employment Service 10,269 14,756 18,562 21,493 28,932 35,075 40,595 43,985 40,204 42,385 42,370
number of beneficiaries, maleCroatian Employment Service 25,914 38,156 36,609 23,286 25,325 28,321 29,774 36,810 27,773 28,082 30,431
average benefit in local currencyCroatian Employment Service 618 672 802 830 836 853 866 891 937 996 988
average benefit in euroCroatian Employment Service 91.4 98.7 115.2 116.2 110.3 111.6 115.9 120.2 123.9 132.8 133.5
average benefit as percentage of average net wageCroatian Employment Service 34 33.1 33.7 30.9 27.4 25.7 24.4 24 23.8 23.9 22.6
Public social expenditure
consolidated general government expenditure in local currency  Ministry of finance
consolidated central 
government + 
unconsolidated local 
government
thousand 
HRK 40,661,953 43,842,878 45,303,770 46,989,413 49,752,094
consolidated general government expenditure as percentage of 
GDP Ministry of finance
consolidated central 
government + 
unconsolidated local 
government 26.7 26.5 25.0 23.7 23.4
family and children
number of cases, total
sum of annual number of 
beneficiaries of 4 benefits 
(below) 498,865 496,929 656,404 595,966 591,875 580,139 558,217
total expenditures
total annual expenditures on 
4 benefits (below) 2,493,074,266 2,622,421,045 3,563,991,415 2,600,431,012 2,454,311,202 2,598,839,166 2,796,118,009
Child allowance
number of beneficiaries, totalCroatian Pension Institute  average number of children 378,303 377,743 546,200 494,371 487,627 462,915 439,616
average benefit in local currencyCroatian Pension Institute  237 262 369 285 265 267 271
average benefit in euroCroatian Pension Institute  31 34 49 38 35 36 37
mandatory maternity benefit up to 6 months
number of beneficiaries, total
Croatian Institute for Health 
Insurance  25,735 28,858 38,412 32,648 32,681 32,615 30,562 29,370 30,697 32,807 33,297
average benefit in local currency
Croatian Institute for Health 
Insurance  1,392 1,766 1,829 2,316 2,397 2,623 2,751 3,039 2,956 3,095 3,326
average benefit in euro
Croatian Institute for Health 
Insurance  206 259 263 324 316 343 368 410 391 413 449
additional (non-mandatory) maternity benefit
It refers to maternity 
benefits from 6 months to 1 
or 3 years, benefits to foster 
parents, salary 
compensation to a part-time 
employed parent 
number of beneficiaries, total
Croatian Institute for Health 
Insurance  23,167 38,183 51,530 44,835 43,990 44,273 39,448 33,558 32,605 44,677 43,936
total expenditure on additional benefit in local currency
Croatian Institute for Health 
Insurance  295,657,932 568,555,134 711,222,098 824,607,638 887,470,632 863,976,903 586,297,603 321,562,492 306,248,790 452,387,116 645,751,365Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
provision of necessary items for newborn babies
number of beneficiaries, total
Croatian Institute for Health 
Insurance  41,499 42,245 44,540 46,489 43,891 42,298 40,194 38,667 38,946 39,740 41,368
average benefit in local currency
Croatian Institute for Health 
Insurance  1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360
average benefit in euro
Croatian Institute for Health 
Insurance  201 200 195 190 179 178 182 184 180 181 184
Taxation
composition of total tax revenues by source
Ministry of finance, Annual 
Report, www.mfin.hr
real amount, for 2006 
estimation
million 
HRK
labour 3,114 3,128 3,106 3,448
capital 3,074 3,131 3,950 4,008
consumption 36,651 38,602 41,323 46,549
tax wedge size and structure
employees' contributions 12,334 13,139 13,857 16,930
employers' contributions 14,323 15,737 16,695 16,697
employees' contributions versus employers' contributions in % 86.1 83.5 83.0 101.4
share of contribution revenues to total expenses in social security
funds
contribution revenues 27,416 29,477 31,301 33,627
total expenses 36,204 39,730 41,358 43,206
share of contribution in % 75.7 74.2 75.7 77.8
revenues by source
employers' contributions 14,323 15,737 16,695 16,697
contributions by protected person 759 600 748 0
transfer from governmen 8,788 10,253 10,057 9,579Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
Annex 3.5: Tax-benefit ESSPROS
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Aggregate social expenditure in local currency, ESSPROSS classification
Expenditures on 
There are no official data based on ESSPROSS classification. 
These data are author's calculations based on ILO-Social 
Security Inquiry.
sickness/health care 13,494,264,014
disability Benefits to Croatian defenders are included 6,360,163,727
old age
Elderly disabled persons are under the function "disability", and 
elderly survivors are under survivors' function 13,358,313,393
survivors Benefits to Croatian defenders are included 5,358,024,680
family
This function comprises: child allowance, maternity benefits, one-
off payment for newborn babies. Costs of child day care services 
are not included because they are in competence of local (city) 
authorities. 1,993,402,381
unemployment
Included: unemployment benefits and other benefits to 
unemployed people. 766,000,100Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
Annex 3.6: Tax-benefit IMF1986
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Aggregate social expenditure in local currency, IMF Government Finance Statistics 1986 classification
Expenditures on … by consolidated 
general government Ministry of finance
Consolidated central 
government + 
unconsolidated local 
government
health
thousand 
HRK 11,476,579 11,921,296 12,207,651 12,781,932 14,083,679
social security and welfare affairs 
and services, of which …
thousand 
HRK 29,185,374 31,921,582 33,096,119 34,207,481 35,668,415
social security
thousand 
HRK 25,235,842 27,934,329 28,972,781 27,540,540 28,936,557
welfare
thousand 
HRK 3,167,532 3,253,873 3,196,790 5,441,117 5,540,109
other
thousand 
HRK 782,000 733,380 926,547 1,225,824 1,191,749
Expenditures on … by central 
government Ministry of finance
health
thousand 
HRK 11,401,000 11,815,560 11,731,070 12,240,969 13,581,958
social security and welfare affairs 
and services, of which …
thousand 
HRK 28,929,000 31,609,730 32,609,510 33,669,283 35,025,631
social security
thousand 
HRK 25,130,000 27,813,740 28,755,123 27,311,421 28,726,082
welfare
thousand 
HRK 3,017,000 3,062,610 3,060,367 5,282,274 5,311,497
other
thousand 
HRK 782,000 733,380 794,019 1,075,588 988,052
… of which expenditures on … by 
social security funds Ministry of finance
health
thousand 
HRK 11,103,000 11,547,000 1,285,410 919,341 862,208
social security and welfare affairs 
and services, of which …
thousand 
HRK 25,130,000 17,010,000 1,838,791 2,020,698 754,822
social security
thousand 
HRK 25,130,000 17,010,000 1,329,300 1,472,945 205,014
welfare
thousand 
HRK 0 0 0 13,910 3,408
other
thousand 
HRK 0 0 509,491 533,843 546,400
Expenditures on … by local 
governments Ministry of finance
health
thousand 
HRK 75,579 105,736 476,581 540,963 501,721
social security and welfare affairs 
and services, of which …
thousand 
HRK 256,374 311,852 486,609 538,198 642,784
social security
thousand 
HRK 105,842 120,589 217,658 229,119 210,475
welfare
thousand 
HRK 150,532 191,263 136,423 158,843 228,612
other
thousand 
HRK 0 0 132,528 150,236 203,697Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
Annex 3.7: Governance
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Government effectiveness
World Bank - Governance & 
Anti-Corruption
World Bank Governance Matters indices on
government effectiveness 54.2 69.9 60.2 66.2 64.9
regulatory quality 44.8 60.9 59.9 62.2 58.1
rule of law 32.5 59.5 60.4 57.7 55.6
Social protection performance in old-age pensions
covered wage bill/wage bill
Croatian Pension Institute and 
Croatian Bureau of Statisics
Actual wage bill is obtained by 
multiplying average gross earnings in 
legal entities with average number of 
employees in legal entities and crafts 
(individual farmers are excluded). We 
take the average wage to be the 
average contribution base for all 
groups of insured persons. 
Contributions for I. and II. pillar of 
pension insurance are included 
(mandatory pension insurance based 
on generational solidarity + mandatory 
pension insurance based on individual 
capitalized savings). 90.9
level of administrative costs Croatian Pension Institute
as percentage of total pension 
expenditures (included personnel 
costs) 2.6
percentage of personnel cost Croatian Pension Institute
as percentage of total pension 
expenditures 1.3
Administrative barriers to firm entry/exit World Bank - Doing Business
number of procedures of starting a business 12
duration of starting a business in days 49
cost of starting a business as % of per capita GNI 13.4
time required for closing a business in years 3.1
cost of closing a business as % of estate 14
recovery rate 28.5Annex 3 | Croatia - other indicators
Annex 3.8: Croatian defenders
source notes unit 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Croatian defenders: pension benefits
disability pension Croatian Pension Institute
number of beneficiaries, total 18,741 21,360 25,766
average benefit in local currency 4,671 4,764 4,799 4,643 4,661 4,910 5,009
average benefit in euro 616 624 642 627 617 655 677
average benefit as percentage of average net wage 152.9 143.2 135.6 124.8 118.3 117.7 114.5
survivors pension Croatian Pension Institute
number of beneficiaries, total 11,760 12,097 12,123
average benefit in local currency 5,878 5,925 5,661 5,403 5,583 5,818 6,616
average benefit in euro 775 776 758 729 738 776 894
average benefit as percentage of average net wage 192.4 178.1 159.9 145.2 141.7 139.4 151.2
Temporary benefit to defenders who have been waiting for 
final decision about their disability pension.    Croatian Pension Institute
number of beneficiaries, total 7,601 7,079 5,814
average benefit in local currency 3,520 3,597 3,873
average benefit in euro 466 480 523
average benefit as percentage of average net wage 89.3 86.2 88.5
total expenditure on defenders in local currency
Croatian Pension Institute, 
Ministry of finance and 
Ministry of family, 
defenders and 
intergenerational solidarity 
thousand 
HRK 2,070,440 2,634,346 2,788,473 3,431,578 3,757,880
...of which expenditures on benefits
thousand 
HRK 2,016,865 2,516,385 2,691,982
total expenditure on defenders as percentage of GDP 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6
total expenditure on defenders as percentage of total 
public social expenditure 4.7 5.8 5.9About ENEPRI 
he European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) is composed of leading 
socio-economic research institutes in practically all EU member states and candidate countries that 
are committed to working together to develop and consolidate a European agenda of research. 
ENEPRI was launched in 2000 by the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), which 
provides overall coordination for the initiative.  
While the European construction has made gigantic steps forward in the recent past, the European 
dimension of research seems to have been overlooked. The provision of economic analysis at the 
European level, however, is a fundamental prerequisite to the successful understanding of the 
achievements and challenges that lie ahead. ENEPRI aims to fill this gap by pooling the research efforts 
of its different member institutes in their respective areas of specialisation and to encourage an explicit 
European-wide approach. 
 
ENEPRI is composed of the following member institutes: 
CASE  Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw, Poland 
CEE  Center for Economics and Econometrics, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey 
CEPII  Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales, Paris, France 
CEPS  Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, Belgium 
CERGE-EI  Centre for Economic Research and Graduated Education, Charles University, Prague, 
Czech Republic 
CPB  Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, The Hague, The Netherlands 
DIW  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin, Germany 
ESRI  Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
ETLA  Research Institute for the Finnish Economy, Helsinki, Finland 
FEDEA  Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada, Madrid, Spain 
FPB  Federal Planning Bureau, Brussels, Belgium 
IE-BAS  Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Bratislava, Slovakia 
IER  Institute for Economic Research, Ljubljana, Slovenia 
IHS  Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, Austria 
ISAE  Istituto di Studi e Analisi Economica, Rome, Italy 
NIER  National Institute of Economic Research, Stockholm, Sweden 
NIESR  National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London, UK 
NOBE  Niezalezny Osrodek Bana Ekonomicznych, Lodz, Poland 
PRAXIS  Center for Policy Studies, Tallinn, Estonia 
RCEP  Romanian Centre for Economic Policies, Bucharest, Romania 
SSB    Research Department, Statistics Norway, Oslo, Norway 
SFI    Danish National Institute of Social Research, Copenhagen, Denmark 
TÁRKI  Social Research Centre Inc., Budapest, Hungary 
 
ENEPRI  publications include three series: Research Reports, which consist of papers presenting the 
findings and conclusions of research undertaken in the context of ENEPRI research projects; Working 
Papers, which constitute dissemination to a wider public of research undertaken and already published by 
ENEPRI partner institutes on their own account; and thirdly, Occasional Papers (closed series) containing 
a synthesis of the research presented at workshops organised during the first years of the network’s 
existence. 
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